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Abstract
During the last ten years, the impact of security concerns on the development and
exploration of distributed embedded systems never ceased to grow. This is mainly
related to the fact that these systems are increasingly interconnected and thus vul-
nerable to attacks, and that the economic interest in attacking them has simultane-
ously increased.
In such a context, requirement engineering methodologies and tools have be-
come necessary to take appropriate decisions regarding security early on. Security
requirements engineering should thus strongly support the elicitation and specifica-
tion of software security issues and solutions well before designers and developers
are committed to a particular implementation. However, and that is especially true
in embedded systems, security requirements should not be considered only as the
abstract expression of a set of properties independently from the system architecture
or from the threats and attacks that may occur. We believe this consideration is
of utmost importance for security requirements engineering to be the driving force
behind the design and implementation of a secure system.
We thus describe in this thesis a security engineering requirement methodology
depending upon a constant dialog between the design of system functions, the re-
quirements that are attached to them, the design and development of the system
architecture, and the assessment of the threats to system assets. Our approach in
particular relies on a knowledge-centric approach to security requirement engineer-
ing, applicable from the early phases of system conceptualization to the enforce-
ment of security requirements. Our methodology can be seen of as an iterative and
complementary co-design process between security requirements and the system ar-
chitecture. Its main goals are to identify, refine, and trace security requirements
with enough expressivity and precision to become a central element throughout the
lifecycle of a security architecture. We illustrate our approach with examples from
the automotive on-board system domain.

Résumé
Au cours des dix dernières années, l’impact des questions de sécurité sur le développe-
ment et la mise en oeuvre des systèmes embarqués distribués n’a jamais cessé de
croître. Ceci est principalement lié à l’interconnexion toujours plus importante de
ces systèmes qui les rend vulnérables aux attaques, ainsi qu’à l’intérêt économique
d’attaquer ces systèmes qui s’est simultanément accru.
Dans un tel contexte, méthodologies et outils d’ingénierie des exigences de sécu-
rité sont devenus indispensables pour prendre des décisions appropriées quant a` la
sécurité, et ce le plus tôt possible. L’ingénierie des exigences devrait donc fournir
une aide substantielle à l’explicitation et à la spécification des problèmes et solutions
de sécurité des logiciels bien avant que concepteurs et développeurs ne soient engagés
dans une implantation en particulier. Toutefois, et c’est particulièrement vrai dans
les systèmes embarqués, les exigences de sécurité ne doivent pas être considérées
seulement comme l’expression abstraite d’un ensemble de propriétés indépendam-
ment de l’architecture système ou des menaces et des attaques qui pourraient y
survenir. Nous estimons que cette considération est d’une importance capitale pour
faire de l’ingénierie des exigences un guide et un moteur de la conception et de la
mise en œuvre d’un système sécurisé.
Cette thèse décrit une méthodologie d’ingénierie des exigences qui s’appuie sur un
dialogue permanent entre la conception des fonctions du système, les exigences qui
leur sont attachées, la conception et le développement de l’architecture du système,
et l’évaluation des menaces qui pèsent sur ses composants. Notre approche s’appuie
en particulier sur une approche centrée sur les connaissances de l’ingénierie des
exigences de sécurité, applicable dès les premières phases de conception du système
jusqu’à la mise en application des exigences de sécurité dans l’implantation. Notre
méthodologie peut être considérée comme un processus itératif et complémentaire
de co-conception entre les exigences de sécurité et l’architecture du systéme. Ses
principaux objectifs sont l’identification, le raffinement et la traçabilité des exigences
de sécurité avec une expressivité et une précision suffisantes pour en faire un élément
central tout au long du cycle de vie d’une architecture de sécurité. Nous illustrons
notre approche par des exemples tirés de systèmes embarqués d’informatique de
bord pour l’automobile.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
Designing a secure system has always been a complex exercise. In practice, much
of the focus for designers and developers being on delivering a working system in
the first place; on the other hand, security concerns have long been considered only
in retrospect, especially after serious flaws are discovered. Security experts are thus
generally confronted with an existing system, whose architecture might actually
hamper the deployment of security mechanisms that would prevent the occurrence
of the attacks they envision. An approach that avoids these problems is the devel-
opment of a security architecture, which is security requirement-driven and which
describes a structured collaboration and interrelationship between the architecture
design and Security Requirements (SR) to support the long-term needs of the sys-
tem [138]. The purpose of security architecture traditionally is to bring into focus
the key areas of concern, highlighting the decision criteria and security context for
each system aspect that has direct or indirect value for a stakeholder. The con-
cept of security architecture encompasses various technical notions wherein security
is introduced at different levels of abstraction and based on different mechanisms.
Thorn et al. [145] described security architecture as "a cohesive security design,
which addresses the security requirements (e.g. authentication, authorization, etc.),
and in particular the risks of a particular environment/scenario, and specifies what
security controls are to be applied where". To this end, one of the key aspects of
security architecture as a tool for secure design is to provide a Security Require-
ment Engineering (SRE) framework by which more realistic and concrete SRs can
be identified and enforced.
From the embedded system viewpoint, this activity, SRE, becomes even more
challenging and more critical. These challenges stem from the tight relationship
between architecture design and its functional, and non-functional requirements as
well as their impact on one another. For instance, if the system architecture design
changes or evolve, the SRs should meet the new architecture design objectives. It
is especially true when these systems are an integral part of safety critical systems
such as automotive systems [129, 9]. This is related to Koscher et al. [80] statement,
"automotive systems need not only to be extremely reliable and defect free, but also
extremely resistant to the threats and exploitation of vulnerabilities". Specifically,
safety applications need to be secured against malicious attacks. Several research ac-
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tivities have described potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures in automotive
systems, e.g., [51, 14], which we are going to refer to in the rest of this thesis. With
some exceptions, most of these efforts consider SRs abstractly, only the require-
ment identification step, and are not aimed particularly at requirement refinement,
and requirement traceability properties. However, there are well-recognized SRE
approaches like KAOS [152] or UMLsec [69] that have already shown interesting re-
sults in the SRE domain to handle security concerns. Still, before considering these
approaches, we first have to make a clear distinction between what we mean by
embedded system and what are their functional, as well as non-functional security
concerns.
In general, embedded systems are defined as a combination of hardware and soft-
ware that form a part of some larger system and are generally designed to perform
some specific task. More precisely, what makes distributed embedded systems differ-
ent from general-purpose system are specific features: these systems are resource-
constrained in their capacities (and consequently in their defenses). They have
reliability and performance concerns, as well as real-time computing constraints.
Such systems are often portable or mobile, and they are easily accessible to adver-
saries at the physical layer. This accessibility has led to several new security attacks
in recent years [80, 163, 164]. For example, Koscher et al. [80] demonstrated the
ability to adversely control a wide range of automotive functions and completely
ignore driver input. These attacks were made by: simply accessing the On Board
Diagnostics (OBD-II) port and embedding malicious code into a car’s telematics
unit. This allows an adversary to virtually control various on-board functionalities
– including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand,
stopping the engine, and so on. In addition, the most important aspect of embedded
system as defined by Noergaard [100]:
". . . none of the elements within an embedded system works in a vacuum. Every
element within a device interacts with some other element in some fashion. Further-
more, externally visible characteristics of elements may differ given a different set of
other elements to work with. Without understanding the ’whys’ behind an element’s
provided functionality, performance, and so on, it would be difficult to determine
how the system would behave under a variety of circumstances in the real world".
From the security viewpoint, this definition implies that, for an embedded sys-
tem to be secure, every element as well as its interrelationships with other elements
at different abstraction levels (i.e., application, protocol level, middleware level, in-
frastructure level, storage level, and so on) must be secure. For example, Electric
Control Unit (ECU) can rely on a hardware security module to process crypto-
graphic operations; however, if the upper layers (i.e., middleware layer) handle this
authentication attribute differently and allow an adversary to fake these attributes
(i.e., authentication tickets), the overall security is broken. We will explain this
attack in more detail in Chapter 5. In particular, we can identify such security
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weaknesses and concerns by examining the subtle interactions and collaborations
between layers. Similarly, several approaches [79, 55, 164, 161] have shown that we
cannot solve embedded system security at a single level of abstraction. Therefore,
it is natural to develop a security requirements specification by focusing on distinct
characteristics of embedded systems and particularly considering a layered (modu-
lar) representation of an embedded system architecture, which will essentially help
us to develop modular security architecture. In this context, the current state of
the art approaches to SRE, like KAOS and UMLsec, are falling short in capturing
the core essence of the embedded system architectures. For instance, the KAOS
framework concentrates mainly on goal satisfaction and on the synthesis of behav-
ior models [151] and does not consider the system architecture of the system. For
instance, in KAOS framework it is difficult to capture and model an architecture,
and even less so multiple architectural layers. In contrast, UMLsec, which is a model
driven engineering approach, considers both the structural and behavioral aspects
of SRs. In essence, this approach considers that well formed requirements have al-
ready been elicited and refined down to the design level through the definition of the
normal behaviors of the system components. UMLsec more specifically focuses on
the refinement of those security requirements into security mechanisms. A detailed
analysis of these approaches as well as other scientific contributions in this domain
are presented in Section 2.2.
1.2 Thesis Contributions and Outline
In this dissertation we propose a Security Requirement Engineering (SRE) approach
that enables the design of security architecture for embedded systems. We in partic-
ular focus on security-related knowledge acquisition and management through the
definition of a SRE process that makes it possible to design a system that would
intrinsically be secure from its design on. Our approach is composed of three suc-
cessive parts.
1. AKnowledge-Centric Approach to Security Requirements Engineer-
ing: In the first phase of this dissertation, we present the main building blocks
of our proposed SRE methodology and discuss its integration with a system
engineering modeling language.
• In Chapter 2, we systematically analyze various sources such as security
standards, a set of methodologies representative of the current state of the
art approaches, in order to build a unified SRE methodology. The pro-
posed methodology demonstrates how the capabilities of different SRE
models and approaches can be integrated through a knowledge-centric
SRE process. In addition, we take the key concepts defined in these
approaches and build security ontologies for each concept in order to
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guide our SRE process with a knowledge base. This will make it possi-
ble to analyze different security concepts and enables a particular way of
structuring, reusing, and sharing security related knowledge base within
the SRE process. Although our proposed methodology is dedicated to
embedded systems, it is still flexible enough to be adapted to any general-
purpose system architecture like Service Oriented Architectures (SOA)
[115], and capable of producing accurate security requirements. The re-
sults are presented in [60].
• In Chapter 3, we first explore the capabilities of SysML, the System Mod-
eling Language [107] for supporting our knowledge-centric SRE method-
ology. The SysML is an OMG [106] standard for modeling system engi-
neering applications and has sufficient expressiveness to describe detailed
system design. However, a major obstacle toward the usage of SysML
is the lack of support from the security viewpoint. To take benefit from
the capabilities of SysML, we proposed several extensions to the SysML
semantics to integrate our security concepts. In particular, we have inte-
grated the security requirement and the security attack diagrams. More-
over, we enriched these diagrams with our proposed ontological concepts
such as a controlled vocabulary. The use of ontologies within modeling
languages offers a concrete opportunity to reason about the correctness
of these models. Furthermore, we implemented these capabilities into
the TTool [82] engine that also supports our extended SysML model for
defining security requirements and attack tree modeling. This tool read-
ily supports the iterative methodology that we advocate.
2. By Design Security Requirements Engineering: In the second part of
this dissertation, we present each activity of the Security Requirement En-
gineering Process (SREP) in more detail and explain how a security related
knowledge base is generated and shared among all activities.
• In order to illustrate the different parts of this thesis, we introduce in
Chapter 4 a running example used all along the thesis to explain our
proposals. The example is originating from the secure design of a vehic-
ular embedded system developed in the European project EVITA [117].
The case study has been developed for illustrating the secure firmware
update process.
• In Chapter 5, we address the problem of identifying security attacks and
vulnerabilities in the context of a multilayered system architecture, where
the security related information is generated, processed and stored at dif-
ferent layers. The idea is to extract the knowledge about different system
activities spread across and that corresponds to various system develop-
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ment activities, and to use this knowledge for security analysis purposes.
In particular, we use the knowledge bases relying upon different ontolo-
gies such as the system architecture ontology, the goal ontology, etc. to
analyze the security of the system and to specify how an adversary can
attack the system. Furthermore, the concept of a knowledge based attack
tree is brought in as the foundational graphical representation for attack
modeling.
• In Chapter 6, we illustrate the approach in the context of security require-
ments identification and refinement, and present a way to trace security
requirements. We describe first the security requirement identification
process, which makes use of the different knowledge bases produced in
different phases of the SREP. It enables us to discover security require-
ments from early system development stages and in relation to different
available knowledge bases. Then, we propose the concept of dependent
refinement model to address some shortcomings and limitations of exist-
ing approaches to SR refinement. Finally, we propose an approach for
tracing requirements in order to determine the source of requirements
and the reason about requirements existence. We in particular use our
extended SysML security requirement diagrams to model and share SR
related knowledge.
3. Security Requirements Enforcement: In the third and final part of this
dissertation, we handle SR enforcement issues and propose solutions for de-
signing and deploying cryptographic protocols and for enforcing access control
related security requirements.
• In Chapter 7, we propose an approach based on the use of cryptographic
key material protected with inexpensive hardware to build the firmware
flashing cryptographic protocol specification. We show how a root of
trust in hardware can sensibly be combined with software modules. These
modules and primitives have been applied to show how firmware updates
can be done securely and over-the-air, while respecting existing standards
and infrastructures. Despite the fact that a trusted platform model en-
tails certain constraints, such as the obligation to bind cryptographic keys
to a given boot configuration, we show how the protocols we presented
deal with the update of the platform reference registers during the boot
phase of an Electronic Control Unit – ECU.
• The final contribution of this thesis, in Chapter 8, is dedicated to the en-
forcement of access control related security requirements. We have pro-
posed and developed a policy decision module that is used to enforce var-
ious access control rules by deploying multiple policy enforcement points
at the different levels of system abstraction. We discuss how to design
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policy engines that implement an effective enforcement in such architec-
tures despite the complexity of the protocol stacks of on-board electronic
control units. It also evaluates how policies expressed in XACML can be
adapted to the efficiency requirements of the automotive environments
despite the limited computational power of those units and their network
bandwidth limitations.
Part I
A Knowledge-Centric Approach to
Security Requirements
Engineering

Chapter 2
Overview of Security
Requirements Engineering
Methodology
2.1 Introduction
A very important part in the security architecture design for the achievement of
secure systems is that known as security requirements engineering which provides
techniques, methods and standards for tackling this task in the system development
cycle. Security requirements engineering frameworks derive security requirements
(SR) using various security-specific concepts, borrowed from security engineering
paradigm [4]. For instance, security requirements stem from potential adversaries
that attempt to compromise the system [62]. Security goals [151] are another con-
cept in SR literature defined as a prescriptive statement of intent, which expresses
some security objective to be achieved by the system. In addition, security re-
quirements are derived from analysis of interactions and dependencies of system
models and the subjects of the attacks [69]. These different views capture a cer-
tain types of information and results in different types of SRs and security design
solutions. For example, some approaches [153, 93, 86, 141] evaluate system from
the behavioral perspective by building obstacle and threat models and exploring
resolutions, security requirements, to enrich and update the system behavior. In
approaches such as [69, 88, 45], security requirements are derived to focus on the
different aspects of the system from structural viewpoint. However, as previously
mentioned, the tight relationship between different architecture layers of an embed-
ded system requires the security engineers take the collaborative SRE approach into
consideration to extract and enforce security requirements. This requires that SRE
framework expand the analysis from the problem space to the solution space as well.
Nevertheless, security requirements are not just related to identification, and prior-
itization or refinement. Security requirement traceability is yet another important
issue: providing a rationale for the definition of finer-grain requirements is necessary
to understand whether a given requirement is still necessary if associated assump-
tions about the environment, an attacker, or even the system architecture change,
for instance. We need to fill a gap from requirement identification to requirement
enforcement, verification and to testing. Establishing relationships between require-
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ments and such later phases of engineering should thus receive appropriate support:
for instance, it should be possible to document the fact that some security mecha-
nism is introduced in order to satisfy one security requirement, or to point at some
test over the implementation in order to verify that it is compliant with the same
requirement. That is to say, security requirements probably constitute one of the
most abstract documentation of the expected system behavior. These requirements
should provide a specification that has to be satisfied at every subsequent stage of
the system: analysis, design, implementation, and validation/testing. This leads
to another important challenge for SRE to cope with inconsistent and incomplete
security requirements specifications.
In this chapter, we first start from reviewing and analyzing different approaches
to SRE and their strengths and weaknesses with respect to aforementioned design
objectives. In Section 2.3, we look at ontologies in the requirement engineering, how
and what benefits we can achieve by using the ontological concepts (i.e., knowledge
acquisition and management) in requirement engineering process. In Section 2.4, we
proceed to defining a unified SRE methodology for the use of ontologies in security
requirement engineering process. Section 2.4.2, presents security ontologies for each
security class identified in the SRE methodology, including design objectives, domain
and scope, and detail descriptions. In Section 2.5, general conclusions concerning
the functionality of security requirements engineering process are drawn.
2.2 The State of the Art SRE Approaches
This section reviews the existing approaches for eliciting, modeling, and analyzing
security requirements. The goal of this section is to investigate the capabilities as
well as shortcomings of the state of the art SRE approaches and to extract the core
artifacts defined in these approaches for driving security requirements. We study
how different approaches for deriving and expressing security requirements result in
different expressions of requirements.
2.2.1 Goal Oriented Approaches
Goal oriented approaches focus on the concept of a goal or objective for eliciting,
elaborating, structuring, specifying, and modifying security requirements. In this
category, we review two frameworks:
• KAOS [153]: was the first to feature a goal-oriented approach for modeling,
specifying, and analyzing requirements. KAOS is a requirement engineering
method concerned with the elaboration of the objectives to be achieved by
the system-to-be. In particular, KAOS takes into consideration that there are
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multiple stakeholders in and multiple views towards a system-to-be. These
views here do not refer to the differing views of the stakeholders, but to the
goal, object, agent, system operation, obstacle, and agent behavior models –
each model stands for a different view of the system as shown in Figure 2.1.
The main purpose of KAOS is to ensure that high-level goals are identified and
progressively refined into precise operational statements. Along this, various
alternative goals and responsibility assignments are considered until the most
satisfactory solution is chosen. KAOS extended to security has been intro-
duced in [151]. This approach extends an earlier framework on eliciting goals
and identifying potential obstacles to satisfying goals to security engineering.
The security obstacles are called anti-goals and are similar to the idea misuse
cases [141], which are the attackers goals and malicious obstacles to security
goals, set up by the attackers to threaten security goals. Anti-goals are refined
to form a threat tree, in which the leaf nodes are either software vulnerabilities
or anti-requirements.
Figure 2.1: KAOS security requirements metamodel (taken from [103])
All requirements in KAOS are written by default using semi-formal graphical
notations and, if needed, using formal notation. In [26], further features a for-
malization of KAOS requirements definitions using linear time temporal logic.
This representation makes use of generic refinement patterns to decompose
goals into a set of sub-goals. However, a major limitation of the approach
(and the framework) results from the fact that at the highest level of abstrac-
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tion, the system behavior is only characterized by focusing on a particular
functionality of subject/object of analysis. Thus, goals may be insufficient
for analyzing all the security concerns, especially when lower-level security
requirements have to deal with concrete details of the system architecture.
As pointed out in [45], it is required to incorporate approaches for reasoning
about the behavior of contexts and how that behavior contributes to satisfying
or violating security requirements. More precisely, since the output of SRE is
a set of required protection mechanisms and constraints on the system-to-be,
the need for building tight relationship between architecture design and secu-
rity requirements and impact of security mechanisms on other requirements is
absolutely imperative.
• Secure Tropos [93]: introduce extensions to Tropos [13] for incorporating
security concerns into the goal-oriented development process. Tropos defines
four requirement development phases in which each successive phase refines
the high level description from the previous phase to a lower level towards
implementation as shown in Figure 2.2. In this enhancement of Tropos, secu-
rity constraints, secure dependencies, threats, and security goals, tasks, and
resources are introduced and added to the Tropos modeling notation. In this
approach, secure entities are tagged with an "S" (see Legend in Figure 2.2) to
indicate those tasks, goals, and softgoals are security related. In particular,
security requirements are described as constraints on the functionalities. In
[90] security concerns are integrated into all phases of Tropos agent-oriented
methodology: from early and late requirements, and architecture and detailed
design. At the early requirements phase, Security Diagram is constructed and
security constraints are imposed to the stakeholders. During the late require-
ments stage, security constraints are imposed to the system-to-be in the Secu-
rity Diagram. The system is presented as one or more new actors, who have
a number of dependencies with the other actors of the organization. In the
architectural design stage, security constraints, secure entities that the new
actors introduce, and secure capabilities are identified and assigned to each
agent of the system. This approach follows a step-by-step refinement con-
struct, where goals are formulated at different levels of abstraction, ranging
from high-level, strategic concerns to low-level, technical concerns. However
one general concern about this framework is that it does not provide means for
propagating changes between the different levels of abstraction. For example,
if there is a change in a organizational model, which includes relevant actors
and their respective dependencies, there is no systematic way of relaying such
changes. A clear interaction relationship between the models would provide
a systematic way of propagating changes between the different models and
hence support maintaining security properties as requirements evolve.
Summary: In general, the goal-oriented approach is a natural way of expressing
security requirements that refine other more abstract security requirements.
While this is an important strength of that model, those approaches generally
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Figure 2.2: SecureTropos security requirement diagram view (taken from [113])
assume a rather static model of the system architecture. Another strength of
goal oriented approaches lies in their ability to capture dependencies between
security requirements; however, how those dependencies may evolve when se-
curity requirements are refined is generally ignored by those approaches, espe-
cially if the refinement is dictated by a refinement of the system architecture.
2.2.2 Model Oriented Approaches
In contrast to goal-oriented frameworks, the general concept of model-based ap-
proaches is underlined by the definition of architecture. Security requirements are
expressed through the architectural concepts described, at different levels of abstrac-
tion. In particular, those requirements arise in that approach from the identification
of security concerns about system components or the way they interact. We review
two model based approaches in the following.
• UMLsec [69]: is an extension to UML that allows expressing security rele-
vant information within UML diagrams. The main uses of such approach are
first, to encapsulate knowledge and make it available to developers in form of
a widely used design notation, and secondly, to provide formal evaluation to
check if the constraints associated with the UMLsec stereotypes are fulfilled in
a given specification. More precisely, UMLsec goal is to define a universal set
of stereotypes and tags that encapsulate security design knowledge to be used
as part of UML diagrams. In [71] combines the use of UMLsec modeling, Use
Case driven process, and goal trees to design the system along with modeling
functional and non-functional requirements respectfully. In this method, the
14
Chapter 2. Overview of Security Requirements Engineering
Methodology
goal tree is developed to record the result or reasons of design actions, which
are expressed in UMLsec diagrams. The security goals are refined in paral-
lel by giving more system details, such as UMLsec stereotypes or tag-values,
in design phases. However, UML is not a requirements engineering notation,
and the only diagram that focuses on the expected functionalities from the
users point of view is the use case diagram. The resulting models do not ex-
press attackers’ behavior, and threat description is limited to using the specific
stereotypes (i.e., Delete, Read, Insert) to changes a state of the subsystem.
Therefore, the usefulness of the modeling constructs is based on the expres-
siveness and comprehensiveness of the stereotypes. Moreover, UMLsec also
assumes that the system architecture is defined to a large extent. In essence,
the methodology considers that well formed requirements have already been
elicited and refined down to the design level as normal behaviors of the sys-
tem components as shown in Figure 2.3, and there exists some system design
to satisfy them. More precisely, UMLsec more specifically focuses on the re-
finement of those security requirements into security mechanisms and their
verification.
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Fig. 9 UML diagrams and UMLsec stereotypes in SecReq
Figure 2.3: UML diagrams and UMLsec stereotypes (taken from [54])
• SecureUML [88]: is another UML-based modeling language for the model-
driven development of secure, distributed systems based on the Unified Mod-
eling Language (UML). SecureUML takes advantage of Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) for specifying authorization constraints by defining a vocab-
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ulary for annotating UML-based models with information relevant to access
control. In particular, their approach focuses on embedding role-based ac-
cess control policies in UML class diagrams (see Figure 2.4) using a UML
profile. The UML profile defines a vocabulary for annotating class diagrams
with relevant access control information. From a SRE perspective, and quite
similarly to UMLsec, SecureUML focuses on a later phase of software develop-
ment than the goal oriented security requirement approaches. As can be seen
from SeureUML metamodel presented in Figure 2.4, the SecureUML method-
ology does not consider security goals, domain knowledge, potential attacks
and vulnerability analysis, and focus on only authorization constraints and
access control requirements. SecureUML does not consider SRs (in the sense
of SRs in the conceptual framework) elicitation, completeness of the set of
requirements, refinement, nor traceability and coflicts of requirements. Fur-
thermore, this approach does not provide a systematic way of building rela-
tionship between different security elements (i.e., high level security objectives
and security requirements, security attacks and security requirements), which
is an important aspect for designing security solution for embedded systems.
Thus, SecureUML can be considered as a notation to specify and design secure
software systems, rather than a SRE method.
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+constrainedElement 
/ 
Role 
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RoleAssignment 
Inheritance 
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ResourceType 
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0..* 1 
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0..* 
0..1 
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0..1 
Inheritance 
0..* 
Figure 2.4: SecureUML metamodel (taken from [88])
Summary: This discussion highlights a major limitation of the model-based ap-
proach to security requirement engineering in that it mainly intervenes in
relationship with the system architecture design and focuses on linking low-
level security requirements with security mechanisms that would satisfy them.
Conversely, this feature also depicts the main strength of this approach, which
is perfectly aligned with the fine grained design of embedded system architec-
ture.
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2.2.3 Problem Oriented Approaches
Problem oriented approaches to defining security requirements focus on the defini-
tion of threats and how security requirements can be extracted from their identifi-
cation. We review the following two approaches:
• Abuse Frames [86]: is based on the Jackson’s problem frames approach [68]
and is intended to analyze security problems in order to determine security
vulnerabilities and to derive security requirements. This approach introduces
the notion of anti-requirement (similar to the concept of an anti-goal [151])
to describe the behavior of a malicious user that can subvert an existing re-
quirement. The basic idea behind the definition of abuse frames is to bind the
scope of a security problem with anti-requirements in order to derive security
requirements. Such explicit and precise descriptions facilitate the identifica-
tion and analysis of threats, which in turn drive the elicitation and elaboration
of security requirements as shown in Figure 2.5. However, it does not provide
any specific techniques or approach to deal with security requirement refine-
ment as well as requirement traceability.
e is the machine 
to be built. The specification of the 
Security Machine—E2 and E3— 
represents the security measure to 
counteract attacks from the Attacker.
 phenomena 
SR 
Attacker
Security 
Machine 
E3
Asset 
E2 E1 
E3 
Figure 2.5: Abuse frame diagram (taken from [85])
• Misuse cases [141]: extend the traditional use case approach to also con-
sider misuse cases, which represent behavior not wanted in the system to be
developed. Misuse cases are initiated by misusers. A use case diagram (see
Figure 2.5) contains both, use cases and actors, as well as misuse cases and
misusers (notated in black color). Development of misuse cases allows the
identification of security attacks and associate security requirements during
application development. In [162], authors present a formal representation of
misuse cases and provide an intuitive way to executable misuse case model.
Although misuses cases are not entirely problem-oriented as they represent
aspect of both problems and solutions, they have become popular as a means
of representing security concerns in the early stages of software development.
However, they are limited by the fact that security attacks and requirements
are only analyzed and derive through use case specification. The completeness
of the security requirements analyzed through scenarios is not guaranteed as
other scenarios by which the security of a system could be exploited may be left
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out. Furthermore, the approach does not consider validation, verification, con-
flicting requirements, or the interaction of security and other non-functional
requirements.
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Figure 2.6: Use case diagram containing misusers and misuse cases (taken from
[141])
Summary: The main liability of those problem oriented approaches is that they
need both a very detailed description of the system architecture as well as a
detailed knowledge of known vulnerabilities that may be present at each of
the components of this architecture. While they fit well the needs of security
certification, in which the security properties expected from a system are as-
sessed, they are much less appropriate to the definition of a brand new secure
system.
2.2.4 Process Oriented Approaches
Process oriented approaches focus on the analysis of security requirements through-
out the system design. These approaches involve identification of threats and vul-
nerabilities, identification and exploration of security requirements for addressing
identified weaknesses, risk analysis, and the verification of security properties. The
SQUARE methodology is the most prominent proposal in this category:
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• SQUARE [91]: is a comprehensive methodology for SRE. Its aim is to
integrate SRE into software development processes [91]. SQUARE stresses
applicability in real software development projects and thus provides an or-
ganizational framework for carrying out SRE activities. It is assumed that
SQUARE is carried out jointly by requirements engineers as well as by the
stakeholders. The SQUARE methodology is composed of nine steps to pro-
vide a mean for electing, categorizing, and prioritizing security requirements
for information technology systems and related applications. However, the
definition of SRs in the SQUARE methodology considers requirements at the
system or software level. This definition does not consider the properties and
behavior of the context in which an application operates. According to [68],
a more concise definition of SRs should consider their context of operation
as satisfaction of a requirement is expressed in terms of the state changes in
the context. Moreover, the steps provide by the SQUARE methodology are
"waterfall model" in nature, and this does not make a provision for iterations
to revise SRs and support the evolution of a system [95]. Although SQUARE
claims to operator with software engineering activities, its main drawback may
originate from the lack of integration and consistency between those different
models from the point of view of SRs. Furthermore, SRs are described using
text-based description (see Table 2.1): this makes it even more difficult to
integrate SRs with other system models as well as to organize the set of SRs
into a description with different levels of complexity. Another disadvantage is
the lack of support for SR traceability making that approach not suitable for
complex systems.
Goal (s): The claimed identities of all users and client applications will be au-
thenticated before they are allowed access.
Protect from unauthorised attacks involving addition, modification,
deletion, or reply of data in network.
Category: Authentication
Requirement(s): AN-1) Authentication control mechanism shall be enforced in produc-
tion environment. Authentication control will be done on user name
and password or other user credentials.
No. AR-01
Misuse case: MC-01
Architectural Rec-
ommendation:
All shared drives on the network should enforce authentication poli-
cies.
Implementation
Choices:
In IIS 6/0, the IIS Manager contains a check box that permits the
Administrator to omit the user name and password. If no user name
and password are specified, IIS uses the requesting user credentials
when the Administrator is using an authentication method that can
perform delegation to authenticate to the remote share.
Table 2.1: SQUARE security requirement template (taken from [91])
Summary: This approach is interesting in that it comprehensively and consis-
tently combines different phases of requirement engineering like threat model,
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requirements elicitation, risk analysis, and requirement prioritization in order
to achieve a more precise and multi-facetted description of SRs. However,
the hard coding of a particular software development methodology also has
a strong impact on the SRs: the example of the SQUARE waterfall model
inadequacy illustrates, in particular, the need for an iterative approach in a
process oriented evaluation of SRs.
2.2.5 Conclusion
We have reviewed the state of the art approaches to SRE. The approaches have
been classified into goal-oriented, model-oriented, problem-oriented, and process-
oriented. Table 2.2 presents a summary of these approaches and brief summaries of
their main characteristics.
Conceptual Classifi-
cation
Security Require-
ment Approach
Security Specific Charateristics
Goal Oriented KAOS Elicitation of security goals to counter anti-goals
Secure Tropos Identification of malicious actor’s goals and plans, and
analysis of each actor’s security constraints.
Model Oriented UMLsec Refinement of security requirement into security mech-
anisms and their verification.
SecureUML Identification of authorization constraints
Problem Oriented Abuse Frames Identification of abuse frame concerns which need to
be addressed for an attack to succeed. Security re-
quirement for counteracting threats are expression a
problem frame.
Misuse cases Misuse cases to address which behavior is not wanted
in the system and associate security requirements dur-
ing application development.
Process Oriented SQUARE Misuse case, attack scenarios, goals, and elicitation of
security requirements from potential risks.
Table 2.2: Summary of security requirement engineering approaches
In general these approaches to SRE involve two main phases in their method-
ology/framework, namely (1) identification of security threats and (2) designing
mitigation strategies to remove the possibility of threats causing harm to assets. In
particular, most of these approaches consider different artifacts (i.e., goal, models,
system behavior, risk, etc.) for identification of security requirements at different
level of system conceptualization. However, as previously mentioned in the intro-
duction, challenges unique to embedded systems require an integrated approach to
SRE covering all aspects of embedded system design from architecture to implemen-
tation.
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2.3 The Role of Ontologies in RE
The above arguments motivated us to look at ontologies as a solution to overcome
the shortcomings and improve the state of the art approaches in this area. The main
objective of ontology is to define an explicit formal specification that try to elimi-
nate, or at least reduce, conceptual and terminological confusions in order to have a
shared interpretation about security terms and concepts. Also, it provides a way to
define dependencies and relationships among captured and stored knowledge. The
use of ontologies for precisely expressing and building requirement knowledge and
its relationships are under discussion since a long time ago [84, 12, 81, 127, 43]. The
key to these approaches appears to relate to the creation and maintenance of ontolo-
gies for requirements that can be easily updated and utilized in a systematic way.
These approaches addressed many diverse synergies between RE and ontologies and
raised issues that can be solved by the use ontologies such as, traceability, complete-
ness, consistency, unambiguous requirement specification, and managing evolution
of requirement. Building specifications (documentation) is seemingly the most com-
monly evaluated application of ontologies [36]. The purpose of using ontologies in
expressing requirement specification is to improve the structure of the document as
well as having a concise vocabulary of terms and concepts used during the documen-
tation. Notwithstanding, the requirement specification activity could additionally
be benefit from ontologies by developing intelligent tools for requirement annotation
that will for instance have capabilities for verifying validity of requirement specifi-
cation with respect to the developed requirements artifacts. Ontologies also offer
to have a clear semantic and interrelationships between different developed arti-
facts, and thus help in building requirement specification as intelligent knowledge
vocabulary [122]. Actually, great expressive power of ontologies helps us to achieve
several characteristics related to the semantics of a requirement specification (e.g.,
unambiguity, correctness, consistency, etc.).
The use of ontologies for checking requirement consistency as well as its partic-
ular support for managing the design rational for requirement engineering such as
traceability, and verification properties is probably one of the areas that have at-
tracted a lot of attention so far [140, 84, 166, 167]. One clear example is adapted by
Siegemund et al. [140], for checking consistency and completeness of goal oriented
requirement specification. They combined ontology consistency checking and rule
driven completeness checks to measure the validity and consistency of the require-
ment models. Similarly, Lin et al. [84] raised several issues regarding the requirement
specification that must address by requirement model such as traceability, complete-
ness, managing the evolution of requirement specification, etc. In response to issues,
they described an ontology driven solution for generating unambiguous, and precise
requirement specification that can be easily extendable and support dependencies
and relationships among requirements. Cranefield [23] promotes the synergy of on-
tologies and their association with software modeling languages such as UML. He
described an approach to take benefit from the use of ontological reasoning to reason
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over UML models. Given a lot of attention to model driven requirement engineer-
ing, ontologies are definitely a promising technology to reason about generated MDE
models and their dependencies in terms of interactions and collaborations. As well as
those mentioned above, ontologies could also be used to share and reuse requirement
[28, 155] related knowledge with other models that are relevant to requirements.
From the security engineering point of view, the development and usage of on-
tologies in different contexts and for many purposes ( i.e., risk assessment [30], threat
and vulnerability ontology, security management [146, 33], security protocol designs
[77], policy configuration [10], security requirements [73, 35, 33], etc.) has shown
the strength and capabilities of ontologies to build the non ambiguous definition of
terms representing the knowledge of the security. For instance, Fenz et al. [33],
proposed several security ontologies to structure the security related knowledge like
threat, assets, vulnerability, etc. However, this approach is only limited to knowl-
edge repository and does not consider how the knowledge is generated and shared
among different activities involved in the security engineering process. Tsoumas et
al. [146] present a security ontologies using OWL and proposed a security frame-
work in order to support security knowledge acquisition and management. Like
others, this approach is also limited to "what" part of security requirement engi-
neering then "how" the security requirement related knowledge is generated and
used. These approaches and methodologies are well recognized in security commu-
nities and already showed interesting results for some of the security requirement
engineering process ( i.e., threat, risk, etc.). However, as pointed out in [142], the
security ontologies vary a lot in the way they cover security aspects; the security
requirement design, integration, implementation and maintenance are almost the
dark side of security ontologies. In addition, none of these approaches analyze and
evaluate collaboration of security ontologies in different aspects of SRE by following
a comprehensive SDLC. Further exploration of semantic annotation mechanism of
security requirements, integration of ontologies and meta modeling architectures,
and a comprehensive security requirement engineering methodology, are some of
the biggest challenges conceding the aspects of security knowledge acquisition and
management.
2.4 Security Requirement Engineering Methodology
The goal of this section is to define security requirement engineering methodology,
describe typical security engineering development lifecycle, security classes used and
produced security metadata (i.e. the knowledge produced by each security class)
in each activity, their dependencies and interrelationships. Based on the discus-
sions, we define a unified methodology for the use of ontological concepts in security
requirement engineering process. More precisely, we aim at building SRE methodol-
ogy that is guided not only by a process but also knowledge about the each activity
within the process is also developed and shared among other activities. We start
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from defining security requirement engineering as an application context for ontolo-
gies, and proceed to defining a methodology that identified places in SREP where
ontologies can contribute to improve current state of security requirement engineer-
ing. In this context, we take the view these state of the art approaches are primarily
based on the same (small number of) artifacts. Our main intention is to identify
the core artifacts of the security requirement and harmonize them together. In this
context, we extracted the essence of the state of the art SRE models (cf. Literature
review presented in Section 2.2), the core artifacts, and then aligned them seman-
tically by defining ontology to construct a unified security requirement engineering
model. The essential artifacts that we identify as common to SRE models are: goals,
security attacks, system models (behavioral and structural), and use case oriented
models. We order these artifacts under the form of security classes where each class
is represented by ontology. We consequently have organized the structure of these
security classes in such a way that the security metadata produced by these security
classes, in different phases of SRE process, can be easily shared and reused among
different activities of the process. For example, security goal related metadata could
be used for identifying the system assets as well as this metadata could be used for
analyzing the security attacks and vulnerabilities. Figure 2.7, resumes the ontology-
driven security requirement engineering methodology.
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Figure 2.7: Ontology-driven security requirement engineering methodology
Our analysis have revealed that multiple SRE models can be expressed in terms
of the security ontologies and their associated relationships that we identify, that the
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degree of overlap amongst existing models is significant, and that many “novel” SRE
models can potentially be developed by simply combining and sharing knowledge of
these diverse models in systematic ways. Nevertheless, identifying a common SRE
model is also desirable because it allows for various general syntaxes, relationships
bindings and common semantics, to be developed in terms of the generic model,
which facilitates the sharing of SR at the different levels of abstraction. For example,
initially identified security requirements, through problem-oriented approaches, can
be fed to models like UMLsec, which focuses on the verification of these requirements
in terms of security mechanisms.
In a similar way, the output of goal-oriented approaches can be combined with
model driven engineering approaches to build the process-oriented approaches. This
is the case of SQUARE methodology, where SRE process starts with identifying the
goals and then defining system architecture in order to identify requirements. Thus,
we can facilitate collaboration of SRE models (e.g., mutual understanding among
diverse models collaborating in RE process, especially in the context of system-wide
security engineering). However, the major obstacle in having such a collaborative
approach is that none of these SRE approaches usually allow for using different
approaches collaboratively, since they are mainly constrained by the modeling lan-
guages and tools they use. Recognizing this problem, we decided to use the SysML,
The System Modeling Language [107], which promotes cohesiveness between the
models generated during different phases of system engineering and creates a shared
understanding from multiple dimensions [50]. The SysML standard supports: "the
specification, analysis, design, verification and validation of a broad range of systems
and systems-of-systems"[107]. Although all of these feasters of SysML demonstrate
many capabilities to different aspects of system engineering, none of them analyze
and evaluated applications of SRE. In this context, we have proposed several ex-
tensions to SysML in order to integrate security aspects along with other system
wide development activities. The central point of these extensions is to utilize the
system engineering models along with the SRE and the associated security aspects
(i.e., verification, testing, etc.) in a single viewpoint.
In order to make this chapter lighter, we only give an overview of knowledge
driven security requirement engineering process and its associated security ontologies
to which we are going to refer in the rest of the thesis. Other important features of
our methodology are presented in the next chapter, namely the modeling language,
SysML, and its support for our Knowledge-Centric SRE Process.
2.4.1 Knowledge-Centric SRE Process
In this section, we first introduce the knowledge driven security requirement en-
gineering process (SREP) whose focus seeks to identify SR from the early design
phases of the system conceptualization. Instead of following the general approaches
like waterfall style [20], we build our SREP on the definition of iterative an in-
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cremental construction of the security requirement specification. Then, we define
security ontologies for each security class used during the SREP. The SREP is artic-
ulated into seven activities, which are iteratively performed throughout the system
conceptualization, although with different focus depending on where the iteration is
situated within the system development lifecycle. These activities are as follow:
1. Agree on Definitions: The first activity in the SREP is to define and to
agree upon a common set of security terms and definitions. It helps to build
a common knowledge base for the experts (i.e., system engineer, risk experts,
security experts, verification and testing teams, etc.) involved at different
stages of system development life cycle. The introduction of, as well as the
agreement on some general terms and principles of IT security within a given
RE process has proven to be very beneficial for all system wide activities:
analysis, design, implementation, and validation/testing [62]. We may use
the security terms and definitions mainly defined in security standards (i.e.,
ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 17799:2005, or ISO/IEC 27002:2005, etc.) to build a
common knowledge base in order to bridge a potential miscommunication gap
across different SRE phases. Appendix A, presents how some of the security
terms are generally defined and understood in this thesis.
2. Identify Security Goals: The purpose of this activity is for the stakeholders
to formally agrees on a set of concise and abstract statements of the intended
solution (goals) to the problem defined by the security problem definition
[20]. More precisely, goal captures stable information (correct behavior) and
provides means to distinguish between stable and unstable (malicious behav-
ior or anti-goals) information. Goals are usually identified by analyzing the
key operational capabilities of the system specified by the stakeholders, deter-
mined from the security policy of the organization, or analyzing the problems
and deficiencies in the system-as-is, as well as from legal requirements and
other functional constraints [151, 25]. For example, the high-level goal "avoid
updating firmware when vehicle is moving" is specified by having an interac-
tion between the security requirements engineering team and the stakeholders.
Once security goals are defined, they can be formally specified in the form of a
goal document. Typically, this document corresponds to functional and non-
functional aspects and range from high-level security goals to low-level ones
[151, 150]. To facilitate efficient collaboration and coordination of goals with
other SRE activities, we have defined the security goal ontology (cf. Section
2.4.2.1) in order to store, share, reuse, and manage goal knowledge base.
3. Identify System Assets: The purpose of this activity is to find all the sys-
tem assets and artifacts, and system behavior in the system context that has
direct or indirect value to the stakeholders. The importance of system assets
when coming to discovering security requirements as well as analyzing security
attacks and vulnerabilities is highlighted in many security specifications stan-
dards (ISO/IEC 15408:2009 ([62], sec. 3.1.2, 6.2), ISO/IEC 27000:2012 ([64],
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sec. 2.3), ISO/IEC 21827:2008 ([63], sec. 3.38), ISO/IEC 27002:2005 ([2], sec.
2.17), etc.) and model driven SRE approaches (i.e., SecureUML [70], UMLsec
[88]). Department of Defense [105] suggests the following definition of system
architecture: “an architecture framework provides a foundational framework
with guidance and rules for modeling, documenting, developing, understand-
ing, analyzing, using, and comparing architectures based on a common denom-
inator across a (virtual) development organization (i.e., value net)”. Therefore,
the system engineering approaches puts a lot of effort to the discipline known
as model-driven engineering (MDE) to allow model driven development of
system architecture.
We take into account the MDE approach composed of structural models as
well as behavioral models in order to determine the valuable and/or critical
system assets. The most important aspects for realizing a life cycle wide SR
are the interaction with involved artifacts and the evolution of the system
architecture [130]. One of the basic ideas of considering MDE, in SREP,
is that models help requirements analysts to understand complex software
compositions and identifying potential solutions through abstraction. Such
abstractions make it easier to understand how the system is evolving and how
it might be secured. This is because most of the information needed to express
security requirements are already defined and formalized by the design models
[88]. For this activity we also defined system architecture ontology (cf. Section
2.4.2.2). In particular, the objective of such synergy is to provide the system
engineers with reasoning services to reason over system models. In addition,
we can connect system models with other SRE activities. For instance, we
can combine goals (Step 2) and system architecture knowledge base to, first,
relate goals with system assets, and then reason about security aspects such
as if the goal is enough to protect the system assets, or there is a need to refine
goals or define more fine-grained goals. Actually, this allows us to combine
goal-oriented approaches with model driven engineering concepts.
4. Identify Threats and Security Vulnerability: This activity is concerned
primarily with identifying attack heuristics and addresses security weaknesses
(i.e., threats and security vulnerabilities) of the system that are exploitable by
an adversary. Security attacks can be identified from different sources. Figure
2.7, depict relationship of this activity with other SREP activities. Following
our objective for having a unified SRE model, we can consider any relation-
ship for identifying threats and vulnerabilities. For instance, the targeted by
relationship between security goal class and attack class allow us to identify
attacks on goals. From the goal oriented approaches viewpoint like the KAOS
[151], this relationship can be considered as an anti-goal model, where anti-
goals are identified either by simply negating the goals that are specified in
goal knowledge base, or linking with the adversary’s malicious goals. Sim-
ilarly, we can use the targeted by relationship between system architecture
class and attack class to identify attack on different system models including
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structural and behavior models. For example, during initial phases of system
conceptualization, we can use the use cases related knowledge base to identify
attacks on the system. For instance, specifying the misuse cases, like done in
the problem-oriented approaches [141]. Moreover, with the evolution of sys-
tem models and architecture design, we can apply more sophisticated security
analysis techniques (i.e., computational attack models [139] or Dolev-yao at-
tack model [29]) to identify threat and security vulnerability on these system
assets.
Security attacks are hard to understand, often expressed with unfriendly and
limited details, making it difficult for security experts and for security analysts
to create intelligible security specifications. For instance, to explain "Why"
(attack objective), "What" (i.e., system assets, goals, etc.), and "How" (attack
method), adversary achieved his attack goals. We introduced security attack
ontology (cf. Section 2.4.2.3), by taking into account security standards and
security dictionaries and deriving the features, in terms of classes and sub-
classes that were needed in such situations. Security attack ontology has been
designed to enable the specification of security attacks in a concise, readable,
and extensible way.
5. Risk Evaluation: The purpose of this activity in the SREP is to assess
whether the threats or security vulnerabilities are relevant according to the
security level specified by the security goals. In our approach, we estimate the
security risks based on the relevant threats, their likelihood/probability that
the threats will materialize as real attacks, any potential consequences on the
system assets or possible severity of an attack for the stakeholders, and the
resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization. To do so, we have
specified evaluated from relationships between risk class and other security
classes (see Figure 2.7). The objective of this relationship is to extract the
knowledge from different security classes and to build the risk metrics with
regards to the risk model. This will, later, allow us to infer and derive the
risk associated with different direct or indirect valuable system assets to the
stakeholders. For instance, by estimating the "severity" of the attack and
its possible outcome for the stakeholders, and the "probability" that such an
attack can be successfully mounted, etc.
6. Security Requirements Elicitation: This step is the core activity of the
SREP. Here, we aim at identifying SRs in relation to the different security
classes as defined in Figure 2.7. In particular, we put much emphasis on the
relationships between different security classes and their association with one
another for identification of SRs. Therefore, we consider two kinds of relation-
ships; (1) individual relationships and (2) collaborative relationships between
different classes to identify SRs. An individual relationship corresponds to
the situations where we can identify SRs by analyzing different knowledge
specified in the security class. For instance, use cases or goals also provide
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constraints and assumptions, such as performance constraints for the security
functions and may themselves suggest a number of security related user re-
quirements. For example, the information received from another entity needs
to be evaluated regarding security and trust (e.g. authenticity of data). In
contrast, we use collaborative relationships to identify SRs in relation to dif-
ferent security classes. For instance, relating goals and attacks (anti goals) to
identify requirements like done in KAOS, or following the model driven SRE
approaches where requirements are specified in order to protect system assets
from malicious threats and vulnerabilities, etc. The novelty of our approach
is that we do not restrict security engineer to identify SRs only by considering
specific constructs, but provide them detailed knowledge about different se-
curity classes as well as relationships between them to identify more concrete
and more realistic SRs. We will exemplify this in more detail in Chapter 6.
Of course, this activity also requires documenting and building well-structured
and well-understood requirement specification [61]. The IEEE 830 standard
recommended eight characteristics for specifying good software requirements
specifications, out of four are related to the semantics and documentation of
a requirement specification (e.g., unambiguity, correctness, consistency, and
Completeness). Following these recommendations and taking advantages of
expressing requirement in ontologies (cf. The role of ontologies in RE pre-
sented in Section 2.3), we have defined SR ontology in Section 2.4.2.4.
7. Categorize and Prioritize Requirements: The purpose of this activity
is to classify the requirements in two different categories based on the risk
analysis as well as on security needs. The initial set of requirements can
be organized into stakeholder-defined categories (i.e., essential, non-essential,
etc.) or we may use the security standards and specifications (i.e., ISO/IEC
15408:2009, ISO/IEC 18045, ISO/IEC 27000:2009, ISO/IEC 17799:2005, or
ISO/IEC 21827:2008, etc.) to determine and categorize SRs into security
functional components, for instance, we can map authentication related SR
into "Identification and authentication – FIA" class defined in Common Cri-
teria standard [1]. The SRs that are selected for inclusion in the design must
therefore be based on an objective assessment of potential threats and their
anticipated implications. As a result, SRs are categorized and prioritized
in a qualitative ranking in a way that the most important requirements are
handled first. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the fact that, during SR prioriti-
zation, some of the requirements may be deemed to be entirely unfeasible to
implement. SRs often conflicts and interact with other system requirements or
functional requirements. For instance, what is possible to do in a reasonable
timeframe or budget might conflict with what is required to implement and
enforce SRs. In this case, the security engineers have an option: completely
dismiss the SR from further consideration, or document and label the SR for
"future consideration".
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2.4.2 Security Ontologies
In this section, we define the security ontologies, modeled as OntologyWeb Language
[27], OWL classes, for each security class described in the previous section. The core
of the security ontology (see Figure 2.13) is the security sub-ontology, consisting of
the concepts (1) security goals, (2) system architecture, (3) security attacks, (4)
security requirements, and (5), security mechanisms, which were derived from well,
established information security standards and security dictionaries. Indeed, each
security ontology is defined as high-level knowledge repository for capturing, clas-
sifying and sharing security related information. With regards to our objective,
which is to reuse different ontologies and taxonomies vocabularies to structure and
organize the utmost security related knowledge, the high-level definition of onto-
logical classes offer interesting perspectives. Furthermore, our security ontologies
use a flexible and easily extendable structure: additional concepts can be included
without effort. Thus, in this section we also complements existing taxonomies as
well as ontologies that focus on building security knowledge.
2.4.2.1 Security Goal Ontology
In this section, we construct security goal ontology that captures an objective which
the system-to-be should meet in the form of security goals. Regarding the security
goal ontology design, we use the KAOS [151] catalog of goal patterns that generalize
the most common goal configurations. The structure of security goal ontology is
illustrated in Figure 4.3, where the main class called "Goal" has five subclasses
including AchieveGoal, AvoidGoal, SoftGoal, CeaseGoal, and MaintainGoal.
Figure 2.8: Security goal ontology
• AchieveGoal: Achieve goals specifies a property that the system will achieve
"some time in the future". More precisely, an Achieve goal describes intended
behaviors where some target condition must sooner or later hold whenever
some other condition holds in the current system state. For example, "authen-
ticity of service station must be ensured while performing firmware updates".
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• AvoidGoal: Avoid goals specifies a property that must not hold "at all times
in the future". In our approach, we consider Avoid goals as an adversary
"AchieveGoals". For example, "install malicious firmware" is an adversary
AchieveGoal, which we want to avoid in our system.
• SoftGoal: "Soft goals capture preferred behaviors; they are used to compare
alternative options" [21]. In particular, Soft goals are goals that do not have
a clear-cut criterion when they were formulated or whose satisfaction can be
subjective. They may be judged as satisfied or unsatisfied to different degrees
at different stages of system development. For example, "in-vehicle security
services must be offered with high availability".
• CeaseGoal: Cease goals disallow achievement "some time in the future".
More precisely, cease goals state that some target condition should not hold
in some (bounded) future state. For example, "prevent service station (adver-
sary) from closing the re-programming session, during the firmware installa-
tion phase".
• MaintainGoal: Maintain goals specify a property that must hold "at all
times in the future". For example, "all in-vehicle communication must be
handled in a secure manner".
2.4.2.2 System Architecture Ontology
System architecture ontology provides a detailed structuring that can be used as a
basis for describing how system assets interact and work together to achieve total
system goals. Regarding the security architecture ontology design, we have adapted
several classes (see marked classes in Figure 2.9.a) from more formal definitions
contained in ISO/IEC 42010:2007 [3] and defined an equivalent security architecture
ontology as shown in Figure 2.9.b. These classes are:
• System is a collection of assets organized to accomplish a specific goal or
set of goals. Following this definition, a system can be further classified into
system assets subclass.
– System Assets "are in the form of information that is stored, processed
and transmitted by or systems to meet requirements laid down by owners
of the information" [62]. Typically, the system assets can be classified
into data, software, hardware, etc. Nevertheless, the notion of system
assets in different domains is quite diverse. In order to give a complete
overview of the system, we can integrate system asset’s taxonomies (i.e.,
WAND Automotive Taxonomy [159], etc.) that describe different classes
as well as subclasses of assets involved in building system architecture.
• Architecture of a system is the system’s conceptualization, articulated in its
system assets, their relationships to each other and to the environment. In
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particular, it defines the structure, behavior, and more views of a system in
the form of conceptual models. Subsequently, each architecture concept can
be further categorized into several subclasses of systems architectures such as
functional architecture, logical architecture, technical architecture, etc.
• View represents a system from the perspective of a set of architecture related
concerns that are meaningful to one or more stakeholders in the system. Views
can be seen as the content of a viewpoint, i.e., a description or modeling
perspective used in defining the system architecture.
• Model represents the particular design of system architecture. We take into
account the MDE approach composed of conceptual models as well as logical
models in order to relate the valuable and/or critical system assets.
– Behavioral model: In the behavioral model the internal structure of a
system is neglected, and only its interaction over its system boundary to
its context is considered.
– Structural model: In the structural model the internal structure of a
system is described in terms of selecting, connecting and characteriz-
ing generic components, describing the way the system is connected to
its context and interacts, and decomposition into components or subsys-
tems.
Based on these two models, one may now start to reason about what is going
on within and beyond the system boundaries, i.e. what the effects of the
systems with respect to its environment are, and on the other side how the
system is internally structured, i.e. how the system behavior is reflected in
terms of the internal system behavior.
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(a) IEEE system architecture metamodel (b) Security architecture ontologys
Figure 2.9: IEEE system architecture metamodel [3]and its equivalent system architecture ontology
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2.4.2.3 Security Attack Ontology
The definition of a security attack ontology aims at building knowledge vocabu-
lary for security attacks that could be described including their type, mode, con-
sequences, and such details. Figure 2.10 sums up our analysis with respect to
extracting different constructs and concepts defined in well-known security stan-
dards (i.e., ISO/IEC 15408:2009, ISO/IEC 18045, ISO/IEC 27000: 2012, ISO/IEC
17799:2005, NIST SP-800:30, etc.) and security dictionaries (i.e., CVE, CAPEC,
OWASP, CLASP, etc.) in order to build the security attack ontology.
Figure 2.10: Security attack ontology
• Attack Type depicts an attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or
gain unauthorized access to make unauthorized use of system assets [64]. This
abstract level definition of attack type allows us to further categorize attacks
into the Threats and Vulnerabilities sub classes (see Figure 2.10). Information
security standards describe these two main dimensions of attack types in many
specifications. For example, threat terminology is described in the ISO/IEC
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15408:2009 ([62], sec. A.6.2) standard, ISO/IEC 27002:2005 ([2], sec. 2.16)
standard , and NIST SP 800-30 ([99], sec. 3.2) standard. In the scope of this
thesis, we use the threat terminology as defined in section 2.45 of ISO/IEC
27000:2012 [64].
– Threat: A threat is a "potential cause of an unwanted incident, which
may result in harm to a system or organization". In a certain sense,
here, we can use the attack patterns approach [18, 24] to categorize dif-
ferent kind of threats.
Instead, the vulnerability terminology is described in ISO/IEC 15408:
2009 ([62], sec. 3.5.7), ISO/IEC 27000:2009 ([64], sec. 2.46), ISO/IEC
21827:2008 ([63], sec. 3.38), ISO/IEC 27002:2005 ([2], sec. 2.17) and
in other security dictionaries OWASP [108], CVE [24], we use the one
described in CVE:
– Vulnerabilities: "An information security vulnerability is a mistake in
software that can be directly used by a hacker to gain access to a system or
network" [24]. Subsequently, we can use the CVE list to classify different
security vulnerabilities and their consequences on the system assets.
• Attack Consequences refers to an impact of security breach or outcomes
that are not the ones intended by a purposeful system action. The attack
consequences can be classified as:
– Usurpation is a derogatory term used to describe either a misappropria-
tion or misuse of the system functionalities.
– Disruption is an event, which causes an incapacitation, corruption, ob-
struction, and unplanned deviation from the expected system behavior,
according to the functional and non-functional objectives.
– Deception is defined as masquerade, falsification, and repudiation actions
taken by an adversary, to thereby causes a system to accept as true a
specific incorrect version of reality.
– Disclosure enables an adversary to gain valuable information about a
system and its functionalities either by exposure, interception, inference,
intrusion, etc. that tries to uncover the details of a system.
• Adversary: An adversary is a threat agent according to the following ISO/IEC
15408: 2009 ([62] sec. 3.1.71) and the ISO/IEC 21827:2008 ([63], sec. 3.35)
standards, who attempts to attack system assets that have value to the stake-
holders. An adversary may range from a very unskilled individual to an expert
or even to multiple dedicated groups. In order to anticipate and thwart the ex-
pected types of attacks, one must have a solid understanding of the adversary’s
perspective and his/her capabilities and know-how about attack potential. We
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consider different attack objectives and corresponding adversary profiles and
describe them as:
– Attack Objective: This class suggests particular types of adversary and
his capabilities, as well as associated attack motivation. At the abstract
level of specification attack motivations can be broadly categorized as:
∗ Individual Benefits: Personal advantages can be gained in different
ways and for different purposes. For instance, gain reputation as
hacker, financial gain fraudulent commercial transactions, etc.
∗ Economical Benefits: These motivations and underlying objectives
should be envisaged at an organizational scale.
∗ Political Benefits: The main goal of the attacker is to destroy the
reputation of an organization or an individual system asset. For
example, acquiring system design information or for the purposes of
fraud, industrial/state espionage or sabotage.
∗ Criminal Benefits: An augmentation of the attack motivation to
harm an individual for the purposes of criminal or terrorist activity,
destroy or financial harm, destructive attacks or intellectual property
attacks, etc.
– Adversary Profile: The adversary profile depicts the attack potential that
is a measure of the minimum effort to be expended in an attack to be
successful. In ISO/IEC 15408:2009 ([62], sec. 3.1.5) the attack potential
is defined as a "measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE,
expressed in terms of an adversary’s expertise, resources and motivation".
Essentially, the attack potential for an attack corresponds to the effort
required creating and carrying out the attack. The higher the adversary’s
motivation is the higher efforts they may be willing to exert. After having
performed a comparative analysis of several security specifications and
standards, we suggest the following abstract level taxonomy (see Figure
2.11) to be considered during an analysis of the attack potential:
∗ Elapsed Time: This is the total amount of time taken by an adver-
sary to identify that a particular potential vulnerability may exist,
to develop an attack method and to sustain the effort required for
mounting the attack.
∗ Expertise: This refers to the required level of general knowledge of
the underlying principles for mounting an attack (i.e., system archi-
tecture, security components, etc.), product types or attack methods.
∗ Location: This refers to the knowledge and the capabilities, which
an attacker may have, depending of his/her location; this is typically
reflected by the terminology for an Insider or Outsider attacker.
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Figure 2.11: Adversary taxonomy
For instance, insider attack agents are likely to have specific attack
objectives, potential, and have legitimate knowledge and access to
the system.
∗ Window of opportunity: This concept has a relationship with the
elapsed time factor. Identification and exploitation of vulnerability
may require considerable amounts of accesses to a system that may
increase the likelihood of detection of the attack. In contract, some
attack methods may require considerable effort off-line, and only brief
access to the target to exploit.
∗ IT hardware/software or other equipment: This refers to the equip-
ment required to identify and exploit vulnerability.
∗ Knowledge of the system under investigation: This refers to the spe-
cific expertise required in relation to the system under investigation.
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Though it is related to general expertise, it is distinct from it.
• Attack Mode: The attack mode refers to the actions ([62], sec. 3.1.1, A.6.2)
that an adversary takes during the execution of an attack and that can be
labeled as active or passive attacks:
– Attacks modifying the behavior of the system (active attacks).
– Attacks aiming at information retrieval without modifying the behavior
(Passive attacks).
• Attack Method: This class is related to the attack mode class. The attack
method can be classified into either functional (logical) attacks or physical
attack methods:
– Attacks physically modifying the behavior of the system (physical at-
tacks) and
– From the functional point of view, attacks aiming at logical manipulation
of information without physically modifying the system behavior.
• Attack Classification: The attack classification class is define to categorize
and systematically aggregated into a set of well-defined classes that provide a
comprehensive description of attacks and its objectives. A collection of ways,
including security dictionaries (i.e., CVE, CAPEC, OWASP, CLAP) can be
used to determine and cluster security attacks and vulnerabilities. However,
at the abstract level, we can classify security attacks into:
– Generic attack descriptions that represent a general class of security at-
tacks and vulnerabilities, which can be reused and adapted to any appli-
cation specific instantiation such as a birthday attack, a preimage attack,
a collision attack, etc.
– Domain Specific attacks and vulnerabilities depict the particular attack
objectives of an adversary and target specific assets (i.e., application,
middleware, infrastructure, and storage), and parameters of the system.
2.4.2.4 Security Requirements Ontology
In this section, we construct security requirement ontology with respect to the dif-
ferent constructs and concepts defined in well-known security requirements specifi-
cations and security standards (i.e., ISO/IEC 15408:2009, ISO/IEC 18045, ISO/IEC
27000:2009, etc.). The SRO, which is independent of the existing conceptual SRE
foundations, aims to detect the missing security construct in SR frameworks and fa-
cilitates their enhancement. The core classes and the concepts identified for security
requirements ontology, summarized in Fig. 2.12, are:
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Figure 2.12: Security requirement ontology
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• SR Type: This class is described to specify and distinguish more concretely
what kind of security requirements should be defined and implemented in order
to assure the security of a system and its data. These types are:
– Functional Security Requirements (FSR) are security services or security
capabilities that a systems or components must be able to perform. Put
simply, it describes a positive functional behavior related to specific se-
curity feature. Examples for FSR are authentication, authorization, in-
tegrity, and so on. Here, we can use the classification specified in ISO/IEC
15408:2009 (part 2 [1] ) in order to classify and map FSR into well-
structured security functional components (SF components).
– Non-Functional Security Requirements (NFSR) are typically security re-
quirements essentially stemming from attack mitigation. Typical exam-
ples for NFSR could be “password or key strength”, “system logs”, or
requirements derived from best practice standards.
• SR Classification: This class is defined to classify and systematically aggre-
gate requirements into a set of well-defined classes and functions of security
requirements that provide a comprehensive description of requirements and its
objectives. We can use collection of ways, including stakeholder-defined cate-
gories (i.e., essential, non-essential, architectural constraints, etc.) , or security
standards (i.e., ISO/IEC 15408:2009, ISO/IEC 18045, ISO/IEC 27000:2009,
etc.) to determine and cluster security requirements into security functional
components (SFC). However, at the abstract level, we can classify security
requirements into:
– Generic: requirement description that represents a general class of secu-
rity requirements, which can be reused and adapted to an application
specific instantiation.
– Domain Specific: requirements or a set of SRs that are specific to the
system and that provide for protection of essential services and assets of
the targeted application.
• SR Specification: This class presents how numerous approaches can be used
for building and modeling security requirements specifications. Categories of
requirement modeling include:
– Informal: The formal representation of SRs, correspond to techniques
where natural languages (i.e., text based approaches) are used to present
security requirements.
– Semi-Formal: The semi-formal representation of requirements, correspond
to techniques where diagram and tabular techniques are used to present
security requirements in structured form.
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– Formal: A formal specification of SRs includes the mathematical logics
(i.e., set theory, proof theory, first-order logic, etc.), and model trans-
formation techniques to present requirements in formal logic, in which
the syntax, semantics and manipulation rules for the requirements are
explicitly defined.
• Assumptions related to SR: Assumptions are just one part of the, usu-
ally hidden, reason for a design decision and are frequently made during re-
quirement engineering process. From the SRE point of view, assumptions
are required to provide an extensive and rich description about “why” and
“what” tradeoffs were made during requirements identification or refinement,
and “how” to realize certain security requirements.
• SR Relationships: The purpose of this class is enable relationships that al-
low security engineers to relate SRs to other requirements as well as to other
model or a set of model elements. We, in particular, consider relationships de-
fined in the SysML specification [107]. The structure of this class is illustrated
in Figure 2.12, where the "relationship" class has six subclasses including re-
fine, derive, copy, containment, verify and trace. A detailed description of
each subclass is present in Section 3.3.3.1.
• Role: The role relates to individuals and/or teams (i.e., security engineers,
test engineers, verification team, etc.), involved in the SREP. We take into
account the role to determine by whom and at what level of system abstraction
SRs are specified.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented the main building blocks of our knowledge-centric SRE
methodology. More precisely, we integrated within a single model the notions of the
goals driven SRE, model driven SRE, security attacks, and risk assessment, with the
view to propose a kind of unified methodology which offers means to overcome the
limitations of these state of the art approaches. The introduction of this knowledge-
centric SRE methodology meets the three following objectives. Firstly, we are able
to build the well-structured and well-formed specification of security concepts (i.e.,
goals, requirements, attacks, etc.) through the definition of security ontologies.
Secondly, it offers the possibility to obtain more concrete requirements as we start
sharing knowledge base between different SREP activities. Thirdly, it increases
the compatibility between concepts of several SRE approaches that share common
concepts. However, we still have to explain which kind of modeling language as well
as tools can be used to support our methodology. These issues are addressed in
chapter 3.
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System Modeling Language for
Security - SysMLSec
3.1 Introduction
We described the main building blocks of the security requirement engineering
methodology in the previous chapter. To pave the way for system-wide SREP,
we first have to breath live into a collection of conceptual stages following the map-
ping of stakeholders needs into product functions and use cases. Also, preceding the
design of these functions across the engineering disciplines (i.e., hardware, software,
etc.). In this context, a number of modeling languages (i.e., UML, SysML, etc.)
have been proposed to help engineers from different system development stages to
communicate, share, and compare their perspectives, to reason about properties
of a system. These modeling languages for software engineering practices express
different concepts to serve different development purposes like use case modeling,
requirement modeling, protocol modeling, etc. However, security issues involve spe-
cial concerns that these traditional software engineering languages do not consider.
Consider, for example, a general behavior modeling notation that expresses inter-
actions of entities in the system without considering the harmful behavior of an
adversary. Thus, the models do not convey the impacts of the malicious behavior
of the adversary on requirements, design, and architecture to the next phases of
system development lifecycle. As we have reviewed in Section 2.2, to model specific
security aspects such as threats, vulnerabilities, assets, and security requirements
several security modeling languages have been developed. A number of extensions
of UML (i.e., UMLsec [69], SecureUML [88], Misuse cases [141], Abuse cases [86],
etc.), allow to express security relevant information within the diagrams in a system
specification have been proposed. Yet, to best of our knowledge, none of them pro-
vides the expressivity required to deal effectively with system-wide SRE. Another
major group of contributions to the conceptual modeling of security requirements
like KAOS [151] and Secure Tropos [93], etc., have defined their own graphical
formalism each of which allows to express security relevant information (i.e., goal,
anti-goals, requirements, obstacles, etc.).
Table 3.1, summarizes existing modeling notations based on the concepts they
express and usage of the models. As can be seen that, each SRE approach is able to
specify certain features of requirement modeling and lacks conceptual modeling as-
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pects to express some other. In addition, these approaches do not provide constructs
to link and map these requirements with other system development activities, and
leave us with two different models that are either difficult to combine or that can not
be cross-referenced. Because engineers express the SRs based on the functionalities
they want to protect, they need to see the security requirements in the design. We
claim it’s necessary to combine objects and functions into the security requirement
engineering process. This is possible with SysML, a general-purpose graphical mod-
eling language. Section 3.2 is specifically dedicated to the evaluation and analysis of
SysML for handling system wide requirement engineering process. The remainder
of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 explains how to go from standard
system modeling language for engineering to the notion of security-oriented system
modeling language. Section 3.4 presents an approach for annotating SysML speci-
fication with security reasoning.
SRE
Approaches
Core Modeling Con-
struct
Structural
Modeling
Behavioral Modeling Attack
Model-
ing
Security
Require-
ment
Modeling
System
Modeling
Use Case
Diagram
Activity
Diagram
Sequence
Diagram
KAOS Goal (anti-goal, obsta-
cles, agent )
     
Secure Tro-
pos
TROPOS (Task, Ac-
tor, Resource, Goal,
Soft Goal, Depen-
dency)
     
UMLsec UML      
SecureUML UML and RBAC      
Misuse
Cases
UML      
Table 3.1: Summary and comparison of security modeling approaches. "" for
available properties, "" indicates that the modeling notation does not consider the
concept in its conceptual modeling.
3.2 System Modeling Language – SysML
SysML, The Systems Modeling Language, specification is defined and promoted
by the Object Management Group (OMG). The goal of the OMG is to provide a
"standard modeling language, SysML, for systems engineering to analyze, specify,
design, and verify complex systems quality, improve the ability to exchange systems
engineering information amongst tools, and help bridge the semantic gap between
systems, software, and other engineering disciplines" [107]. SysML aims at unifying
the various types of modeling languages currently used in system engineering in
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a similar manner to how UML combined diverse modeling languages used in soft-
ware engineering. SysML allows system engineers to model and follow system wide
development concepts including system requirements, system behavior and system
structure. SysML is often interpreted as being a new system engineering modeling
language, but there have been several languages that have been used in the past
such as block and internal block diagrams of UML are used to model the parametric
constraints. In fact, SysML is based on UML and cannot be considered an entirely
new language – more a large set of useful additions (extensions/modifications) to
the existing core UML modeling concepts and diagrams. However, SysML, notably
the object diagram, the deployment diagram, the component diagram, the commu-
nication diagram, the timing diagram, and the interaction overview diagram, does
not require some diagrams of UML. In contrast, SysML includes some new diagrams
and constructs not found in UML: the parametric diagram, the requirement diagram
and flow ports, and the flow specifications and item flows. In addition, SysML also
includes an allocation relationship to represent various types of allocation, including
allocation of functions to components, logical to physical components, and software
to hardware [107]. SysML classifies these different diagrams into four categories:
behavior, structure, system requirements, and parametric relationships. These are
known as the four pillars of SysML as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The four pillars of SysML [107]
These four pillars represent a system engineering process, with a system model
being made up of one or more modeling diagrams (i.e., system behavior, system re-
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quirements, system structure, etc.), each of which interacts with one or more other to
support model-based systems engineering (MBSE). For instance, the system struc-
ture can be represented by block definition diagrams and internal block diagrams,
the behavior of the system can be depicted by the use case diagram, the activity
diagram, the sequence diagram, etc. The latter modeling constructs are imperative
to support requirements engineering and performance analysis. The focus of the
new constructs in SysML is geared towards some fundamental system engineering
concepts, such as requirements engineering and system behavior [50]. Let us dis-
cuss these two new modeling constructs (i.e., Requirement Diagram and Parametric
Diagram) in more detail, which are the core activities in requirement engineering
process.
Requirement Diagram: Although requirements have traditionally been realized
using use case diagrams, which consider requirements from a behavioral point
of view, the introduction of the requirements diagram in SysML allows the
structural relationships between requirements to be modeled [50]. The re-
quirement diagram is used to integrate the system models with text based
requirements that are typically captured in requirements management tools.
Figure 3.4 shows the metamodel for requirement diagrams. From the model
it can be seen that a "Requirement diagram" is made up of one or more "Re-
quirement" and zero or more "Relationships" elements. The dark background
in the objects represents the core elements of the SysML metamodel. While
others elements represent our contribution to the metamodel, which we will
explain in Section 3.3.3. Here, a requirement element is used to represent text-
based system requirements that can be related to other requirement or system
models/elements via the relationship element. For instance, a requirement
can be expressed and assigned to a system model or set of model elements
that is intended to realize or satisfy the requirement. Thus, it provides a
bridge between typical requirements management tools and the system mod-
els. As the SysML specification states: "The requirements model describes
the SysML support for describing textual requirements and relating them to
the specification, analysis models, design models, etc. A requirement repre-
sents the behavior, structure, and/or properties that a system, component, or
other model element must satisfy" [107]. With respect to the requirement rep-
resentation, SysML provides the graphical, tabular, or tree structure format
for modeling requirements. The SysML requirement graphical notation that
allows security engineers:
• To express and attribute individual requirement in a precise way,
• Make each requirement understandable (the interpretation of each re-
quirement is clear),
• Relate requirements with other system development activities throughout
the system’s life cycle.
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• Group and to decompose requirements according to a hierarchical set of
concepts, and
• Trace the source of requirements and reasoning for requirements exis-
tence.
These various properties allow the modeller to document the requirement in
well structured and in a consistent way.
Parametric diagram: The Parametric diagram is the second new type of dia-
gram introduced to describe constraints on system properties to support engi-
neering analysis. The parametric diagram is a specialized variant of an internal
block diagram that restricts diagram elements to represent constraint blocks,
their parameters and the properties of block that they bind to. Parametric
diagrams are made up of one or more constraint blocks, zero or more part, and
one or more connectors [107]. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The constraint
block is used to show which constraints are being used. The SysML specifi-
cation describes constraint blocks in terms of conditions that are represented
by mathematical equations. More precisely, the constraints block contains an
equation, expression or rule that relates together the parameters given in the
parameters block. The concepts behind constraints can be extended to cover
general rules that constrain system properties and behavior such as authen-
tication should be performed BEFORE authorizing entity to access system
resources, etc. The use of a constraint block is called a constraint property
and is depicted on a parametric diagram. The interconnection between con-
straint blocks and part or constraint blocks is shown on a parametric diagram
using zero or more binding connectors as shown in Figure 3.5. Binding con-
nectors depict an equality relationship between the two connected parameters
or between a parameter and a value property. In the parametric diagrams, a
standard part element includes properties to specify its unique identifier and
text description.
We can draw some conclusions from the aforementioned properties of the SysML.
SysML provides a support to establish a good understanding of the processes that
exist and that are needed to realize the requirements of a system throughout the
system engineering process. In addition, SysML provides a well-integrated and
powerful notation, requirement diagrams, to specify expressive requirements. This
provides us a guarantee to obtain complete, consistent, organized, and verifiable
requirements, which are traceable at any stage of system conceptualization. It also
provides means to capture the rationale for a specific requirement or relationship.
Moreover, SysML provides an excellent set of extension mechanisms that can be
used to augment and enhance the capabilities of the modeling language. SysML
thus seems to be the right tool to map and relate security requirements to other
system development activities. However, a major obstacle towards the usage of
SysML is the lack of support from the security viewpoint. In particular, there is no
explicit modeling construct to express security weaknesses such as security attacks
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and vulnerabilities in the system that may lead to modeling attacks, nor for modeling
security requirement.
3.3 SysML for Modeling Security Aspects
The purpose of this section is to develop syntactic, semantic, and methodological ex-
tensions to SysML, that are needed to support the modeling of security aspects and
their relationships. We use different SysML diagrams as well as extended require-
ment and parametric diagrams to model security aspects like security requirements
and attack tree modeling. We group these set of diagrams (diagrams used for mod-
eling security aspects) in a profile, SysMLsec, The System Modeling Language for
Security. Figure 3.2, presents the SysMLsec diagram taxonomy. Among the many
tools (i.e., Enterprise Architect [144], Papyrus [110], Rational Rhapsody Developer
[56], OMEGA2 [102], ARTISAN [126], etc.) that support SysML, we have extended
an in-house SysML tool called TTool [82] to supports our SysMLsec profile. TTool is
an open-source toolkit that supports several UML profiles, including DIPLODOCUS
[8], and AVATAR [114], TURTLE [6], and Network Calculus [7]. TTool targets the
modeling of embedded systems with time and security constraints and offers addi-
tional capabilities such as simulation, formal verification, and code generation.
SysMLsec is mainly composed of four methodological steps and use different
SysML diagrams:
3.3.1 Structural Modeling
Structure diagrams in a SysML specification are a type of diagram (block definition
diagrams and internal block diagrams that represent) that are used to represent the
internal structure of a system, and the collaborations that this structure makes pos-
sible [107]. Following our model driven security requirement engineering approach,
in which models are the main artifact during system development, structure dia-
grams play a central role in modeling and expressing these system models. They
also provide a common root for user defined or domain-specific hierarchies of sys-
tem component types. We in particular use block and internal block diagrams in
order to represent hardware, software, facilities, or any other system element. More
precisely, we use:
• A block definition diagram to describe the system hierarchy and system/com-
ponent classifications (Chapter 4).
• The internal block diagrams are used to describe the internal structure of a
system in terms of its parts, ports, and connectors (Chapter 4).
3
.3
.
S
y
sM
L
fo
r
M
o
d
e
lin
g
S
e
c
u
rity
A
sp
e
c
ts
4
7
!"#$% '()*+),!"# %& ()*+)
-./)0(1+ '()*+),./)0(1+& ()*+) !"#$%&"'"()*+%,-&,' !2+3423+. '()*+),!2+3423+.& ()*+)
./)%0%)1**+%,-&,'
!.53.64.&'()*+), 7#.&8)#.&'()*+),
234/5*+"6%(%)%4(*
+%,-&,' 7()"&(,3*234/5*+%,-&,' 9)4:)*. '()*+),9)4:)*.& ()*+)
8,&,'")&%/*+%,-&,'
!2)2.&$)4/(6.&'()*+),
!),.&)#&7$%&;
$1<(=(.<&=+1,&7$%&;
>.?&'()*+),&@"A.
!.43+(2"&'()*+),
!.43+(2"&B.53(+.,.62&
'()*+),
C22)4:&@+..&'()*+),
Figure 3.2: Extended SysML diagram taxonomy – SysMLsec
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3.3.2 Behavior Modeling
The behavior diagrams include the use case diagram, activity diagram, sequence
diagram, and state machine diagram.
• The use case diagram provides a high-level description of functionality that is
achieved through interaction among systems or system parts" [107]. We rely
on use-case diagrams (Chapter 4) to model anything that performs a function.
It is thus a useful tool for the security analysis phase of security requirement
engineering.
• We use activity diagrams to explain use cases in more detail. More precisely,
we use activity diagrams when the use case scenario contains considerable con-
trol logic, inputs and outputs, and/or algorithms that transform data (Chapter
4);
• In our SysMLsec approach, we use the sequence diagram to represent the
interaction between collaborating parts of a system, the objects and classes
involved in the scenario, and the sequence of messages exchanged. We typically
use message sequence charts to model the security protocols (Chapter 7).
• The state machine diagram describes the state transitions and actions that
a system or its parts perform in response to events [107]. We can use the
state transition diagrams to express and analyze an abstract description of
the behavior of a system during security analysis as well as during formal
verification and testing activities.
3.3.3 Security Requirement Modeling
In order to take advantage of SysML requirement modeling capabilities (e.g., graphi-
cal modeling of requirements, relationships between requirements, traceability, etc.),
we have extended the SysML requirement diagram to model SRs. A meta-model,
which is an extension of the SysML meta-model for requirement, showing the or-
ganization of the security requirements is depicted below in Figure 3.4. The gray
background in the objects represents our extensions to the meta-model for model-
ing security requirements, whereas the objects in black background presents the core
element of SysML requirement diagram. A common way to define new modeling
constructs is by extending existing SysML constructs with new properties and con-
straints. In this context, the SysML specification [107] suggests to use the stereotype
mechanism to define new diagram notations. More precisely, a stereotype extends
the SysML metamodel, allowing one to create new kinds of diagrams/classes de-
rived from existing ones, but specific to a class of problems. We used the stereotype
mechanism to extend the requirement class (see Figure 3.4) in order to create the
«SecurityRequirement» diagram which allows us to model and distinguish SRs from
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other system requirements. After creating a stereotype, specific properties and con-
straints can be created. Properties add information to elements of the model, and
are normally associated to tagged values. Properties are displayed inside braces,
with the tag and the value encoded as strings. Tagged values add extra semantics
to a model element. We have created several properties (i.e., SR Type, SR Kind,
Risk, a reference to Attack Tree Node, etc.) in order to enrich SR with additional
but compulsory details. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4. In particular, we mapped
concepts from our SR ontology (cf. Section 2.4.2.4) to the tagged values to see the
concepts and properties in our SysML SR diagram that we will explain in more
detail in Section 3.4. Such concepts and properties are useful in particular with
respect to the construction of fine-grained and detailed SR specification.
3.3.3.1 Relationship
A relationship is a connection that enables the security engineer to relate SRs to
other requirements as well as to other UML/SysML model elements. In the SR
diagrams, we use several SysML relationships to define the structure between model
elements. Examples of relationships include the containment, refine, verify, derive,
satisfy, copy, and trace relationships. Based on the modeling construct of these
relationships, we group them into two categories:
• Related To. Relationship types are used to show how one SR is related to
another requirement.
– «Containment» enables a complex SR to be break down into its child
requirements [107] – that is an aggregation association which contains sub
requirements in terms of a requirements hierarchy. The decomposition
relationship (see Figure 6.1) is shown with a «containment» relationship.
– «Copy» relates SRs that are reused across model elements (versions/-
variants) [107]. A «copy» relationship between SRs establishes a mas-
ter/slave relationship between them in such a way that the text of the
slave SR is a read-only copy of the text of the master requirement:
the slave requirement cannot be changed but, if the master requirement
changes, then so will be the slave. For each slave a unique master should
be related but several slaves are possible for each master requirement.
In particular, the objective of this relationship is to reuse generic SRs
in multiple contexts. For instance, enforce access control is a generic
SR which we can reuse for multiple applications by using the «Copy»
relationship.
– The «DeriveReq» relationship relates a derived SR to its source require-
ment [107]. This typically involves some analysis to determine the mul-
tiple derived SR that support a parent SR. The derived requirements
generally (see Figure 6.12) correspond to the refinement of SRs at the
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next level of details of the system analysis.
• Connected To. some relationships can be used to connect any type of model
element to a SR and are used in the following ways:
– The «Refine» relationship can be used to describe how a model element
or set of elements can be used to further refine a security requirement
[107]. For example, details about the architecture of an embedded system
and the attacks it may be subjected to may be used to refine the analysis
about a SR. The refine relationship in the SysML specification is meant
to be used for that exact purpose with the difference that we use the
refine relationship to relate security requirements to different security
classes (i.e., system assets, attack trees, etc.), whereas in the SysML
specification, the refine relationship used to link requirements (i.e. system
requirements) to use cases [107]. Figure 3.3 shows our extended definition
of the refine relationship, representing the SR object and the referenced
class objects. Here, we focus on the reference class (see Figure 3.4) that
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Figure 3.3: Extended definition of the «refine» relationship
enables us to link and map SR to the models/elements. More precisely,
the object of reference class is to link and trace the source of SR, reason
for requirements existence, as well as understanding as to why and how
the system meets the current set of SR.
– The «Satisfy» relationship is used to show that a model element (or will)
satisfies a security requirement. A «satisfy» relationship will appear in
SysML SR diagram that relate elements of a design or implementation
model to the security requirements that those elements are intended to
satisfy [107].
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– The «Trace» relationship is used to show that a model element can be
traced to a security requirement. The trace link is a general-purpose
relationship free-form link connecting a requirement element to any re-
quirement/model element [107]. We use «trace» relationship specifically
to link security requirements to their related source.
These various types of relationship allow us to relate explicitly different parts
of a model to the SRs as a way of ensuring the consistency of the SRs and other
system models. We will exemplify these various relationships in Chapter 6.
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3.3.4 Attack Modeling
As seen in the previous section, the definition of parameters and constraint blocks
offer convenient means to constrain aspects of a system in a rule-based fashion that
can relate the parameters of different parts of a system. The parametric diagram
depicts how the parameters of the equations are bound to each other, to the prop-
erties of the system (i.e., the system performance, desired physical characteristics,
etc.) that is being analyzed. The concept of security analysis is similar to the
concept of trade-off analysis in that there is also more than one way to attack sys-
tem assets, and an adversary may be trying them simultaneously or just a subset
of them. More precisely, an adversary can use distinct attack paths or alternative
approaches until reaching his attack objectives. This is often illustrated through the
attack trees, which form a convenient way to systematically categorize the different
ways in which a system can be attacked.
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Figure 3.5: Metamodel for the SysML attack tree diagram
Basically, attack trees (the term was introduced by Schneier [133]) are multi-
leveled diagrams consisting of one-root, leaves, and children nodes. In addition,
different node values can be combined with AND, OR relationship to learn even
more about a system’s security flaws and weaknesses. Specifically, the purpose of
an attack tree is to define and analyze possible attacks on a system in a structured
way. This structure is expressed in the node hierarchy as well as in the form of
logical operators (i.e., conjunctive (aggregation) or disjunctive (choice), etc.) for
expressing interrelationship between different attack tree nodes. Thus, using both
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logical operators and node definition retains the natural way security experts build
the attack trees or fault trees [143, 129, 133, 17, 156]. Actually, these two building
blocks (nodes and logical operators) of an attack tree can be modeled with the
definition of constraint block with a object functions and the part element of the
parametric diagram. Thus, at a conceptual level we can use parametric diagrams
to model attack trees. Let us present how we suggest representing attack trees in
SysML using the above-mentioned modeling constructs.
3.3.4.1 Attack Trees in Parametric Diagrams
Let us first focus on the extension of the parametric metamodel (see Figure 3.5)
that is necessary for modeling attack trees. Following the extension mechanism
suggested in the SysML specification where the stereotype mechanism is defined to
extend the existing SysML classes, we create a new stereotype to represent security
attacks: the «attack tree». This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. As mentioned earlier,
we mainly focus in this thesis on expressing security knowledge to be shared and
reused throughout the system development process to design a secure system. In
order to integrate attack related knowledge, we extend the parametric diagram’s
"part" element with ontological concepts and properties from the attack tree on-
tology, presented in Section 2.4.2.3. We argue that such a representation is indis-
pensable to precisely understand how attack trees can be manipulated during their
construction and analysis. More details are given in Section 3.4 is about the intro-
duction of security reasoning into SysML models. We use the "constraint block"
element for the definition of set of constraints such as mathematical expressions
(i.e., AND, OR, etc.) among the pieces of the security attack nodes. The objective
of these operators is to show the relationship among difference attack nodes. More
precisely, we use OR operator to represent alternatives ways an adversary tries to
achieve his attack objectives. For instance, an adversary has to perform either one of
the attacks "hijack authenticated session" OR "disconnect client" to accomplish his
attack goal. AND relationship represent different steps toward achieving the same
goal, for example, by assuming an adversary can gain root access of vehicle Commu-
nication Unit (CU) if and only if he can tamper the on-board communication unit.
In our attack tree modeling approach, rather than considering only these two types
of logical operators, we also consider temporal operators (i.e., AFTER, BEFORE,
SEQUENCE, etc.). We in particular allow security experts to capture temporal
dependencies between attack nodes and sequences in an attack. For instance, in
order to install the bogus authority keys (see attack tree node AT.4.b in Figure
5.2), an adversary first have to switch an ECU into a re-programming mode. We
can represent the ordering between attacks by using the SEQUENCE relationship
as shown in Figure 5.2. We will exemplify these relationships in Section 5.3. We use
a "connector" element to link zero or more "part" with constraint block. The use
of a "constraint block", "part", and "connector" element for building attack trees
is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Generic attack tree structure
Attack Tree Modeling: An overall procedure for attack tree modeling looks
like this:
1. Build attack tree rooted (Level 0) on an abstract "attack objective". We use
the "part" element to model each attack tree node.
2. Its child nodes (Level 1) represent different "attack goals" that could satisfy
this attack objective. Attack goals and attack objectives are linked via a
binding "connector".
3. For each attack goal node:
• Decompose into a number of "attack methods" (Level 3) that could be
employed to achieve the attack objective
• Specify the logical relationships (Level 2) between different attack meth-
ods, if there are. We use the "constraint block" to specify these logical
expressions. At this stage, we also consider intermediate steps that rep-
resent attack method at a certain level of abstraction.
4. The attack tree terminates when leaf conditions (basic operations are described
that gives all details of the attack) are reached that meet the adversary’s
capabilities.
The attack tree modeling approach that we advocate provides a bridge between the
typical attack trees modeling approaches [133], and the anti-goal models approaches
[151]. More precisely, the first two steps of our attack tree modeling approach are
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equivalent to the KAOS anti-goal model [151], which provides the top down approach
for modeling attacks. The next two steps correspond to the standard attack tree
modeling approach, where attacks are identified from bottom up perspective. Figure
3.6 sums up these two approaches. Parametric attack trees are considered in much
greater detail in Chapter 5, which gives a worked example showing the construction
of attack tree diagrams.
3.4 Integration of Ontology Reasoning on Security with
SysML
Every system engineering activity, whether it is a system model such as a struc-
tural model, a behavioral model, or a requirement model, defines and organizes
concepts and properties into meaningful classes and relationships. As seen in pre-
vious sections, these concepts and relationships can be particular to a model (e.g.,
«deriveReq» relationship is specific to the requirement model), or they can be com-
mon to a family of models (e.g., a «trace» relationship is used to relate requirements
with its source such as use cases, system architecture, etc.). In other words, models
can be shared, contrasted, and their knowledge can be adapted in different mod-
els (e.g., knowledge related to use cases can be used in modeling activity diagram
or in sequence diagrams). Similarly, ontologies define a common set of concepts,
and terms that are used to represent knowledge by a vocabulary and, typically,
logical construction of knowledge in terms of classes, subclasses and relationships
among them. Syntactically SysML and ontology languages (i.e., OWL, OIL, etc.)
have a lot of syntactic overlap. SysML uses a graphical formalism with elements
for blocks, associations, part properties, and relationships between models as well
as set of model elements. In contrast, ontology languages use classes, properties,
relationships, and individuals as basic knowledge constructs. For instance, OWL
defines classes by appropriate and implicit logical constraints on properties of their
subclasses and concepts. Both approaches provide compelling benefits, system en-
gineering and in particular security engineering, should make use of both. Recently,
the integration of reasoning and ontological concepts in SysML has been discussed
in the literature. For instance in [41, 39, 158, 40, 83], the authors reasoned about
embedding SysML within a knowledge base, knowledge can be used to maintain
models consistency as a design evolves. More precisely, the purpose of such inte-
gration is to enable engineers to employ reasoning, explicit documentation about
system models, and to define more precise relationships in the course of a typical
model-based development process. Similarly, several approaches [111, 112, 149, 11]
are visualized towards using ontologies with UML modeling. However, these ap-
proaches are neither concerned with system wide engineering aspects, nor related
to the reasoning on security aspects such as checking the relationships among dif-
ferent security artifacts (i.e. attacks, system architecture, security goals, security
requirements, etc.).
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3.4.1 Annotating SysML Diagrams with Ontological concepts
In this section, we focus on annotating security concepts and terms defined in the
security ontologies (cf. Section 2.4.2) particularly security requirement ontology
and security attack ontology with security requirement and attack tree diagrams.
For other SysML models, such as system architecture, we consider [41] as a sup-
porting approach for integrating ontological knowledge. Figure 3.7, presents an
overview of an integration approach for embedding ontological concepts and terms
into SysMLsec models. As previously stated in section 3.3.3 we can add the onto-
logical concepts and terms into SysML models by extending the SysML metamodel
by including the user defined stereotypes or properties and tagged values. Let us
first consider the SR diagram (presented in section 3.3.3), and map SR related on-
tological classes (cf. Section 2.4.2.4) to the SR diagram. We build the integration
approach based on three core ideas:
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Figure 3.7: Integration of ontology reasoning on security with SysML
• We have defined the «SecurityRequirement» stereotypes (see Figure 3.8) to
represent the security requirement ontology in the SysML RD.
• We integrate high-level ontology classes (see Level-1 in Figure 3.8.b) as a
SysML requirement’s diagram properties (i.e., type, kind, etc.) as shown in
Figure 3.8.a.
• We use ontology subclasses (see Level-2/n Figure 3.8.b), as tag values of the
SysML requirement’s diagram property element. This is illustrated in Figure
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3.8.a. These values constitute a controlled vocabulary. Thus, it provides
a canonical set of mapping mechanism in order to deal with integration of
ontological concepts into the SysML.
According to these rules, every SR diagram extended with a «SecurityRequirement»
stereotype is also associated with ontology concepts and terms as shown in Figure
3.8.a. The diagram consists of three parts; standard SysML requirement properties
(e.g., id, text), extended ontological properties (e.g., kind, type, role), and properties
for our reference concept (e.g., targeted attack, reference element). The discussion
here will be limited to the extended requirement’s property constructions that can
be directly translated to ontology classes. It can be seen that, for each high-level
class of the security requirement ontology (see Figure 3.8.b.) we basically define a
new property element in the requirement diagram. This is illustrated in the Fig-
ure 3.8.a. These properties are then populated with the subclasses and concepts
defined in the security requirement ontology as its tagged values. In particular, the
properties and tagged values are specified in the same manner as the classes and
subclasses concept described in the security requirement ontology. For instance, for
the Type property, we have constructed the list of tagged values (i.e., FSR, NSFR,
etc.) by using the sub classes of the "Type" class that depict the tree-based overview
of all classes and sub classes and their relationships (see Figure 3.8.b) within the
SR ontology. This allows security engineers to browse different ontological concepts
and terms within the SysML models, and to reason about them (cf. Section 3.4.2)
at different levels of abstractions from multiple dimensions. In particular, such in-
tegration will help security engineers to keep the security requirement description
and security requirements related knowledge such as type, kind, etc., consistent as
development proceeds. For instance, during the initial stages of system concep-
tualization, security requirements are often generic like "prevent denial of service
attack", these requirements are refined to more concrete security requirement de-
scription (i.e., "availability of an application"), or to security mechanisms such as
"Filter messages that are making an application unavailable", as the system evolve.
In this case, security engineer can map these requirements to more specific classes
and concepts (i.e., application specific) by selecting appropriate tag values from the
controlled vocabulary as shown in Figure 3.9. In this way it is possible to make sure
that, for example, particular information set belongs to specific knowledge branch,
and is confined within its hierarchical structure.
Following the same line of reasoning suggested above where high-level ontology’s
classes are used to represent the properties, and its subclasses represent tagged
values, we have extended the definition of "Part" element (presented in Figure 3.5)
of the Attack Tree diagram. Figure 3.9, is a schematic diagram that shows the
integration of concepts and terms from the security attack ontology in the SysML
Attack Tree diagram.
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We have defined the «attack» stereotypes to represent the security attack on-
tology in the "part" element. While the properties of the "part" element shown in
Figure 3.9.a are concepts and terms defined in the security attack ontology shown
in Figure 3.9.b. For instance, the different high-level classes of the security attack
ontology such as attack method, attack mode, attack type, etc. are mapped to a
corresponding property name (see property view in Figure 3.9.a), and their tagged
values corresponds to subclasses of these classes. For example the "Adversary" class
takes Layman, Expert, and Professional as its tagged value. Accordingly, we map
all other concepts and terms defined in the security attack ontology into the "part"
element. From a modeling perspective, security engineers can include this informa-
tion by double click on the attack tree node which shows the property view of the
part element as depicted in Figure 3.9.b. In a similar way, this information can be
viewed in the SysML diagram by a simple click on the attack tree node as shown in
the Figure 5.2, for DenialOfService" attack.
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3.4.2 Reasoning with SysMLsec Models
In this section, we describe the extent to which we can use the capabilities of ontolo-
gies to reason about these different security concepts defined in SysMLsec models.
In particular, our objective is to enable the security engineers to have access to var-
ious ontological concepts and terms, and to reason on these models. Although, with
integration of ontology classes and subclasses into the SysML diagrams, we already
provided the partial reasoning capabilities to reason about different security concept
within the SysML models. More precisely, when security engineer select a particular
concept in the SysML diagram, for instance, SR is a "Domain specific" requirement,
we annotate the structure of the sub-classification with the tagged values that be-
long to the domain specific class such as an application specific, middleware specific,
etc, as shown in the property view of Figure 3.8. In a similar way, for each ontol-
ogy class we apply the same approach and limit the knowledge space for security
engineers to specify only those concepts and terms that belong to the super class
or the parent class. Thus, provide means to reason about security concepts within
the SysML models, which brings additional power to the development of security
models like consistency checking (i), concept satisfiability (ii), and concept classifi-
cation. The shortcoming is that we cannot specify the reasoner calls in relation to
one another or in relation with other security models such as security goals, attack,
system architecture, etc., which is our core objective. In order to fulfil this design
objective, we have implemented the "SysMLsec-to-Ontology" translation engine as
shown in the Figure 3.10. The translation engine, we have implemented for mapping
from SysMLsec models to the OWL description, contains a set of rules that match
security constructs and transform them into equivalent instance of ontology such as
shown in Figure 4.5.
TTool -- SysMLSec Models Protégé -- OWL
!"#$ !"#$
SysMLSec-2-Ontology Translation Engine
input output
security reasoning
import SysMLsec 
modelsexport SysMLsec
models
!"#$%&'()"*+,#-*'".*)#-$&*
)"#)/)%.*0'1$2*'33/,4'()"1*
Figure 3.10: SysMLsec to ontology translation engine
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The primary purpose of this translation engine is to make the security engineers
able to reason about their security models using well known and efficient reasoning
engines such as SPARQL [121], OWL-QL [34], RACER [44], SQWRL [104], etc.
Engineers can directly make use of reasoning capabilities of these engines within
the context of current engineering practice and tools without building and using
some separate ontological models. In particular, our objective is to give the security
engineering a more precise way to employ reasoning in the course of a typical model-
based development process. On the other hand, since we obtain an OWL described
document, we can integrate our SysMLsec models with any other ontology based
applications such as integrating the security requirement knowledge with security
resource annotating approaches like [77], or providing input to the ontology based
risk analysis approaches [30] in order to compute risk metrics.
In this dissertation, we refer to SQWRL (Semantic Query Web Language) [104] as
a query language because of its concise, readable, and semantically robust semantic.
SQWRL is a SWRL-based [53] query language that can be used to query OWL
ontologies and provided in Protégé 4.2 beta version [147]. To retrieve knowledge
from OWL ontology, SQWRL provide SQL-like operation. The form of rule is
antecedent→ consequent
In this rule an antecedent part is referred to as the body, and a consequent part is
referred to as the head. Both the body and head consist of positive conjunctions of
atoms:
Atom ∧ Atom → Atom ∧ Atom
This rule can be read as if all the atoms in the antecedent are true then the conse-
quent must also be true. Here, an atom is an expression of the form P(arg1, arg2,
...argn), where p is a predicate symbol and arg1, arg2, ..., argn are the terms or argu-
ments of the expression. In our approach, the predicate symbols can include security
ontology classes (i.e., asset, goal, attack, security requirement, etc.), properties (i.e.,
hasFunction, hasSequence, hasAvoidGoal, etc.) or data types. Arguments can be
class individuals (i.e., SR-Type, AT-Classification, AvoidGoal, etc.) or data values
(i.e., ), or variables (i.e, ) referring to them. In the further course of this thesis,
we will use the above-mentioned SQWRL query expression to retrieve, manipulate,
and reason about different security-related information.
3.5 Conclusions
The interest of a SysML should be measured by how it benefits the system engineer-
ing process. Given that SysML is a powerful approach to an essential part of this
process, the provision of means to better model security aspects, in particular, SRs
and attack tree modeling is obviously beneficial. Potentially, SysML could reach
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a wider user community. Modeled in SysML, security aspects can be incorporated
into the rest of a system engineering process, seamlessly linking the security engi-
neering process part of a project to the whole. Furthermore, we implemented these
capabilities into the TTool engine that also supports our extended SysML model for
defining security requirements and attack tree modeling. This tool readily supports
the SRE methodology that we advocate.
Part II
By Design Security Requirements
Engineering

Chapter 4
Running Example: The Firmware
Flashing Process
4.1 Introduction
Diagnosis of cars is not a new goal in the automotive industry. It has existed
since cars were first designed. During the last 20 years car diagnosis gained more
importance because of the increasing use of electronics in cars. Standards were
defined not just to allow different manufacturer’s ECUs to communicate with each
other in an in-vehicle network system, but also to allow different diagnosis tools to
have access to diagnosis data. In addition, there is a shift towards multipurpose
ECUs and usage of flash memory technology in the microcontrollers.
Besides these trends in the design of automotive on-board IT architectures, new
external communication interfaces, fixed and wireless, are becoming an integral part
of on-board architectures. One key factor for this development is the integration
of future e-safety applications based on V2X communications (external communi-
cations of vehicles, e.g. with other vehicles – V2V, or with the infrastructure – V2I)
which have been identified as one promising measure for increasing the efficiency
and quality of operational performance of all vehicles and corresponding intelligent
transportation systems.
These connected cars are revolutionizing the automotive industry. Yet as the
amount and the complexity of ECU and firmware inside cars increases, so too does
the need to update the firmware in order to provide new functionality and perform
firmware maintenance. Firmware updates are crucial for the automotive domain, in
which recalls are a very costly activity and thus should be avoided where possible.
Google has showed the practicability of remotely updating devices for their Android
telephones. With this, they have a powerful tool to react on discovered security
flaws in very short time [137].
In the automotive domain, update intervals are calculated in quarters of a year
and not quarters of a day right now. This paradigm is about to change and security
mechanisms within the car provide the necessary building blocks. With the arising
“always-connected” infrastructure, it will be possible to perform over-the-air (OTA)
diagnosis and OTA firmware updates (see Fig. 4.1), for example. This will provide
several advantages over hardwired access, such as saving time by faster firmware
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updates, which improves the efficiency of the system by installing firmware updates
as soon as the car manufacturer releases them.
Figure 4.1: Over-the-Air firmware flashing process
In this dissertation, we are going to use firmware-flashing application as a running
example. There are several reasons for choosing this as the subject of the example.
• The firmware flashing is an excellent example of automotive systems that may
be possible in the real world. While this functionality herald a new era of
safety in transportation, new security requirements need to be considered in
order to prevent attacks on these systems.
• The firmware flashing is an example of a system that consists of both hard-
ware and software as well as is composed of internal and external interfaces.
Moreover, it contains a number of cooperating sub systems such as service
station system, in-vehicle system, and OEMs backend systems. Thus, allow
us to perform in-depth security analysis and evaluation of complex automotive
architecture.
• There are many aspects that can be modeled, from the structure of the
firmware flashing process, the parts used to build it, to the behavior that
the flashing process has to achieve. These various aspects lend themselves to
the use of most of the SysML diagrams.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the
firmware flashing application scenario. In Section 4.3, we will present security goals
that we have identified by analyzing the description of firmware flashing application.
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Section 4.4 presents a detail description of system architecture design including
behavioral and structural models. Finally, the chapter summarizes the results that
we achieved regarding modeling of firmware flashing application.
4.2 Firmware Flashing Use Case Specification
The firmware flashing use case description is based on a common architecture [74]
and topology for the in-vehicle communication networks consisting of ECUs, sensors,
and actuators as shown in Figure 4.2. However, the use case of course can also be
mapped to other instantiations of the reference model. The purpose of this use case
is to describe the possibility of installing/updating firmware in the vehicle from an
external device. In particular, this use case demonstrates how after receiving the
request of the vehicle owner, a service station using a DT, the Diagnosis Tool, will
try to assess the state of a vehicle located in their area without making any physical
connection to the vehicle. The diagnosis of the vehicle should even be possible if
the vehicle is not in the area of the service station, by using an Internet connection.
This is necessary since real time data when a vehicle is moving can help to discover
malfunctions, which are not detectable when the car is in the service area. The use
case involves three communication entities, two within the vehicle (CU and ECU)
and one outside of the vehicle (DT). The DT uses a wireless connection to connect
with the Communication Unit – CU. The CU is hard-wired connected to the ECU
within the vehicle. To simplify the modeling and description of firmware flashing
process, the use case is split into two sequential phases named remote diagnosis and
remote flashing, respectively.
• Remote Diagnosis: In this phase, the service station has to first connect
via Internet and Wireless LAN to the in-vehicle network. An employee of the
station using the DT, sends a connection request to the vehicle. A connection
response is sent back to the DT. Once the connection is established, the DT
sends, depending on the option chosen by the employee of the service station,
requests to read out diagnosis information from the ECU it wants to check
such as ECU type, firmware version, and date of the last update. Assuming
the ECU type is known, a comparison is made to figure out the need of an
update of the version.
• Remote Flashing: A possible consequence of previous step (diagnosis) would
be the update of the software version of the ECU to remove bugs or to improve
the functionality. The DT sends a request to open a re-programming session
at the ECU level. Once the re-programming session is open, the DT sends the
new firmware version to the RAM of the ECU. The communication still goes
through the CU. The firmware is flashed in the ROM, and the date is saved.
At the end the DT closes the re-programming session at the ECU level and
the connection with the vehicle.
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Figure 4.2: EVITA Use Case reference architecture [74]
4.3 Security Goals
We start our SREP by analyzing the problems and deficiencies in the firmware
flashing specification. At the early stages of system conceptualization, we have
identified the following preliminary goals:
• Avoid Goals: are related to the malicious behavior that an adversary can
perform during the firmware flashing process. For instance, an adversary can
"install older version of firmware", or "flash malicious firmware". If it is not
the case, it is still possible to an adversary can" abort the firmware flashing
process" by jamming the wireless communication channel. In a similar way,
we go through each detail of the specification and identify goals that may
prevent us from successfully installing firmware in the vehicle.
• Achieve Goals: We have applied a similar approach like the above to find
the achieve goals, that firmware flashing process must achieve throughout its
lifecycle. For instance, "Only valid users are allowed to access firmware flashing
functions" goal is identified for example to avoid the unauthorized access to
firmware flashing functions as well as from sending flashing commands. Some
of these goals are listed in figure 4.3.
As a result of this activity, we use this knowledge and instantiate the goal ontol-
ogy (cf. Section 2.4.2.1) for storing the knowledge about different goals related to
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firmware flashing process as shown in Figure 4.3. In addition, we associate Achieve-
Goal with SRs (see figure 6.1), whereas, AvoidGoals are modeled as attack goals in
the SysML Attack Tree diagram, as shown in figure 5.2. This goal knowledge base
will later help us to identify more concrete security attacks and security require-
ments. We will exemplify this in coming chapters.
Figure 4.3: Ontological representation of the security goals
4.4 System Architecture Design
We now dictate how the most important assets within the firmware update pro-
cess can be identified and modeled from the high-level security goals and scenario
specification, and what interactions and collaborations are required in the system
to allow for their successful integration and function. A combination of mechanisms
are used to accomplish this including behavioral and structural models.
4.4.1 Behavioral Models
In this section, we provide a detail description of firmware flashing application from
its behavioral aspects. We particularly consider three combinations of behavioral
models (Use case Diagram, Activity Diagram, and Sequence Diagram) to describe
the functionality of firmware application.
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4.4.1.1 Use Case Diagram
In the first step, we start with modeling use case diagram in order to describes the
functionality provided by a firmware flashing application in terms of actors, their
goals represented as use cases, and any dependencies among those use cases. Figure
4.4 shows what the above use case might look like in SysML schematic form. As
you can see, several firmwares related scenarios are extracted from the high-level
specification (cf. Section 4.2) and joined together in one use case. In our firmware
flashing application, the names of some use cases are: "ConnectionRequest", "Diag-
nosisCheck", and "Re-programmingSession". We further associated these use cases
with actors by including everyone and everything that needs to exchange informa-
tion with the system. In our example, the actors included in the specification are
the DT, the CU and the ECU.
Figure 4.4: Use Case Diagram - Firmware flashing process
The general idea of using use case diagrams is to express different knowledge re-
lated to scenario and then asking what outwardly visible, measurable result of value
that each actor desires. Following our ontological mapping principal (cf. Section
3.4.2), we extract the knowledge modeled in the Use case diagram, and generate
a corresponding instance of the system architecture ontology (cf. Section 2.4.2.2),
particularly, instance of a behavioral model. Figure 4.5 illustrate the ontological
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representation of Figure 4.4, where "actor" subclass of use case class is used to hold
the different actors modeled in the Use case Diagram and "case" subclass is used
to hold values of different cases. In addition, we also capture association between
"actors" and "cases" by using a "hasAssociation" relationship as shown in figure
4.5.
7
4
C
h
a
p
te
r
4
.
R
u
n
n
in
g
E
x
a
m
p
le
:
T
h
e
F
irm
w
a
re
F
la
sh
in
g
P
ro
c
e
ss
Figure 4.5: Ontological representation of the firmware flashing process Use Case
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4.4.1.2 Activities Diagram
We now adopt the SysML activity diagram to discover and reason about the different
activities/actions of the firmware flashing process. The main reason behind using
this diagram is to analyze a use case by describing what actions need to take place
and when they should occur. More specifically, we use activity diagram to describe
the operational progression that defines the sequences of firmware flashing operations
and the realization of operation. Following our example, figure 4.6 explains the use
case of figure 4.4.
Figure 4.6: Activity Digram - Firmware flashing process
However the behavior of a task is sequential and we characterize each task by
the following elements:
• Behavior that describe the task’s functionality.
• A set of input communication connectors
• A set of output communication connectors
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• A set of attributes, that are used by the task’s behavior such as integer or
boolean (see choice element in Figure 4.6), and
• A name that represents the identifier of the task, which must be unique.
In addition, we use activity diagram to link up with the blocks and the structural
modeling to model continuous streams, which we will explain in the next section.
We feel that the usefulness and effectiveness of SR can be increased manifold by
considering the SysML activity diagram in the SREP. Our view is that, using activity
diagram we are in a position to identify and express SR that are not restricted to
the current state of the system but also to its past and future history.
4.4.1.3 Sequence Diagram
As part of the system architecture design, we also specify the system behavior using
SysML Sequence diagrams, which in the case of the firmware-flashing example are
used to describe the communication between the DT and the in-vehicle components
such as CU and ECU. A sequence diagram shows object (DT, CU, and ECU) in-
teractions arranged in time sequence. It depicts the objects involved in the scenario
and the sequence of messages exchanged between the objects needed to carry out
the functionality of the scenario. Objects required for accomplishing a firmware
flashing tasks are shown as lifelines as illustrated in figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Sequence Chart - Firmware flashing process
To be more precise, we use Sequence diagrams primarily to design, document,
analyze and validate the architecture, interfaces and logic of the system by describing
the sequence of actions that need to be performed to complete firmware flashing
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process. Figure 4.7, clearly depict the sequence of events and show when objects are
created and destroyed. As like Use case model, we also generate ontological instance
of Sequence diagram as shown in the figure 4.8. In particular, we capture the
objects (DT, ECU, and CU) in our "Object" class, events (i.e., connection request,
connection response, etc.) in our "Message" class, and sequence of events (i.e., msg1,
msg2, etc.), in our "Sequence" class, defined in the ontology (see Section 2.4.2.2).
Moreover, in order to capture the relationship among all these elements, we have
used the "hasMessage" relationship to relate events with objects, and "hasSequence"
relationship is used for capturing the order of events as shown in figure 4.8. However,
further information such as time outs, synchronous/asynchronous messages types,
etc., can also be expressed in the ontologies.
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Figure 4.8: Ontological representation of the Firmware flashing process Sequence Diagram
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4.4.2 Structural Models
Previously we have discussed the point that the most obvious concept in embedded
system architecture design is that of the structural models. A variety of archi-
tectural structures are used to introduce technical concepts and fundamentals of
an embedded system design like Y-chart approach [76], SHE Methodology [148],
COSYMA approach [31], etc. Most of these approaches are concerned with design-
ing embedded system architecture by focusing on representing system architecture
from the high-level specification through to hardware synthesis and software com-
pilation. The general approach used in these approaches includes the exploration
of hardware software characteristics such as area, speed, memory limitations, power
consumption, maintainability, upgradability, testability, reliability, etc. Note that
most of these approaches are concerned with analyzing the non-functional or quality
related requirements of embedded systems. Therefore, a useful characteristic would
be to use these approaches also from the security requirement-engineering point of
view. This would permit us to analyze the security aspects from the early design
stages and in relation to the different architecture levels and their interrelationships.
On the contrary, analyzing the security concerns with design exploration step allows
system engineers to investigate the influence of security aspects on the system per-
formance (such as latency, throughput and resource utilization). The results may
inspire the designer to improve the architecture, restructure/adapt the application,
or modify the mapping of the application.
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Figure 4.9: Extended Y-Chart approach
We particularly use the Y-chart approach, because of its capabilities towards
enabling the designer to address separately functionality, architecture and mapping
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issues to develop a fully mapped system. It is important to notice that the Y-
Chart approach clearly identifies three core issues (i.e., architecture, application,
and mapping) that play a role in finding feasible architecture. Be it individually or
combined, all three issues have a profound influence on the system design [76]. It fits
conveniently with our system architecture description, where we need to define po-
tential security requirements for targeted application expected to run in co-designed
hardware and software. However, as our objective is to identify security weaknesses
and security requirements in relation to different architecture levels from the early
stages of system conceptualization, we slightly modified the conventional Y-chart
approach and also consider mapping of functions on the software/middleware layer.
Even if the architectural structures are rough and informal at the early stages, it
is still better than nothing. As long as the architecture conveys in some way the
critical components of a design and their relationships to each other, it can provide
us with key information about whether the device can meet its requirements, and
how such a system can be constructed successfully. This is depicted in figure 4.9.
The design flow embraces the following three steps:
4.4.2.1 Application
Application represents the functionality to be performed by the targeted system.
In particular, application is structured around the notion of "task" that holds a
functionality (task’s behavior). We describe the behavioral description of task in
terms of a SysML Activity Diagram (see Figure 4.6). However, note that one be-
havioral description per task is required. A task has a dedicated behavior that will
define how it will execute and define its communication scenario with the other
tasks. Figure 4.10 depicts a firmware flashing application example modeled with
the TTool toolkit. The application in the example is the composition of a set of
tasks (DiagnosisConnectionInitiation, DiagnosisRequestManagement, etc.) and the
set of Communication Connectors such as connection request, connection response,
etc.
Figure 4.10: Functional view - firmware flashing process
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These different tasks functionalities are interdependent as each task is an origin
and destination for different communication connectors. For instance, "Diagnosis-
ConnectionInitiation" exchange data with "DiagnosisRequestManagement" through
the channel "ConnectionRequest", but it is a destination for the event "Connection-
Response" sent by "DiagnosisRequestManagement". With the same logic, we build
the detail functional view of the application. In particular, we want to extract the
functional path (information flow path) of the firmware flashing application from
this view in order to analyze what data and messages are exchanged between dif-
ferent tasks. This will certainly help us to perform more detailed security analysis
as well as to express more concrete security requirements. To be more precise, we
define functional path as:
The functional path of an application is a tuple consisting of a set C of events
and data channels, and of a set F of functions. C and F are defined as follows:
• Fc is included into F.
• C contains all channels which destination is a function of F.
• F contains all functions that output messages in channels of C.
Therefore, the functional path of an application includes all data and events that
are taken as an input by all functions involved in the direct or indirect production
of the application.
4.4.2.2 Architecture
Following the line of reasoning suggested in Y-Chart approach, targeted architec-
tures are modeled independently from applications as a set of interconnected generic
hardware nodes. A set of parameters permits to calibrate components for their
application area. At this stage of system architecture development, we use the
DIPLODOCUS profile for modeling diagrams hardware architecture, as well as for
specifying high-level description of software/middleware layer, which is already in-
tegrated in TTool engine [5]. A hardware architectural description is a collection
of interconnected hardware nodes. Those hardware nodes are computing nodes
(CPUs, I/O devices, hardware accelerators), storage nodes (RAM, etc.), sensors
and actuators. The interconnection between those nodes is described in term of
busses, networks and wireless links (see Figure 4.11). In the context of software ar-
chitecture, we define it from the functional/logical-modeling viewpoint. Functional
modeling, focuses on building the functional architecture of the system by breaking
the problem domain into a set of non-overlapping and collaborating components. In
other words, software architecture is focused on organizing components to support
specific functionality such as processing tasks, sending message/data, etc. In order
to have common mapping, we classify hardware and software components into three
activities: 1) Computation, 2) Communication, and 3) Storage activities.
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Figure 4.11: A partial view of the hardware architecture - Firmware flashing process
Note that, from a functional point of view, communication and storage look very
similar (sending and writing could be considered as the same operation; receiving
and reading too), but they are different: Communication takes place between dif-
ferent tasks while storage is dedicated to a single task, for its own needs. Moreover,
reading is an action while receiving a message is an event: A task decides to read
or not but has no control on messages reception, even if received messages can be
ignored. Of course, when considering the physical view, it may be that communi-
cations are implemented through read and write operations in a memory and, in
most cases, read and write operations of a task are implemented as transactions
on a physical communication link between a processor and its external memories.
Each of the three activities has a physical and functional counterpart, as outlined
in Table 4.1.
System Ac-
tivities
Physical View Functional (Logical) View
Computing CPU or dedicated hardware accelerator Processing task
Communication Wired bus or network, wireless link Send/receive messages on logical channels
Storage Memory (RAM, ROM, flash) Read/write data from/to address spaces
Table 4.1: Physical and Functional Viewpoints
4.4.2.3 Mapping
A mapping process defines how application tasks are bound to execution entities
and similarly how abstract communication channels between tasks are bound to
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communication and storage devices. The general DIPLODOUC mapping framework
is the following.
• Each abstract task of the application is mapped on exactly one computation
node (i.e., CPU), which is a combination of both physical and functional view.
• Abstract communication entities are mapped on communication and storage
nodes. A channel is usually mapped on buses, bridges and exactly one storage
element [5].
Figure 4.12: Mapping view - Firmware flashing process
The mapping activity is carried out based on previously created DIPLODOCUS
architecture diagrams (Figure 4.10, and 4.11). The output of this activity is shown
in Figure 4.12, where artifacts representing tasks and channels are simply bound
to architecture components. Similarly like other activities, we also capture the
knowledge about structural model and generate an equivalent ontological instance
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of system architecture ontology. Figure 4.13, represents the knowledge about sys-
tem assets and mapped functions on these assets. In particular, we have used the
"system asset" class to store the knowledge about different system assets as well
as knowledge about their subclasses (i.e., CPU, RAM, Hardware accelerators, etc.),
and "function" class to capture different functions involved in the firmware flashing
process. The "mappedTo" relationship class specified in the ontology captures the
mapping relationship between system assets and function.
Figure 4.13: Ontological representation of the Mapping view of the Firmware flash-
ing process
4.5 Conclusion
In summary, this chapter made the reader familiar with our running example, the
different behavioral and structural models of the system, its methodology and op-
erators. Furthermore, while creating system models (i.e., Use Cases, Sequence Di-
agrams, Structural Models, etc.), we also generated the corresponding ontology in-
stances of these different models. Thus, allow security engineers and analyst to use
these models and reason about different concepts and terms specified in these mod-
els. For instance, during SR identification activity, security engineer can query the
use case knowledge base about different "actors" involved in the system, or he can
search for different "functions" mapped on a particular system asset. Our objective
for the next steps of the SREP is to use these models as well as the knowledge base
generated from these models for performing the in-depth security analysis and also
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identifying and prioritizing security requirements. Furthermore, we also use these
models for building our cryptographic protocols and enforcement of access control
related security requirements in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively.

Chapter 5
Security Analysis and
Knowledge-Based Attack Trees
5.1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing need to integrate business applications deployed across dis-
tinct architecture layers reflects the reality of how software is being consumed nowa-
days [60]. Such applications must also be compliant with SRs and regulations, which
can change and/or evolve according to the business context. For instance, access
control and monitoring for intrusion detection are prime examples of functionalities
that are subject to this problem: they cannot be properly modularized, that is,
defined in well-separated modules, especially if they cross administrative or techno-
logical boundaries [58]. In such a context, it is not sufficient to discover security
attacks only at overlooked weak point of the system; there is also a need to analyze
the information flow control issues, especially when the underlying platforms and
infrastructures are also made of services themselves. Security analysts also need to
consider threats to these underlying infrastructure and middleware for a particular
security realization, as the assets to be protected originate both from the horizontal
(i.e., between different entities and components) and vertical (i.e., multiple layers)
compositions.
A related problem is that it is easier to analyze the protection level at each
separate layer in the system architecture stack, but become vulnerable to various
security exploits and flaws in a coordinated manner [58, 129, 143]. Because of their
complexity and of the varying degrees in which system assets are deployed and exe-
cuted, it is often the case that a system is compromised through a path its developers
never have thought of. What is worse, a local security attack and vulnerability or a
mismatch between the security mechanisms adopted at different locations can have
dire consequences, potentially putting the security of large system at stake. Most
of such security attacks stem from the limited knowledge shared between various
security-engineering activities that collaborate with each other and the expression
of their interdependencies. One thing is that it is not easy to discover all parts of
a system that are relevant for its security. In mainstream practice, this knowledge
is often spread across different architecture layers, and correspond to various sys-
tem development activities such as system architecture design, goal specification, In
general, for a thorough security evaluation, one needs to take into account these dif-
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ferent knowledge perspectives. In this context, in Section 5.2, we aim at proposing a
security analysis model derived from the conceptual constructs of security ontologies
that will serve as the common knowledge repository for discovering, analyzing, and
sharing attack knowledge with other system development activities. Thus, it will
offer means to analyze the security of the system in such a way that it is possible to
discover simple and complex security attacks and vulnerabilities at different levels
of system abstraction. Furthermore, the concept of attack tree, modeled in SysML
Attack Tree Diagrams (ATD), is brought in as the foundational graphical represen-
tation for modeling and embedding the collected security attacks knowledge into the
security attack ontology. In this manner, the attack trees are completely parame-
terized by the ontological concepts so that it is possible to handle simultaneously
several knowledge bases associated with security attacks and vulnerabilities. In par-
ticular, the knowledge based attack trees ease the process of keeping security attack
specifications clear and understandable, minimizing the inconsistencies and helping
to achieve maintainability – even when security attacks are drafted cooperatively
by several entities as well as at different system development stages.
5.2 Security Analysis Process
In this section, we reason about instance of the security attack ontology (cf. Sec-
tion 2.4.2.3) to discover and share a common understanding of information about
security attacks and vulnerabilities among different system development activities.
In contrast to related research activities what we have in mind is to extract the
knowledge and relationships between different security ontologies, for the purpose
of being able to combine and analyze them together and discover security weak-
nesses. In our approach, we perform a security analysis in the following sense: given
system development phase, we capture the knowledge about core (valuable) system
components including hardware and software components, security goals, as well as
security requirements, and analyze their security relative to security objectives and
other functional and non-functional constructs, and we perform this analysis itera-
tively and incrementally at each system refinement stage. We thus, focus on high
level security attacks (or anti goals) and relationships and evolve them in accordance
with other system development activities, and in particular the level of refinement
of the system architecture. In this context, it is also useful to think about threats
in terms of what the adversary is trying to achieve and what are the adversary
capabilities. This changes the focus from the identification of every specific attack
– which is really just a means to an end – to focusing on the system-wide attacks.
A security analysis process is composed of two parts: knowledge extraction and its
evaluation, and a security attack modeling. We define the security analysis process
as a systematic process performing the following steps:
1. Extract the knowledge from various knowledge bases such as security goals,
system architecture, security requirements, and relationships among them
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through inferences rules and questions on available material.
2. Define every "attack goal" that is associated with a benefit (cf. Section 2.4.2.3)
to the adversary of some kind.
3. Identify classes of adversaries and their capabilities.
4. Decompose attack goals into a number of "attack methods" that could be
employed to achieve the attack objective; refinement terminates when leaf
conditions are reached that meet the adversary’s capabilities.
5. For each attack method, specify different properties that as described in the
attack ontology such as "attack mode", "attack type" (i.e., generic or appli-
cation specific), assumptions, consequences, etc.
Let us illustrate these steps in more detail with our firmware flashing case study
presented in Chapter 4. At the early stages of the system conceptualization, the
major inputs to our security analysis process are security goal knowledge (see Sec-
tion 4.3) and system architecture knowledge (see Section 4.4). However, during each
refinement stage we extend the current knowledge as well as include the knowledge
from other system development activities (e.g., security requirements, security pro-
tocols, etc.) as a basis for exploring more detailed security attacks and vulnerability.
Let us start from the analysis of the security goals presented in Section 4.3. Based
on the results of knowledge extraction phase (cf. Step 1), we move on to analyz-
ing different "attack goals" that can be associated with these system architecture
components. One obvious option is to browse the security goal knowledge base (see
Section 4.3) systematically in order to determine whether there is any "AvoidGoal"
that could be wished by malicious agents. In this case, we use the following rule to
select "AvoidGoals" from the security goal knowledge base:
Goal(?g) ∧ hasAvoidGoal(?g, ?AvoidGoal) → select(?g, ?AvoidGoal) (5.1)
The above query retrieves (cf. reasoning with SysML model presented in section
3.4.2) all goals in ontology with a known subclass that is AvoidGoal as shown in
the Figure 5.1. In this case, we start analyze each AvoidGoal and determine how
an adversary can attack this goal, which in his (adversary) case is an AchieveGoal.
For example, an adversary can "abort firmware flashing process" by jamming the
in-car communication or by shutting down the Communication Unit (CU) [129].
We analyze each AvoidGoal to identify the adversary objectives as well as deter-
mine additional AvoidGoals, if any. In addition, while browsing the security goal
knowledge base, we might stop on the "AchieveGoal" stating, "service station is
allowed to install firmware". This goal is obviously going to be of interest for a
number of adversaries. For instance, an adversary goal might be to "install mali-
cious firmware". We can also directly determine security flaws and weaknesses by
negating the "AchieveGoals". For instance, the statement "service station is not
able to install firmware", actually corresponds to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
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Figure 5.1: Avoid goals - Firmware flashing process
In a similar way, we extract the knowledge about system architecture models and
analyze different aspects of the system in order to determine additional attack goals
and attack points. For instance, we can extract the knowledge (see Rule 5.2) stored
in use cases knowledge base (see Figure 4.5) to define the behavior not wanted in the
system to be developed. This corresponds to the misuse cases approach [141], where
analyzing the interaction between actors and cases specifies attacks. For example,
an adversary’s goal might be to cease the firmware diagnosis process by sending fake
information about the version of the installed firmware to the DT. Similarly, we de-
termine various attack goals by reasoning on instances of these different knowledge
bases.
UseCase(?u) ∧ hasActor(?u, ?Actor) ∧ hasCases(?u, ?Cases) (5.2)
→ select(?u, ?Actor, ?Cases)
Once initial attack goals are identified, we start building the attack tree in SysML
Attack Tree diagram and group these different "attack goals" under the root node
called "attack objective". This is illustrated in Figure 5.2, where the root node (e.g.,
"Attack Firmware Flashing") depicts the attack objective and its child nodes (e.g.,
"install malicious firmware"," service station is not able to install firmware") repre-
sent attack goals. The identification of adversary instances is obviously intertwined
with the identification of attack goals. In particular, the attack goal raises the ques-
tion of who might profit from it. In this case, we can use the adversary taxonomy
presented in section 2.4.2.3 to identify different the adversaries and their capabili-
ties. For example, the following query retrieves all adversaries with the capabilities
that can a achieve a particular "attack objective":
Adversary(?e) ∧ hasExperties(?e, ?expt)
∧ hasEquipment(?e, ?equp) ∧ hasKnowledge(?e, ?kwlg) (5.3)
∧ Asset(?a)→ select(?e, ?expt, ?equp, ?kwlg, ?a)
However, in many cases these different capabilities are not independent, but may
be combined/substituted for each other in varying degrees. For instance, expertise
or equipment may be a substitute for time. In this example, we assume an expert
adversary who knows everything about the firmware flashing process as well as have
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knowledge about in-vehicle system being attacked. In the next step (step 4), for
each initial attack goal and adversary class identified, we build the attack tree by
decomposing attack goals into a number of attack methods that could be employed
to achieve the attack objective. As mentioned previously, our objective is to identify
security attacks and vulnerabilities that are targeting single or multiple architecture
layers. In this case, we follow our functional path (cf. Section 4.4.2.1), and Mapping
approach (cf. Section 4.4.2.3) to analyze security attack and vulnerabilities. In
particular, we extract (Rule 5.4) the knowledge from System architecture knowledge
base (see Figure 4.13) about different functions, their mapping on the different
system assets, and details about information flow path in order to analyze how an
adversary can perform attacks to achieve his attack goals.
Architecture(?e) ∧ hasFunctions(?e, ?Funtions)
∧ hasSequence(?Functions, ?Sequence) ∧ hasAssets(?e, ?Assets) (5.4)
∧ mappedTo(?Function, ?Assets, ?Mapping)
→ select(?e, ?Functions, ?Assets, ?Sequence, ?Mapping)
The result of this query corresponds to a set of functions (e.g., diagnosis ini-
tiation, firmware identification, etc.), information flow path in terms of sequences
(e.g., msg1, msg2, etc.), and their mapping on different system assets (e.g., CU,
ECU) as shown in figure 4.13. Based on the result of this query, we start ana-
lyzing the available information and different attack methods that correspond to
attack goals. For example, the above-mentioned attack goal (e.g., "Install Malicious
Firmware") can be require a "Man in the Middle" attack. As a result of attack
identification that corresponds to the attack goal, we add attack node (see attack
tree node – AT.2.a in figure 5.2) as a child of the attack goal. In addition, following
our knowledge based attack tree modeling principle (presented in section 3.3.4), the
security expert has to document the attacks using about different ontology concepts
(e.g., attack type, attack method, attack mode, adversary, etc.). This information
is available in SysML Attack Tree diagrams as a controlled vocabulary (see Section
3.4.1). Let us consider another case where an adversary is trying to achieve the
same attack goal ("Install Malicious Firmware") by "Injection of forged transac-
tions" (attack tree node – AT.2.b). In this case, we use the definition of constraint
block (cf. section 3.3.4) and link these two attack methods using "OR" operator
as shown in figure 5.2. Thanks to the expressive power of ontologies, we can freely
combine rules as antecedent patterns to capture complex topological structure, and
analyze different system activities altogether in order to identify different attack
methods. A description of various attack methods that we identified by analyzing
different knowledge bases and interrelation between them are listed in Section 5.3.
We can also decompose these attack goals by querying different well-know attack
and vulnerability dictionaries (e.g., OWASP, CVE, etc.). However, as indicated
previously, for a thorough security evaluation and validation, we require an explicit
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knowledge of security experts to decompose attack goals into child attack methods.
The security analysis process terminates when realistic attack methods are obtained
that meet the adversary’s capabilities.
5.3 Attacks on the Firmware Flashing Process
In the following, we use the above-mentioned security analysis process and analyze
the attacks against our three core activities of system architecture (see Table 4.1)
that we have defined for our firmware flashing process. In particular, we first analyze
the system from the active and passive attack viewpoints, and then classify security
attacks.
• Attacks Related to Active Mode: One of the ways to attack the firmware
update process is to modify its behavior. In the following, we show security
attacks that are associated with modifying the behavior of different system
assets and corresponding activities involved in the firmware update process.
– Communication: The attacks on the communication activity can be bro-
ken down into threats on physical and functional (logical) communica-
tion links that are used during the firmware update process. There are
two main means to implement physical1 attacks against communications:
tampering with it and the injection of forged transactions (see attack tree
node – AT.2.a in figure 5.2). Because on-board computing devices and
memories are usually connected through buses, attacks against physical
communication links can be used to tamper with the communication.
The consequences of physical attacks on communication links are on the
receiver side only (attacks aiming at modifying or canceling a firmware
update message before it is actually sent are, in fact, attacks against the
sending computing node). From the functional (logical) point of view,
attacks comprise Denial of Service (DOS) attack (see Attack Tree node
– AT.5.a). For instance, one way to do this would be attack the wireless
communication module by jamming the signal (see attack tree node –
AT.5.a.3.a). As we previously mentioned (cf. section 4.4.2), an archi-
tectural description is a collection of interconnected layers. Thus, the
security attacks targeted for one particular layer may span across other
layers and system activities. For instance, when a memory bus is at-
tacked, it can be in order to modify the function of a task (software code
modification) or the data it processes. There are three classes of mem-
ory bus injection attacks (see attack tree node – AT.2.c.2): spoofing (the
injected information was forged by the attacker), splicing (the injected
1The text in bold represents different classes and subclasses of the security attack ontology as
well as relationships between these classes. While, the text in italic characterizes the concrete
attack methods.
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information was taken at a different location in the memory) and replay
(the injected information was taken at the same location in the memory
but at a previous moment in time, where it differed from the expected
one).
– Computation: The computational capabilities of an attacker encompass
several different abilities such as decrypting incoming messages, encrypt-
ing outgoing messages and computing secrets. There are two components
that affect these abilities: hardware capabilities (pure computation) and
available information. In particular, communication attacks are target-
ing computing nodes (CPUs, hardware accelerators) that are involved in
the firmware update process (see figure 4.11). They consist in physical
modifications of the component (like modifying the content of an embed-
ded ROM or the structure of an operator), its replacement or even its
destruction. Transient fault injection is another possibility (see attack
tree node – AT.1.c.a). The consequence is the production of results that
differ in some way from those that would have been produced in nor-
mal operation, including failure to produce results when expected or the
converse. From the functional point of view, these physical attacks can
translate into: it seems easier (and more likely) to attack the on-board
units with a DoS attack (see attack tree node – AT.5.a) to prevent or de-
lay the computation/detection of events needed for the firmware flashing
process.
– Storage: Storage attacks consist in modifying the regular content of a
memory. As a consequence the read operations performed by the tasks
accessing the address space do not return the expected information, that
is, the last one that was written at the same location. The consequences
are very similar to the consequences of attacks against memory buses.
The means used to achieve content modification depend on the technol-
ogy: ROMs can be replaced (see attack tree node – AT.3.b.1.a), non-
volatile writable memories (EEPROMs, flashes) can be replaced or re-
programmed, volatile memories (static and dynamic RAMs) are much
more difficult to attack in a conscious way but more or less random bit
flips can be induced by voltage, clock frequency, temperature modifica-
tions, or more active fault attacks. In some cases, volatile memories can
even be cooled, removed from their PCB and plugged onto another host
without losing their content which can then be read out and/or modified
before the component is plugged back in its regular host system.
• Attacks Related to Passive Mode: In the following, we illustrate security
attacks aiming at information retrieval without modifying the behavior of the
firmware update process.
– Communication Communication can be spied upon and sensitive mes-
sages or read/written data exposed. On-board or on-bus probing (see
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attack tree node – AT.2.c.2) is a very effective and attractive mean for
wired communications. Wireless communications are even more sensitive
to this kind of attack as they can be conducted in a completely remote
and undetectable way. On-chip probing requires package removal, ex-
pensive equipment and very skilled attackers. Another possible attack
would consist in trying to gain access to the on-board units, for example
by personalizing the car with an external device, without changing the
behavior of the flashing process or vehicle, to exploit rekeying protocol
vulnerability in the diagnostic interface (see attack tree node – AT.4.e),
to extract the firmware data.
– Computation: Attacks against the computing activity aim at retrieving
either a secret quantum of data (secret key) or the processing definition
itself through software code extraction (see attack tree node – AT.3.b).
As every computation is actually performed by a physical device, mea-
surable syndromes are produced, like its power consumption, computing
time, or electromagnetic emissions that can be exploited to guess what
operations are performed or what is the value of some sensitive data.
This kind of analysis is referred to as side channel attacks in the litera-
ture. Observing the external communication or the exchanges (see attack
tree node – AT3.b.1.b) with memories is another mean to get informa-
tion about the computing but fall into the passive communication attacks
category.
From a security point of view they are all potential targets of attacks but by
different means and consequences. Security requirements shall therefore address all
system elements that might be involved in attacks identified in attack trees.
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Figure 5.2: Attacks on the Firmware flashing process – Knowledge base Attack Trees representation
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5.4 Multilayer Security Analysis
This section describes an example of an actual exploitation that we have identified
during the multilayer security analysis. As we previously mentioned, the loose cou-
pling between different architecture layers leads to various security exploits and flaws
in a coordinated manner. This was the case in our example, where a loose security
binding between architecture layers (i.e., Hardware Security Module, middleware –
EMVY RPC Library [125], application, etc.) makes it possible for an adversary to
impersonate valid users2. In particular, the security attack that resulted was due to
the improper design of the middleware layer, EMVY RPC Library, and it’s handing
of security related data. EMVY RPC library allows applications to use functionality
on the client itself and also to access higher-level security functionality (i.e., install
applications, set security policies, etc.) through the Master node as part of the RPC
invocation.
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Figure 5.3: RPC Logoff attack scenario
In order to perform this attack (impersonate valid users), we have created two
EMVY clients: Client 1 and Client 2. The Client 1 is considered as a legitimate
entity, whereas, the second entity, Client 2, act as a malicious entity. In the first
step, both entities send a login request (see figure 5.3) to EMVY Master node in
order to invoke several other security services. The authenticity for the connection
is verified in the Master node, by calling its hardware security module, which ver-
ifies the authenticity of the Client 1 and the Client 2 at the transport layer. Once
the authenticity of both entities is successfully verified both entities are allowed to
2User impersonation allows an entity/application to execute a task using the security context
of another user.
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invoke any RPC functions. In the next step, Client 2, who is an insider adversary,
scan the connected entities in the network to extract their identifiers. Lets assume
that Client 2 managed to capture an identifier (i.e., Client1) of the Client 1. It
then invokes an RPC logoff function (see Listing 5.1), which only requires Entity
as a parameter. An adversary uses the identifier of Client 1 as a parameter of the
function in order to stop all the services accessed by the Client 1. The transcript in
figure 5.1 shows the use of the RPC Entity_logoff(client1) request from Client 2 to
EMVY Master node in order to logoff Client 1.
1 EMVY_logoff(const Entity* entity);
Listing 5.1: EMVY Log_off RPC function
On the Master side, it only verifies that Client 1 is in its "Entity Authentication
List". If its so, it removes the Client 1 from "Entity Authentication List" and close
the connection with the Client 1, thereby allowing the adversary to impersonate the
valid user. This attack happens since authentication is only performed at the trans-
port layer and not further considered at the upper layers. More precisely, the need to
authorize operations based on RPCs together with the fact that only channels, not
RPC messages are authenticated has forced us to piggyback the transport-level au-
thentication on internal framework calls from the components like Communication
Control Module3 (CCM) to the application layer.
5.5 Conclusions
Given an input for our knowledge centric design methodology, the security analysis
process helps to both classify identified attacks, but also to think about new ones,
given a category. Security analysis process is a combination of both top-down and
bottom-up approach to provide a support tool to security analysts. The purpose of
developing the ontology driven security analysis process is to identify possible secu-
rity threats and to allow aspects such as the desirability (to the adversary), oppor-
tunity, probability and severity of attacks to be assessed in order to share knowledge
among various system development activities (i.e., security requirements engineer-
ing, protocol design, testing, etc.). We believe that, on the one hand, ontology based
security analysis is expressive enough to describe several real-world security attacks
with a multi faceted approach; at the same time, it provides constructs to map and
relate security attacks with other system development activities.
3The central communication module provides a high-level interface for secured communication.
It can integrate various communication protocols.

Chapter 6
Security Requirement Engineering
6.1 Introduction
We described the main building blocks of our SRE process in the previous chapters.
We now move on to the next stage of this process and illustrate the approach in
the context of SRs identification, refinement, and present a way to trace SRs. We
first discuss in section 6.2, why security requirements should not be considered in-
dependently from the architecture of the system they relate to, or from the threats
and vulnerabilities that may arise on that system. We highlight how the strengths
of ontological approach can be used to drive the security requirement identification
process. In section 6.3, we investigate a fundamental flaw in state of the art ap-
proaches to security requirements refinement. We expose in this chapter in what
respect the different security artifacts (i.e., security attacks, system architecture),
and its evolution involve challenging refinement problems, in particular with respect
to the understanding of security requirements.
Security requirements refinement cannot rely on only high-level definition of secu-
rity goals or preliminarily constructed SR specification and disregard the evolution
of other security artifacts on top of which security requirements are based. In this
perspective, we first illustrate why security requirements can be refined with enough
precision for supporting the design of security architecture only if they are exten-
sively linked with security attacks and the system architecture. All existing solutions
have so far fallen short in that they only consider refinement separately within the
SR requirement model and/or within the attack model. We present a refinement
model to combine and jointly annotate all security artifacts and how it can be used
to develop an iterative refinement process.
In section 6.4, we also propose a very simple but fairly effective approach for
the traceability of security requirements. In particular, we provide insights on how
a traceability links empowered with cross-reference capabilities can provide clean
modularization to security assurance. We show how cross-reference traceability
links help in achieving the impact analysis of prescribe changes in the different
system development activities, by improving the efficient tracking and management
of security requirements.
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6.2 Security Requirements Elicitation
In this section, we aim at identifying security requirements in relation to the afore-
mentioned system development activities. In the process of going from steps 2 to 5
of requirements engineering process (see section 2.4.1), we make use of the knowl-
edge base, which we developed, in the previous chapters. Let us recapitulate what
we have defined so far.
• In step 2, we have specified several security goals (see section 4.3) as key oper-
ational capabilities of the system specified by the stakeholders or determined
from the security policy of the organization. For example, an achieve goal (see
figure 4.3) "only valid users are allowed to access firmware flashing functions"
is specified by analyzing the firmware flashing specification. As a result of this
activity, we accumulated a goal knowledge base and hold the relationships
between ontology related classes and subclasses, as illustrated in figure 4.3.
• In step 3 of the SREP, we presented the system architecture models (in sec-
tion 4.4) for building the behavioral and structural models for firmware flash-
ing application, during the early stages of system development. This step of
the SREP is performed incrementally, by iterative analysis of the functional
models and of the mapping view. Figure 4.4, 4.7, and 4.12 gives an overall
view and results of how the step 3 is applied in the context of identifying
system assets and their behavior. Furthermore, we instantiated the system
architecture ontology to build a knowledge base about structural and behav-
ioral models (see figure 4.3, 4.5, 4.8, and 4.13) that are constructed during the
system architecture modeling.
• In step 4 of the SREP, we have used the results, in the form of knowledge base,
from step 2 and step 3, and performed a complete assessment and security
analysis of system assets and goals in chapter 5. It involves a security analysis
process (presented in section 5.2), that is, a dual model of threats to the system
model: it shows how system assets can be attacked within multilayered system
perspective and how this attack knowledge (i.e., attack knowledge base) can be
shared with other system development activities. As a result of this activity,
we accumulated knowledge about potential malicious activities into an attack
knowledge base in the form of a SysML Attack Tree Diagram (ATD) (see figure
5.2). We highlighted the different threats in terms of what the adversary is
trying to achieve (i.e., attack type, attack method, etc.) and what are the
adversary capabilities.
• Based on the results of the above steps, we have performed a risk analysis in
section B.1.1. In particular, we have used the risk model [129] developed in
the EVITA project [117], which indicate the risk level (see Table B.4), based
on the potentiality (equal to severity level + likelihood/probability) and the
maximum impact level on the concerned system assets.
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After gathering knowledge about different system development activities, we now
show how these knowledge bases can be adopted in SR identification step. Following
the line of reasoning suggested in section 2.4.1, we start the requirement identifi-
cation process by querying and applying inferences rules on the already developed
knowledge bases of different security classes. For instance, let us turn back to the
case of identifying SRs from the security goal and let us show how our model can
integrate capabilities of goal-oriented [38] approaches to identify SRs. In this case,
we use the following types of rule to select suitable security goals from the goal
knowledge base (cf. section 4.3):
Goal(?g) ∧ hasAchieveGoal(?g, ?AchieveGoal)
→ select(?g, ?AchieveGoal) (6.1)
This query will return goals (i.e., "only valid users are allowed to access firmware
flashing functions") with a known ontology class type that is an "AchieveGoal".
Thus, based on the result of query, we analyze goals and derive SRs. For instance,
"only valid users are allowed to access firmware flashing functions" goal can be
refined into "ensure authenticity" security requirement as shown in figure 6.1. In
addition, queries can also operate in conjunction with rules from other security
classes (i.e., system architecture, use cases, etc.) and can be used to identify SRs
inferred by those rules. This for instance is the case of model-driven [54, 88, 151] en-
gineering approaches where security requirements are identified in accordance with
goals and system architecture. Consider for example that during the system archi-
tecture design, system architect specified the "AvoidGoal": "avoid service station
from gaining root access of CU" (see figure 4.3) in order to protect the CU. Thus
during the SR identification phase, we can use the following rule (equation 6.2) to
retrieve a set of "AvoidGoals" and their relationships with specific component of the
system architecture.
Goal(?g) ∧ hasAvoidGoal(?g, ?AvoidGoal) ∧
Architecture(?a) ∧ hasComponent(?a, ?component) ∧ (6.2)
Component(?c) ∧ hasHardware(?c, Hardware) → select(?g, ?c)
Based on the result of this query, we decide what kind of SR is required to avoid
service station from gaining root access of the CU. As you can see from the query that
we also extract the knowledge about the system architecture like system component,
and its subclasses (i.e., type of system asset, in/out parameters, functions, etc.) in
order to analyze different properties of systems. In particular, the object of this
query is to extract the knowledge from two different knowledge bases (i.e., goal and
system architecture), analyze them together and define a security requirement. In
this case, for example, we can specify "controlled access rights to CU" requirement
to restrict the rights of service station to access different functionaries of the CU, as
shown in figure 6.4. We can further identify SR by analyzing the security attacks
on the system assets and goals. For example, while browsing the attack knowledge
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(using Rule 6.3) about firmware flashing application we might stop on the attack
that corresponds to our above mentioned example, where an adversary (i.e., service
station) gain root access of CU by "installing bogus authority keys" (see attack tree
node – AT 4.a in figure 5.2).
Attack(?a) ∧ hasActiveAttack(?a, ?Active)
∧ hasFunctionalAttack(a?, ?Functional) ∧Asset(?CU) (6.3)
→ select(?a, ?Active, ?Functional, ?CU)
In this case, we can specify "restrict access rights to install keys in the vehicle"
security requirement as shown in figure 6.4. The purpose of this SR is to prevent
service station to install any kind of authority key in the vehicle, which might allow
him to gain access to different parts of the on-board architecture. In a similar
way, we can go through each ontology class, as well as a combination of different
relationships in order to infer and derive SRs. In the next section, we model these
identified SRs in the SysML SRs diagram, and enrich them with ontological details
(cf. SR ontology presented in section 2.4.2.4), such as type of the requirement, its
kind, etc.
6.2.1 Security Requirement Modeling
We now illustrate the modeling of security requirements in the SysML SRD and
show how we can use ontological concepts. We will continue our discussion using the
firmware flashing example from the previous chapters. Using the two main SR types
(i.e., FSR, NFSR) introduced in the section 2.4.2.4, the first subsection is dedicated
to Functional Security Requirements. Next, we present the Non-Functional Security
Requirements that are also necessary to secure the firmware flashing process.
6.2.1.1 Functional Security Requirements – FSR
This section describes the security requirements that a system or system component
has to ensure during the firmware flashing process.
• Ensure authenticity: This security requirement specifies that the se-
curity features of a firmware flashing application shall require each entity
(i.e., internal or external) to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any firmware update action to be executed. This involves: ensure the iden-
tity of a service station, and firmware authentication. We use the SysML
«containment» relationship and group all these requirements together under
the abstract security requirement "ensure authenticity" in order to organize
requirements in well-formed structure, as shown in figure 6.1. From the onto-
logical point of view, we analyze each security requirement and map them to
appropriate ontological classes. For instance, "ensure the identity of a service
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Figure 6.1: Authenticity security requirements
station" SR is a specific requirement defined for the firmware flashing appli-
cation. During modeling this requirement we classify this requirement as a
"Domain Specific" SR, and specify this in SR diagram by selecting the tagged
value of the "Classification" property as Shown in the Figure 6.1. In a similar
way, we also specify the type of SR by selecting an appropriate value from its
list of tagged values. For instance, in the case of authenticity security require-
ment, we select the "User Identification and Authentication" as a "Type" of
SR. In addition, following our reference concept, introduced in section 3.3.3,
a reference to the attack tree node (i.e., see attack tree node – AT.4 in figure
5.2), a reference to the system assets (i.e., Middleware), and a value about the
risk level (i.e., High) is also computed for each SR and specified in the SysML
SR element.
• Ensure Integrity: This security requirement should of course be monitored
to check whether a message sent between service station and on-board com-
ponents is unaltered, but also with respect to guarantee that the content of a
storage facility are not modified between two given read operations, or even to
ensure that the execution of the software implementing a service is not being
attacked through a modification to the execution environment or the code it
runs. Figure 6.2 depicts an aggregation of these security requirements using
the SysML «containment» relationship. As before, we analyze each ontological
concept for each of these requirements and map them to appropriate ontology
terms and concepts defined as a controlled vocabulary.
• Ensure Freshness: This security requirement prevents an adversary from
performing replay attacks in which a valid data is maliciously or fraudulently
repeated or delayed. In this context, this requirement is defined to ensure that
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Figure 6.2: Integrity security requirements
all the messages and data exchanged between entities (i.e., DT, CU, ECU, etc.)
fulfill the freshness property. Even so, we also need to ensure the freshness
of firmware data and the freshness of all the messages along functional path.
Besides this, it is also imperative to ensure the freshness of flashing commands
sent from diagnosis tool. Figure 6.3 depicts the SysML representation of these
requirements along with mapping of ontological terms and concepts.
Figure 6.3: Freshness security requirements
• Ensure Authorization: This security requirement is specified to prevent the
gathering of unauthorized access rights to the resources. During the firmware
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update process, it is required that the system uses the access control rules
to decide whether access requests from the (authenticated) service station,
using the diagnosis tool, for an installation of the firmware shall be approved
or disapproved. Moreover, it is also required to restrict the access rights for
accessing the flash memory, reading from the flash, and also limiting the access
rights to firmware update functions, or restricting access to install authority
keys as shown in figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Authorization security requirements
• Ensure Confidentiality: This security requirement is defined to ensure that
the authorized entities are the only ones that can know any secret of informa-
tion (i.e., firmware data, firmware shared keys, etc.). In the firmware update
scenario, this requirement is mainly specified in order to prevent an adversary
from accessing the firmware code, analyzing its structure, function, and in-
jecting his own code in the original firmware flashing code. Figure 6.5 demon-
strates the SysML representation of Confidentiality requirement.
Figure 6.5: Confidentiality security requirements
• Ensure Availability: This security requirement is focusing on properties
that should be maintained despite denial of service attacks, coming either un-
der the form of computational resource oriented DoS, network DoS, or even
degradation of real-time constraints. In this context, an availability require-
ment applies to a service provided by the ECU, or to platform running on
the ECU, or to physical components of the ECU (i.e., CPU, RAM, or Bus)
providing a service. This requirement is satisfied when some service is opera-
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tional during operational periods. It is further detailed with the specification
of the period during which the availability is required and of a set of entities
requesting the availability. Figure 6.8 depicts the SysML representation of
availability requirements mapping of ontological terms and concepts.
Figure 6.6: Availability security requirements
6.2.1.2 Non-Functional Security Requirements – NFSR
The previous section showed how to define functional security requirements, their
classification. In this section, we present non-functional security requirements, which
are also essential to ensure the security of the firmware update process.
• Monitor the Network Traffic: This security requirement is focusing on
properties that the system should monitor about network or system activi-
ties, or policy violations. It should then trigger alerts on detecting unusual
behavior, during the firmware update process.
Figure 6.7: Monitor the network traffic security requirements
• Prevent Structural Weakness of the Firmware Keys: This security
requirement is defined to ensure that the keys to be used within the firmware
update process have a well-defined structure. They should therefore be large
enough so that a brute force attack (possible against any encryption algorithm)
is infeasible – i.e., would take too long to execute. As the security of the
firmware code is solely based on the strength of cryptographic keys and of
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the encryption algorithm, the difficulty for an adversary to obtain the key
determines the security of the firmware update process.
Figure 6.8: Prevent structural weakness of the firmware keys security requirements
6.3 Security Requirements Refinement
Although the refinement relationship is already defined and explored in aforemen-
tioned approaches for an explicit iteration of security requirements, an important
amount of diversification of this relationship still remains hidden and underspecified.
For example, those approaches generally lack any basic support for understanding
significant changes from the perspective of dependency relationships between differ-
ent artifacts (or security classes in our definition). In this perspective of an early
introduction of security concerns in the design of a system, security requirements
and goals are often originated from the functional behavior of the system. More
precisely, security requirements originate from the system functional specification,
and in particular from the system architecture artifacts themselves, as well as from
the threats identified on those components: in this respect, the SRE model should
also take into account the relationships between SRs and the specific context such
as attacks, goal, and architecture, that prompted their expression, which should
become increasingly detailed through refinement. The latter point of view is for
instance supported by approaches like ISO-15408 ([62], sec. 6.2), which links secu-
rity requirements with system assets. The next section describes in more detail the
different dimensions of the refinement of security requirements in the vision outlined
above.
6.3.1 What a SR Refinement is not . . .
In this section, we investigate how a fundamental flaw in state of the art approaches
to SRE limits the fulfillment of the refinement vision sketched above. A first step to-
wards this evaluation consists in analyzing the various relationships among different
artifacts that are involved in the security requirement identification process. We can
find various relationships and associations used in the literature, like the dependency
relationship [88, 93, 87, 47, 57, 141] or the composition relationship [69, 153, 57].
However, as mentioned in the literature review section 2.2, the impact of these re-
lationships on the iteration process is fairly neglected. With regards to iteration
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and relationship binding, each refinement step may have different implications on
the security requirement (or set of SRs). As an illustration to SR refinement, we
consider the dependency relationship and consider this relationship on our running
example (section 6.2). Figure 6.9, recaps the initial results obtained from the SREP.
(a) Partial view of the system architecture
AttackFirmwareFlashing
[AT.5] Prevent Service Station Installing Firmware
[AT.5.a] Denial of Service Atttack
... ... ...
(b) Partial view of attack tree
(c) Availability security requirement
Figure 6.9: Security requirements, Attack Tree, and System architecture
From the refinement point of view, the dependency relationship means that a sin-
gle change in any of the activity involved in the SREP (i.e., security attacks, goals,
system architecture) may lead to changes in SRs. Consider for example a case where
the security attack (i.e. DoS – attack tree node 1) would be prevented by modifying
the system architecture: there is no longer a need for any availability SR in that
case, or if the attack definition changes, the availability SR should meet the new at-
tack contract. For instance, we can assume that a number of previously considered
security attacks and vulnerabilities might not possible anymore, or refinement in the
system design makes it difficult for an adversary to exploit this attacks (i.e., DOS
attack). Nevertheless, we should not neglect the fact that sometimes such a refine-
ment can also make it easy for an adversary to exploit other security weaknesses. In
this regard, it is desirable that SRs are defined and refined in relation with the other
system wide development activities, because it may otherwise lead to inconsistent
and incomplete SR specifications. Inconsistencies often arise because multiple con-
flicting requirements are introduced into the SR, or because the system functional
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specifications themselves are in a transient stage of evolutionary development.
Additionally, we have learned from our experience towards security requirement
refinement [129], that sometimes a trivial adjustment in the functional specification
of the system architecture design or a small adaptation in the assumption specifica-
tion leads to a completely different realization or refinement of security concerns. For
example, during the system architecture design, suppose that functional requirement
about the message encoding scheme is changed from BER to DER [65], in order to be
compliance with underlying layers such as low level drivers and Hardware Security
Module (HSM) interfaces [136]. This variation in the system architecture design,
provides an opportunity to the expert adversaries, who have knowledge about sys-
tem architecture, to encode the messages with previously message encoding scheme
(BER), and send to the vehicle to make system busy in analyzing and decoding
unwanted message formats. This may lead to either system crash, or system re-
mains too busy in decoding unnecessary messages that it is not able to provide
services (i.e., DoS attacks) to other legitimate requests [58]. Furthermore, we have
experienced with a system, which is a combination of a heterogeneous landscape of
technologies (e.g., RPC) and includes various off-The-shelf components from third
parties: they also need to be analyzed and coordinated to determine and refine se-
curity requirements. We have identified several security attacks and vulnerabilities
(as mentioned in Chapter 5), due to the use of a middleware layer, which was in-
troduced in later stages of the system development [58]. From this perspective, SRs
and other system development activities have complementary relationships.
Walking through these different concerns, we note that we cannot simply rely on
just parallel refinement models. Instead, there are strong relationships between SRs,
system assets, and security attacks. There is a need for an integrated approach where
these security classes can be linked together; starting from an initial high level goal
specification and refining down to concrete security mechanisms that can be enforced
by the system model. However, existing frameworks or methodologies [70, 47, 88]
for SR refinement are falling short with respect to that objective as they consider
refinement separately in these different dimensions (if they even consider more than
one dimension). They also generally fail to link requirements together. The next
section describes our approach towards the refinement of security requirements in
relation to different security classes.
6.3.2 SR Refinement Process
Contrarily to what is often done in requirement engineering approaches, we develop
an approach for SR refinement which not only follows the iterative and incremental
development lifecycle but also deeply rely on the relationship and concepts defined
in the SREP (cf. Section 2.4.1). More precisely, the relationships coming from the
SREP are considered as the most important driving factor for the refinement of the
SRs specification. We in particular believe this consideration is of utmost impor-
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tance to realize the vision of security requirements engineering as the driving force
behind the design and implementation of a secure system. This approach can be
supported only by a constant dialog between the design of system functions, the
requirements that are attached to them, the design and development of the system
architecture, and the assessment of the threats to system assets, which would give
momentum to the refinement of the security requirements, as well as to that of the
system architecture and threat analysis. Thus, the focus is on refining the amount
of detail, which facilitates both the selection of the right architectural solutions and
the specification of a security rationale for architectural choices. For the purpose of
clarity, rather than refining the whole system development process, we refine only
that part having to do with security requirements refinement. The SR refinement
process, in particular, follows the same steps and inference rules as defined in the
SREP (cf. section 2.4.1), depending on the level of details and properties we are
interested in. That is to say, the preliminary constructed specifications (i.e., system
models, security attack specifications, risk metrics, and security requirements spec-
ifications) are refined to more detailed specification. As soon as the system models
are evolved to new states, where all the new functions and mapping parameters (i.e.,
arbitration policies, priorities, etc.) are specified with their possible values, we insert
this knowledge into the corresponding knowledge base of these security classes. For
instance, consider the case of structural models in particular architecture descrip-
tion (cf. section 4.4.2.2), where more detail about the RPC layer is included in the
middleware specification.
At the ontology level, we used the "hasSubclass" relationship (as described in
section 3.4) to link the definition of RPC layer with the middleware view. In this
case, we take advantage of new knowledge and analyze the evolved system models
for the identification of security attacks and vulnerabilities. For instance, we can
use the Equation 6.3 to extract the new knowledge about the system architecture.
This query returns a list of architecture components and their subclasses as shown
in figure 6.10. However, in order to limit the search space, we have used the concept
of reference attribute, defined in section 3.3.3, which links the design artifacts to the
security requirements as well as to security attacks. In this case, we only query for
those particular concepts that are referenced in the design. For example, if we look
at the "impersonating valid users" attack (see figure 6.11), a reference to system
asset "middleware" is specified in its reference parameter. We use this value and
query (Rule 6.3) the architecture ontology to detect and analyze the current state of
this particular architecture component. This query returns a value RPC layer and
its subclasses such as "FirmwareFlashing", "log_off", etc as shown with dotted lines
in the Figure 6.10. Based on the result, we infer and refine the threats using rules
specified in Section 5.2, and embed this knowledge into the attack tree diagram.
Note that the refinement process goes on until reaching terminal conditions that
are either realizable security attacks in view of the adversary’s capabilities. This is
illustrated in figure 6.11, which shows the refinement of an attack tree node (AT.4.b)
into a "log_off" attack (AT.4.b.1). A detail description of this attack is presented in
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Figure 6.10: Ontological representation of the refined system architecture
section 5.4. In addition, while refining attack tree, we add/update the source value
(i.e., source of the attack) in the reference attribute, which in this case is "RPC
layer". In this way, it is possible to make sure that, at the given level of abstraction,
for example, a particular security attack is discovered due to some specific system
configuration. Using reference attributes in this way increase the maintainability of
security attacks as well as security requirements and makes its unnecessary repeating
the same rule for different ontology classes. On the one hand, the use of a reference
attribute also solves the problem, which we exposed in Section 6.3.1. It provides us
with a way to link with different system development activities as well as allows us
to support step-by-step refinement to fulfill our refinement design principles.
In the next stage of the refinement process, we use this newly generated knowl-
edge and decide if any refinement of SR is required, or whether SR still covers the
desired goals, attacks, system requirements, etc. In particular, we use different in-
ference rules (as described in section 6.2), and combination of different condition
to refine the security requirements. For instance, we can consider the Rule 6.3
to extract the knowledge about security attacks and their targeted system assets.
This rule for instance returns the "log_off" attack and the "RPC layer" as a re-
sult. Based on this result we refine the "ensure the identity of a service station"
requirement into " RPC layer authentication" (see figure 6.12), which states "RPC
member functions should only be executed by the entity that authenticated as that
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Figure 6.11: Refined Attack Tree
designated in the parameter". We use the SysML «deriveReq» relationship in order
to specify the relationships between these requirements. The SRs that results from
a refinement cycle are at a refinement level suitable to prevent security attacks and
meet the requirement of refined system architecture. We may thus now apply our
reference concept here again to relate security requirement with the security attack
(i.e., AT1.1) and a reference to the system asset (i.e., RPC layer) is specified in the
SR diagram in order to link and maintain the relationship between different models.
The goal of this step is to refine the SR specification so that enhances and clarifies
previously specified SRs in relation to other security classes (i.e., attacks, goals, etc.)
and their constructs.
6.4 Security Requirements Traceability
In the previous chapters, we have defined the different processes to perform the SRE,
through a conceptual construction of ontologies and associated security classes. The
SREP describes an iterative and incremental construction of the SR specification
whose focus is to provide a relationship between the SRs, the security attacks, and
the other system development activities like the architecture design. However, as
mentioned in the chapter 2, major concern in designing secure systems, especially
the ones with evolving security requirements, is tracing the source of requirements
and understanding why and how the system meets the current set of security re-
quirements. In this context, it is essential to maintain the traceability link between
security requirements and the other security classes during the system development
process. However, as can be seen from the above SRE model, linking security re-
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Figure 6.12: Derived security requirements
quirements to their sources, and providing traceability links during the SREP can
be along several dimensions. In particular, different roles (i.e., business modelers,
security engineers, test and verification teams, etc.) contribute to capturing and
building the SR specification, often with divergent perspectives. For instance, the
types of relationships of interest to a test engineer are tracing and verifying the
relationship between security goals and enforced security requirements. In contract,
a security engineer interests are in providing the link between security requirements
and other security classes. To help in this alignment, we developed security require-
ments traceability metamodel (see figure 6.13). The purpose of this metamodel is
at least two fold:
• Building the source – target relationship between different security classes to
trace the origin of security requirements across different system development
efforts.
• Allowing designers to link and show that the security classes, more specifi-
cally security requirements meets the system design at different development
stages, and helping with the early recognition of those security requirements
not satisfied by the system design.
In our context, as introduced in chapter 3 and exemplified in our various examples,
we have used the reference attribute to link all different security classes and their
generated artifacts. In the case of traceability relationship between security require-
114 Chapter 6. Security Requirement Engineering
ments and other security classes (i.e., system assets, security attack class, etc.), the
reference element of the meta-model is defined by:
• A security class (Source), which references an element of the security class(es).
More specifically, the source relation documents the essence, which the secu-
rity requirement is based on. The source element can be, for example, a system
asset, an attack tree node(s), a value from the risk matrices, or security re-
quirements.
• A security class (Target), which references an element of the security require-
ments class.
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Figure 6.13: Security requiremnt traceability metamodel
As discussed earlier, the advantage of the source – target relationship as a seed
for the subsequent analysis is that, we can directly relate different security classes
(i.e., security attacks, security requirements, etc.) with their origin, as well as with
the reason for their existence. However, one of the concerns in managing traceability
links is that SRs originates from multiple sources and also have strong dependency
relationships with one another. In this context, a composite reference is required
to group and trace SRs though the lifecycle at the different level of granularity. By
“composite reference”, we mean aggregating individual references into one or more
complex traceability links. To support these security requirements traceability links,
we have made several extensions to SysML semantic (presented in section 3.3), in
order to link and cross-reference SysML diagrams (i.e., SysML AT Diagrams, SysML
SR Diagrams, etc.) with one another. We also used the SysML «trace» relationship
to add a source reference to any SysML model item, thus indicating its origin. Once
the reference attribute is specified, we can obtain a detailed report of the SRs traced,
using the TTool report generation mechanism. A SR traceability table, shown in
figure 6.14, illustrates the interest of this reporting feature. In this table, the ID
column depicts the identifiers of SRs and also indicates the dependencies between
different security requirements at the different levels of system abstraction such as,
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Figure 6.14: Security requirement traceability table
AUT-1 and AUT-1.a, AUA-1.b and so on (see figure 6.1). The following two columns
(Name, Type) represent the SR and defied SR type. The Kind column specifies the
more concrete category these requirements belong to. The columns Targeted Attack
and Reference Element contain a reference of the attack tree node and a reference to
system asset elements for which the security requirement is specified. Our summary
table (figure 6.14) illustrate the capabilities of our tool in tracing SRs along with
additional properties, which we have specified in SRO such as the type of SR, SR
kind, as well as assumptions (if defined) during the security requirements engineering
process, etc.
6.5 Where we Stand
The expression of security requirements is central when it comes to describing how
to secure a system. We reviewed in chapter 2.2, SRE approaches and in particular
how appropriate they are for the identification, the refinement, and the traceability
capabilities to security requirements. Table 6.1, summarizes the core capabilities
of our SRE methodology (SysMLsec) in comparison with other SRE approaches.
The main observation concerning this comparison table is that currently there is no
perfect match with respect to the capabilities that SRE should provide.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented the SREP that help in capturing the charac-
teristics of SRs and the way these characteristics can be specified using the SysML
representation. The aim of specifying security requirements is to provide an input to
the secure on-board architecture design, to the model-based verification, to the pro-
tocol specification, and to the security architecture implementation. We illustrated
why security requirements can be refined with enough precision for supporting the
design of security architecture provided if they are extensively linked with security
attacks and the system architecture. Finally, we presented traceability metamodel
to facilitate tracking, management and assurance of SRs to support our approach.
We believe that, SREP is expressive enough to model and build fine-grained SR
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Table 6.1: Comparative analysis of security requirements approaches. The degree
of fulfillment will be "" for available properties, "" for not available, and "⊞"
for partly or optionally available properties.
specifications; at the same time, the complexity of adapting SREP to subsequent
stages of the system development lifecycle is manageable.
Part III
Security Requirements
Enforcement

Chapter 7
Constructing Security
Specification of Cryptographic
Protocol Design
7.1 Introduction
When developing cryptographic protocols, the most common design principle is
specifying the behavior of protocols, security properties to be enforced, as well as
discussing the context/environment in which they will be used. While this simple
logic is not always explicit or evident when one designs cryptographic protocols,
there are various dilemmas in describing knowledge of cryptographic protocols in
this manner, in particular, two important issues. First, the notion of knowledge
typically depends upon certain mixes of functional and non-functional constructs
and the knowledge of a few system parameters: the sequences of states or events
(protocol itself), security requirements, the operational environment and system
boundaries, and security expertise about security mechanisms. Second, a more im-
portant problem relates to how this security knowledge and conceptual foundations
for different security classes (i.e., security requirements, security algorithms, secu-
rity mechanisms, etc.) is shared and used in the design of cryptographic protocols.
We experienced during the design and verification of cryptographic protocols for
automotive on-board network that, even though the protocols are based on crypto-
graphic building blocks, and proven backed by hardware mechanisms, the adversary
is still capable of performing considerably simple attacks (cf. logoff attack presented
in section 5.4). In particular, such kind of attacks are possible due to the lack of
relationship binding between different architecture layers and also due to the weak
association with other security constructs (i.e., security requirements, system ar-
chitecture, etc.). In a similar way, it is also challenging to decide about security
mechanisms and security controls without having enough details about all involved
artifacts, their properties, and how security related information is exchanged and
used by different functions in the protocol specification. Given these constraints,
constructing cryptographic protocols is a subtle and complex task, because it is diffi-
cult to speak of any logic for security protocols without relating to different security
constructs and classes. In this perspective, we argue that the concept of ontologies
make it clearer what are the relationship between security mechanism and security
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requirements. In general, such ontology allows a cryptographic protocol, together
with its knowledge representation, to be constructed in accordance with functional
and non-functional security aspects of system architecture.
The focus of this chapter is consolidating and developing the relationship among
different ontologies that can be used to design cryptographic protocols specifica-
tion. In section 7.2, we propose ontology for cryptographic protocols design, which,
in turn, facilitates the construction of cryptographic protocols. With an ability
to refer to different security constructs, the proposed ontology provides modular-
ization in such a way that cryptographic protocols can be combined and, when
appropriate, interchanged while preventing that certain security functionality is im-
plemented redundantly. In the sequel, in section 7.3, we present an OTA firmware
update cryptographic protocol to show how this security protocol ontology is em-
ployed in order to secure firmware update process. As already highlighted in chapter
5, attacks on the in-vehicle network have serious consequences for the driver. If an
adversary can downgrade the legitimate firmware with his malicious firmware, he
can essentially control the functionalities of the vehicle and perform arbitrary ac-
tions on the in-vehicle network. The OTA firmware flashing cryptographic protocol
has especially been designed with respect to these attacks as well as by consider-
ing the functional and non-functional requirements of such heterogeneous on-board
architectures. Our approach provides the link between hardware security anchors
(integrated security modules) and software security framework, which is necessary
to achieve an enhanced trust level for safety-critical applications like influencing the
vehicle’s behavior. Section 7.4, reviews the capabilities of existing OTA firmware
update protocols in comparison with our own protocol specification. In section 7.5,
general conclusions concerning the functionality of security protocol ontology and
the design rational of firmware update cryptographic protocol for such heterogeneous
automotive networks are drawn.
7.2 Ontology for Cryptographic Protocols
The objective of ontology is to assist the protocol designer in reviewing and relating
different security concepts when designing the cryptographic protocol specification.
In this section, we highlight different security classes of the ontology (see Figure 7.1)
and the relationships binding between their conceptual foundations.
• Security Requirements class describe the desired security behavior ex-
pected of a system. In particular, the purpose of security requirements is
not only to specify per-assets security needs, but also to ease the selection
of appropriate security measures and the enforcement of security constructs.
We use the security requirement ontology (see Section 2.4.2.4) to extract the
knowledge about different security requirements and their classification.
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Figure 7.1: Cryptographic protocols ontology
• Security Mechanisms class describe methods and techniques that are used
to implement and enforce security requirements. More precisely, this class
serves as the "security building block" whose result is the basis for SRs en-
forcement. The organization of this class is depicted in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Core classes of security mechanisms ontology
– Security mechanisms classification: This class is defined to distinguish be-
tween different security mechanisms used to enforce security objectives.
We categorize security mechanism in to two categorizes: cryptography
and non-cryptographic security mechanism. For example, applying either
simple password based security solution can enforce authentication or
approaches like authentication with symmetric challenge-response tech-
niques or smart card based mechanisms like single sign-on (SSO), one
time password (OPT), etc. can be used. Each of these security mecha-
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nism represent different construct to achieve the same security objective;
that is based on non-cryptography and cryptography security constructs,
respectively.
– Security algorithms: This class is defined to categorize and systematically
aggregate security algorithms into a set of well-defined classes that pro-
vide a comprehensive description of cryptographic algorithms and their
objectives. Here, we can reuse the security algorithm taxonomies pro-
vided in [77, 157]. The organization of NRL algorithm taxonomy [77] is
depicted in Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: NRL security algorithm taxonomy [77]
– Security credentials: In this class, systems assets are classified in terms
of their properties towards security such as smart card, passport, fin-
gerprint, etc. To annotate specific system assets that support security
credential class, we reuse the credential taxonomy (see Figure 7.4) devel-
oped by NRL [77].
• System Architecture: The cryptographic ontology is further enriched with
knowledge about system architecture. The security architecture constitutes
the framework that describes how system assets interact and work together to
achieve global system objectives. In particular, it describes the behavioral and
structural models of the system, what each asset of the system does, and what
information is exchanged among system assets as well as security functional-
ities supported and provided by different components of system architecture.
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Figure 7.4: NRL security credentials taxonomy [77]
In this context, we can make a link to the previously defined system architec-
ture ontology (se Section 2.4.2.2), which provides different architect views (i.e.,
application view, middleware view, infrastructure view), and logical and con-
ceptual models of the system, and describes the relationships among different
assets.
7.3 Firmware Flashing Cryptographic Protocol
In the following we present a cryptographic protocol for firmware flashing application
and show how the different classes specified in the ontology can be adopted to build
a cryptographic protocol specification. We start building cryptographic protocol
specification by extracting and tracing back to different knowledge bases that we
have developed so far. For instance, let us start from extracting the knowledge
about functional security requirements (FSR) by querying (Rule 7.1) the security
requirement knowledge base. This query returns all the FSRs that we have specified
for firmware flashing application, during the SRE process.
SR(?r) ∧ hasFunctional(?r, ?FSR) → select(?r, ?FSR) (7.1)
Based on the results, we decided to select authenticity (Figure 6.1), integrity (Fig-
ure 6.2), freshness (Figure 6.3), authorization (Figure 6.4), and confidentiality (6.5)
as the security criteria of interest regarding the firmware update process. In addition,
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thanks to the knowledge specified in the SysML SR diagram, these SRs also provides
us details about security attacks they cover, and their relationships with system as-
sets. For instance, in order to prevent service station from "installing bogus
authority keys" (see SR – AT.4.b in Figure 5.2) in the Hardware Security Module
(HSM), we have specified the "ensure authenticity of service station" (see
SR – AUT.1.a in Figure 6.2) and "restrict access rights to the HSM" (see
SR – ATH.1.b in Figure 6.4) security requirements. Thus, facilitate us to decide
appropriate security mechanisms as well as how to enforce them in order to pre-
vent security attacks. For instance, we can enforce the "ensure authenticity of
service station" security requirement by defining a "digital signature" secu-
rity mechanism. In a similar way, we translate each security requirement into a
specific security mechanism or set of security mechanisms. In order to do so, we
first extract (Rule 7.2) the knowledge about system architecture such as type of an
ECU, its properties, security services supported by a particular system assets, etc.
Architecture(?a) ∧ hasFunctions(?a, ?Funtions)
∧ hasSequence(?Functions, ?Sequence) ∧ hasAssets(?a, ?Assets) (7.2)
→ select(?a, ?Functions, ?Assets, ?Sequence)
As we previously mentioned, the reason to extract the knowledge about system
architecture is to have enough details about all involved artifacts, their properties,
and what kind of information is exchanged and used by different functions in the
protocol specification. All these details will certainly help us to select appropriate
security mechanisms. For example, in order to satisfy the performance requirements
for signing and verifying messages for V2X communications, a very efficient asym-
metric cryptographic engine is required, whereas, for in-vehicle communication, we
make use of shared secrets (i.e., symmetric keys) due to cost and embedded con-
straints [161, 134]. Based on the analysis of the security requirements, the system
architecture as well as extracting knowledge from the security mechanism class,
we have specified the security primitives in section 7.3.1 and used these security
primitives to develop the secure firmware flashing protocols in section 7.3.3.
7.3.1 Security Primitives
In this section, we briefly describe the security primitives that are required during
firmware flashing process. In particular, the Hardware Security Module (HSM) pro-
vides these security primitives. A topology to enable ECUs to implement cryptog-
raphy security primitives in a secure manner is shown in Figure 7.5. In this figure,
the application CPU(s) of an ECU is equipped with a cryptography coprocessor
HSM. This module is responsible for performing all cryptography applications in-
cluding symmetric encryption/decryption, symmetric integrity checking, asymmet-
ric encryption/decryption, digital signature creation/verification, and generation of
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random numbers used for security applications.
Figure 7.5: Hardware Security Module – HSM [161]
• Signature: This function is used for demonstrating the authenticity and
integrity of a message. A valid signature gives a recipient reason to believe that
a known sender created the message, and that it was not altered in transit. For
signature generation, a signature generation scheme sig(m)k takes as input a
key k, and messagem, outputs a signature S; we write sig(m)k = {S}k. Where
k is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (s ; v). s is the signing key,
which is kept secret, and v is the verification key which is made public. We
also assume that a time stamp (UTC Time) is generated and then also covered
by the signature calculation, and write m = (m+ t) to denote the message and
a time stamp whose signature is S. For the signature verification, ver_sig(m
, S)v → S
′ function is defined, takes as input the signature S, the signature
verification public key part v, and outputs the answer S ′ which is either succeed
(signature is valid) or fail (signature is invalid). As a precondition, the v must
be loaded and enabled for verification.
• Message Authentication Code – MAC: This function is used to protect
both the data integrity and the authenticity of a message, by allowing verifiers
(who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content.
For generating a MAC as well as the message itself, the notation MAC (m)k
= {M}k is used, so that it produces the message itself plus the cryptographic
authentication code based on k andm. Here, k refers to a cryptographic key for
MAC generation and m to the message to be authenticated. In the same way
as for signatures, the use of the time stamp m = (m+t) is covered by the MAC
calculation. For the verification of a MAC, the notation ver_MAC(m,M) is
used. Based on the k, it is verified whetherM corresponds to the message m.
• Key Management: This module provides following functionalities for inter-
nal key creation (using the internal RNG), key import and export:
– Key Creation is used for the creation of a key k on a hardware module,
using HSM Create_Random_Key function. All properties of the key are
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determined and fixed during creation. This includes the cryptographic
algorithm to be used, the use and further property use flags indicating
what actions may be done with this key (i.e., sign and verify) as well as
the authorization data needed for key usage. Additionally, the creator of
a key has the possibility to set individual usage authorizations (use flags)
for each key usage. The use flag parameter indicates the operations that
may be performed with the key. In particular, the following flags are
present:
∗ sign|verify: Key can be used to generate and/or verify digital
signatures or H/MACs of any data.
∗ encrypt|decrypt: Key can be used to encrypt and/or decrypt any
data.
∗ secureboot: Can be used to create/verify secure boot references.
∗ keycreation: Can be used for creation of new keys, e.g. via key
derivation functions (symmetric) or DH key agreement (asymmetric).
∗ securestorage: Can be used to realize (locally bound) secure stor-
age
∗ utcsync: Can be used for synchronizing internal tick counter to
UTC.
∗ transport: Can be used to protect transports of keys (i.e., migra-
tion, swapping, move) between locations, according to individual
transport flags (i.e., 0 = INT, 1 = MIG ,2 = OEM, 3 = EXT).
Only the use flag may explicitly be set by the creator whereas further
property flags are set inherently. Once created, the key properties are
unchangeable. As output, the function delivers a key handle for later
usage of the key.
– Key Export is used for moving keys between different HSMs, between
HSMs and external (trusted) locations (if permitted). The HSM pro-
vides key_export functionality that ensures confidentiality by encrypting
(E(k)Tk) private key internals via a special transport key (Tk) (symmetric
or asymmetric) transport encryption as well as authenticity of all key data
structures via (symmetric or asymmetric) so-called transport authentic-
ity codes (i.e., a digital signature or a MAC). The key authenticity code
can be an explicit symmetric key enabled with use flag = verify or an
implicit symmetric/asymmetric key derived from a transport key. The
use of this key authenticity code is mandatory. As output, the function
delivers the encrypted key together with its authentication code; we write
E(k)Tk= {Ke}Tk . As an important precondition, the specified transport
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key must be loaded and enabled to be used for transport. Furthermore,
the transport flag of the key to be exported must be appropriately marked
according to the type of module managing the transport key.
– Key Import is used for importing keys into HSM or to other trusted par-
ties. In this way, the key_import function provides the counterpart to
the previously described export function. The key k may be imported ei-
ther into the non-volatile memory or into the main memory (RAM) of the
HSM. In the same manner as for key export, the use of the key authen-
ticity code is mandatory. As output, the function delivers a key handle
to reference the key for later usage. As a precondition, the transport key
must be loaded and enabled before. In addition, the authentication code
verification key must be loaded if the key is protected by a signature.
• Key Master – KM: We introduce a new functional entity, which we call the
key master. As there exist multiple variants of the HSM, that support different
cryptographic keys (symmetric/asymmetric), we had to take this into account
for key distribution. The KM is a central element in the establishment of a
session between entities. It holds public key (P) and pre-shared keys (Sk) of
the individual ECUs, which are used as transport keys, to establish a secure
session. This functional entity resides on a dedicated ECU or is integrated
into another ECU. There may be more than one KM node in a vehicle for
replication purposes.
• Monotonic Counter: serves as a simple secure clock alternative while pro-
viding at least 16 monotonically increasing 64-bit counters together with cor-
responding access control similar to TCG’s monotonic counters [42]. For
handling these counters, the following HSM functions are provided: Cre-
ate_counter; Read_Counter, Increment_Counter, and Delete_Counter. Ac-
cess authorization data needs to be provided as input data, and is later nec-
essary to create, increment or delete the counter.
• Pseudo Random Number Generator: creates pseudo random numbers
with a PRNG algorithm specified on invocation that can be seeded internally
from a physical true random number generator (TRNG) or from an external
TRNG during production in a controlled environment of the chip man- ufac-
turer. The latter case additionally requires a proper seed update protocol. All
prototype modules provide at least an officially evaluated PRNG according to
E.4 [131] (e.g., AES- or hash-based).
7.3.2 Assumptions and Constraints
Before sketching the protocol, we describe some additional assumptions and con-
straints that have to be taken into account for secure firmware updates: including
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the secure storage of key material in the diagnostic tool and secure transport of
firmware data over the on-board bus system (i.e., CAN).
• HSM in the Diagnostic Tool: As mentioned already in Chapter 5, there
are numerous scenarios, where an attacker targets the diagnostic tool (DT).
For instance, the attacker might inject bogus authority keys into the ECU,
through DT, which compromises the overall security of the vehicular on-board
architecture In particular, this means that the DT stores challenges and public
strings for key recovery (i.e., ECU unlock key) and is therefore responsible for
the security of the subsystem. Therefore, this information needs to be stored
securely on the DT-side. An additional advantage of HSM is the resistance
against physical tampering of the DT. Any damage to the HSM changes the
behavior and therefore prevents the extraction of secret key material.
• Bandwidth Limitations of In-vehicle Networking Technologies: Firmware
update protocols comprise two parts: a V2I part, and an intra-vehicular part,
the latter involving a large number of interconnected ECUs. Secure transport
protocols are needed for the exchange of on-board messages. In the on-board
bus systems used, a specific restriction lies in the limited size of data packets.
For the CAN bus, for example, this means that only eight bytes of payload
may be transmitted at a time. For this purpose, secure common transport
protocols (S-CTP) [59], extensions of the CTP defined in [15] are applied to
diagnosis jobs, where typically larger data chunks need to be transmitted.
7.3.3 Cryptographic Protocol Specification
To simplify the description of the protocol, we split the firmware update protocol in
five sequential phases named (1) remote diagnosis, (2) ECU reprogramming mode,
(3) firmware encryption key exchange, (4) firmware download, and (5) firmware
installation and verification. In the next subsections, we describe the design of the
firmware flashing protocol. The resulting protocol is shown in Figure 7.6.
7.3.3.1 Remote Diagnosis
In the firmware flashing process, a service station using a diagnostic tool (DT) con-
nects remotely to a vehicle, using V2I communication channel, to assess the state of
the vehicle. To know which version is installed, a diagnosis of the vehicle is required
to have all necessary information such as ECU type, firmware version, and date of
last update. An employee of the station using the DT establishes a secure connec-
tion with the vehicle, at the ECU level, in order to determine the current state of
the vehicle.
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To do so, DT creates a session key ks (exportable), by sending a HSM command
create random key and specifies the set of allowed key properties as
ks : create_random_key(target_algorithm_identifier, key_size, valid_until
memory_target{nv|ram}, key_usage_size, key_usage_data)
(7.3)
It then calls export function (see Equation 7.4) of the HSM to encrypt the ks,
using Pb
1 (Public key of the central communication unit – CU) as a transport key
(Tk), and transmits a freshly created session key along with its signature to the
vehicle, gives us message exchange as shown in Equation 7.5.
{Ks}Pb : key_export(key_handle, use_flags transport_key_handle (7.4)
transport_key_authorization_size, authenticity_key_handle
authenticity_key_authorization_size, authenticity_key_authorization)
A → B : m, {S}sa here, m = ({Ks}Pb + t) (7.5)
Here, the CU is the first receiving entity in the vehicle, responsible for receiving
and distributing messages to the on-board network. In the vehicle, the CU, equipped
with the HSM and acting as a key master (KM) node, receives the connection
request. The authorization for the connection is verified in the CU, by calling
the PDM. The message is checked for freshness, integrity and authentication of the
service station is also verified by calling the EAM. If the check succeeds, CU imports
the key ks into the HSM (see Equation 7.6). It then exports the received {Ks}Pc
with the corresponding Pc and distributes it to the target ECU (see Equation 7.7)
in order to enable end-to-end communication. This message includes all information
that is necessary to deliver this message to the correct ECU.
Ki : key_import(transport_key_handle, transport_key_authorization_size, (7.6)
transport_key_authorization, authenticity_key_handle
authenticity_key_authorization_size, authenticity_key_authorization, memory_target,
import_key_size, import_key, key_authenticity_code_size, key_authenticity_code)
B → C : m, {S}sb here, m = ({Ks}Pc + t) (7.7)
On the receiving side, ECU verifies the integrity, authenticity and authorizations
of CU as well as for DT, based on the policies specified in PDM as to whether DT
1For clarity reasons of our OTA firmware update protocol description, we denote the diagnostic
tool (DT) as “A”, the communication unit (CU) as “B”, ECU as “C”, and the OEM as “D”. Fur-
thermore, all cryptographic operations such as generation or import/export, signature verification,
integrity checks, etc. take place inside the respective HSMs.
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is allowed to deliver a message or not. If this is true, and the message is fresh, ECU
imports the ks in the HSM, using the same equation defined in 7.6. Once key ks
have imported, an acknowledgment is sent back to DT. After this acknowledgment
frame, the DT sends, depending on the option chosen by the employee of the service
station, requests to read out diagnosis information (State/Log information) from
the ECU it wants to check.
Advance Notification: Due to legal reasons and to allow for flexible deploy-
ment, we consider that service station will send an advance notification of possible
firmware updates, if the type is the expected one. This advance notification is in-
tended to help customers plan for the effective deployment of updates, and includes
information about the number of new updates being released. These updates still
need to be approved for install before downloading. The customer receives this
information on the vehicle human-machine interface (HMI) and can decide about
possible deployment (i.e., Install, Decline, Decide later, etc.). Only updates that
have the approval status Install will be downloaded to the vehicle. Disabling any
ECU while vehicle is running may cause safety critical problems, depending on the
function ECU is responsible for. We thus assume that additional checks will be
performed by the on-board system, to ensure that the vehicle is stopped and has ac-
cess to the infrastructure, before switching the ECU into the re-programming mode.
Furthermore, we assume that the V2I communication is available throughout the
OTA firmware update process.
7.3.3.2 ECU Re-Programming Mode
If the type is the expected one, the DT forces the ECU to switch from an application
mode into a re-programming mode by requesting a seed (see Equation 7.8). This
seed is required to calculate an ECU specific key value to unlock the ECU for re-
programming. The ECU verifies desired security properties. ECU verifies whether
m is authentic and fresh by verifying the {M}ks . If it is true, ECU sends a HSM
command SecM_Generate(seed) to generate a seed Na as shown in Equation 7.9.
It then encrypts the seed E(Na)ks for confidentiality enforcement, compute a M
using key ks and transmits it to the DT (see Equation 7.10).
A → C : m, {M}ks , here, m = (request_seed + t) (7.8)
Na : rng_get_random(algorithm_identifier, random_byte_request_size) (7.9)
A ← C : m, {M}ks here, m = (E(Na)ks + t) (7.10)
At the same time, the ECU sends a HSM command to compute the key on the
HSM using Na. As output, the function delivers a Ku key, that is used to unlock
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the ECU as
Ku : secm_compute_key(secm_seed_type, secm_word_type, secm_key_type) (7.11)
On the DT side, it verifies {M}ks , decrypts the received seed (E(Na)ks), and com-
putes the Ku with the aid of the received Na, using the same key computation
fuction as used by the ECU (see Equation 7.11). Once the Ku key value is com-
puted, it is exported {Ku}ks , using session key ks as a transport key, and transmitted
to the target ECU as
A → C : m, {M}ks here, m = ({Ku}ks + t) (7.12)
The ECU verifies the M, and compares the received Ku with the self-generated
Ku. If the two values are identical, the ECU is switched into unlock state (from
application mode to the re-programming mode) and sends an acknowledgement
message to the DT. This message is sent after the ECU is switched into the unlock
state to make sure the switch has been performed. The information whether a
re-programming request has been received or not shall be stored in non-volatile
memory, e.g. EEPROM. Since switching from the application to the re-programming
mode shall be done via a hardware reset, all contents of volatile memory will be lost
[92]. If the comparison failed, the flashloader [92] holds the ECU in locked state.
ECU re-programming is possible only in the unlocked state.
7.3.3.3 Firmware Encryption Key Exchange
In this phase we are considering two possible scenarios for exchanging firmware
encryption keys: (1) on-line solution and (2) off-line solution. In the on-line solution:
the service station has access to an online infrastructure of the manufacturer, it can
request the firmware and as well as the firmware encryption key – {K}ssk. Here,
the SSK is a stakeholder symmetric key pair [59], created externally, with use flag
= decrypt only, key for stakeholder individual usage e.g., software update. Instead,
in the case of off-line firmware is encrypted with the pre-installed SSK.
Considering current trends and advancements in the automotive industry, on-line
solutions provide more reliability, flexibility and will eventually increase the security
of the on-board network. Sharing the firmware encryption key only with specific
ECUs makes an on-line solution more robust and generic compared with of-line
approaches, where all vehicles share unique symmetric keys that are pre-installed in
the vehicles. In addition, the existence of various security levels in the architecture
[129], pleads for the specification of a validity period of the SSK (short term or
long term keys), for an individual ECU.
Following our results from security requirements engineering (cf. Non-Functional
Security Requirements – NFSR presented in section 6.2.1.2), we suggest to use short
term keys for firmware encryption. Short terms keys will expire after a short amount
of time and thus, as there is no need for instant revocation if keys are compromised.
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This has the advantage that OEMs do not have to go through another key migration
(installing new keys) process if keys are compromised. As such, the following section
only details the on-line solution. In this context, the DT sends a request to the OEM
server to get the firmware F encryption key (see Equation 7.13). This message m
includes information about the ECU (i.e., ECU type, ECU identification number,
firmware version, etc.).
A → D : m, {S}Pa here, m = (request_firmware_key + t) (7.13)
The OEM verifies whether m is authentic, fresh, and integrity protected by verifying
the signature S of the received message. If verified, OEM server retrieve the Pc from
the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), (possibly) maintained by an individual OEM
or by third parties, and exports SSK using Pc as a transport key. As the SSK key
blob is encrypted with the ECU key, It is not possible for the DT to retrieve the
firmware encryption key. The OEM server sends a message m with an encrypted
and signed firmware encryption key to the service station as
A ← D : m, {S}Pd here, m = ({Kssk}Pc + t) (7.14)
Next, the DT transmits the received firmware encryption key to the ECU as
A → C : m, {M}ks here, m = ({Kssk}Pc + t) (7.15)
The ECU imports the SSK in the HSM using the key import function (see
Equation 7.6). The key import function provides the assurance to the ECU that
the key is generated by the OEM, by verifying the authentication code send along
with the encrypted key, and can only be decrypted by the specific ECU key. After
importing the SSK in the HSM, the ECU sends an acknowledgment about the
successful import of the SSK.
7.3.3.4 Firmware Download
Once the SSK is successfully imported into the HSM, the DT sends the received
signed and encrypted firmware F along with its ECU Configuration Register (ECR)
reference to the Random-Access Memory (RAM) of the ECU. Following the HSM
use flag approach, where multiple key-properties areq set, only the OEM server can
sign and encrypt the firmware, whereas the receiving ECU can decrypt and verify
the received firmware, using the same key material, shared before. The encrypted
firmware is downloaded block by block (logical block). Each of those blocks is
divided into segments, which are a set of bytes containing a start address and a
length. The start address and the length of each segment is sent to the HSM during
the segment initialization. For one block, a download request is sent from the DT
to the ECU. The ECU initializes the decryption service and sends an answer to the
DT. The download then starts segment by segment. After sending the last firmware
segment, the DT sends a transfer exit message to the ECU as
A → C : m, {M}ks here, m = (transfer_exit + t) (7.16)
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7.3.3.5 Firmware Installation and Verification
For an installation of the firmware, we consider the standard firmware installation
procedure defined in [92], where each logical block is erased and re-programmed.
However, before the flash driver can be used to re-program an ECU, its compatibil-
ity with the underlying hardware, the calling software environment and with prior
versions of the firmware has to be checked. This compatibility check is performed
by means of version information stored in the HSM monotonic counters. The HSM
read counter function is used to read out the value of a counter. A counter identifier
previously increased after every authentic and successful installation of the firmware.
These monotonic counters are defined to perform such a checking of its current ver-
sion against the new firmware version in order to prevent the downgrading attacks
meant to install older firmware.
For the verification, we defined a two-step verification process: In the first step,
before re-programming, the ECU verifies the signature of the firmware data. This is
verified by using the pre-installed Manufacturer Verification Key MVK. It proves
that the software was indeed released from the OEM. In the second step: we con-
struct a tiny trusted computing base (TCB) during the installation phase. We
compute an ECR trusted chain at each step of the firmware installation. The ECR
reference is needed to ascertain the integrity/authenticity of the firmware data. An
extend ECR function is defined to build the ECR trusted chain. This function is
used for updating the ECR with a new hash value. The new value is provided as
input and chained with the existing value stored in the ECR, using a hash update
function. As output, the function delivers the updated ECR value.
After a successful installation of the new firmware data, software consistence
check is performed. The check for software dependencies shall be done by means
of a callback routine provided by the ECU supplier. This check is done after re-
programming and before setting the new ECR reference. Next, the compare ECR
function is called. This comparison can only be performed after all writing proce-
dures for the logical block have been finished. This function allows the direct com-
parison of the current ECR with a reference ECR value received with the firmware.
It is also possible that the ECR reference may be contained inside the firmware
itself. In this case the flashloader shall call a routine provided by the ECU supplier
to obtain the ECR reference. If the check succeeds, the HSM preset ECR function
is called. This function is used to manage references to ECR values by ECR indices
in the context of a secure boot. After successfully setting the ECR value, the HSM
increment counter function is called to increment the monotonic counter with the
new value. At the last step, the actual hardware reset is executed, the flash-loader
deletes (i.e. overwrites) the routines for erasing and/or programming the flash mem-
ory from the ECU’s RAM [92], thereby making sure those routines are not present
on the ECU in application mode. After the reset, the application is started.
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Error Handling: Each function of the HSM returns a status after its successful
or unsuccessful execution. Some functions may deliver further function specific error
codes. The value of the status shows the positive execution of the function or the
reason for the failure. In case of a failure, the flash process must stop with an error
code and the ECU enters the locked state.
Figure 7.6: Firmware flashing cryptographic protocol
In this section, we have presented a security protocol to show how hardware,
software security mechanisms can be used to achieve secure firmware updates pro-
cess. In particular, by using secure in-vehicle communication and a trusted platform
model, we showed how to establish a secure end-to-end link between the manufac-
turer, the service station and the vehicle. Despite the fact that a trusted platform
model entails certain constraints, such as the obligation to bind cryptographic keys
to a given boot configuration, we showed how the protocols we presented deal with
the update of the platform reference registers during the boot phase of an ECU.
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7.4 The State of the Art: Firmware Update
The past decade has seen a tremendous growth in the vehicular communication
domain, yet no comprehensive security architecture solution has been defined that
covers all aspects of on-board communication (data protection, secure communica-
tion, secure and tamper proof execution platform for applications). On the other
hand, several projects, namely GST [118], C2C-CC [16], IEEE Wave [160] and SeVe-
COM [120] have been concerned with inter-vehicular communication and have come
up with security architectures for protecting V2X communications.
These proposals essentially aim at communication specific security requirements
in a host-based security architecture style, as attackers are assumed to be within a
network where no security perimeter can be defined (ad-hoc communication). These
proposals consider the car mostly as a single entity, communicating with other cars
using secure protocols. Mahmud et al. [89] present a security architecture and dis-
cuss secure firmware upload, which depends however on a number of prerequisites
and assumptions (i.e., sending multiple copies to ensure firmware updates) in order
to make secure firmware update. However, sending multiple copies is not realis-
tic and imposes several constraints on the infrastructure. This proposal does not
consider automotive on-board networks, where domains are traditionally separated,
and due to functional and non-functional requirements. Furthermore, on-board key
management issues are not mentioned in their approach. Kim et al. [78] present
remote progressive updates for flash-based networked embedded systems. In their
solution a link-time technique is proposed which reduces the energy consumption
during installation. However, no security concern is addressed in this proposal.
Nilsson et al. discuss in [96, 98] provide a lightweight protocol and verification for
secure firmware updates over the air (SFOTA). In the SFOTA protocol, different
properties are ensured during firmware update protocol (i.e., data integrity, data
confidentiality, and data freshness). However, this approach also relies on strong
imposed assumptions in order to ensure the secure software upload: the authenti-
cation of the vehicle is not considered, keys are assumed to be stored securely and
the authors use a single encryption key for all the ECUs in a car. Furthermore, no
specific execution platform requirements are put forward by this proposal. In [97],
key management issues are discussed in relation with software updates. A rekey-
ing protocol is defined in order to distribute keys with only specific nodes in the
group. It also uses a multicast approach to update the software on a group of node.
However, we consider that different firmware’s are installed on different ECUs, de-
pending on the ECU functionalities, which makes multicast approach not useful.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, this approach also does not consider execution
platform requirements. It does not discuss about computation attacks, where the
attacker can learn and modify the firmware, during the installation phase or simply
prevent to update the counter, for later replay attacks.
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Hagai [135] presents an approach that takes hardware into account by providing a
secured runtime environment with a so-called Trust Zone on an ARM processor. In
contrast the solutions of [9, 48] are software based. The so called tools and enablers,
which are low-level and application-level security functions in [9] also cover a number
of on-board automotive use-cases, while leaving the essential link to the external
communication domain uncovered. The approach most closely related to our work
is that of the Herstelle-Initiative Software – HIS [92]. The flashing process defined
by the HIS provides a good basis for the OEMs, but the recommended protocol does
not provide all the necessary security functionalities (i.e., freshness). Furthermore,
this process only addresses hardwired firmware updates and does not provide any
information about which key is used for firmware encryption, in a heterogeneous
landscape of communication network technologies.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the concept of ontology for cryptographic pro-
tocols in order to build the foundations for designing secure protocols in accordance
with available security constructs and security classes. In particular, ontology makes
it possible to analyze and design the cryptographic protocols by combining and
binding system architecture, its security requirements, relationship with its security
mechanisms, and available security services provided by different system assets. We
have exemplified how the ontology can be used for building dedicated distributed em-
bedded system protocols like a vehicular on-board firmware flashing cryptographic
protocol specification. We showed how a root of trust in hardware could sensibly
be combined with software modules such as PDM, EAM, and KMM. These mod-
ules and primitives have been applied to show how firmware flashing can be done
securely. In contrast to existing approaches, the protocols presented in this chap-
ter, describe a complete process, which involves the service provider, the vehicle
infrastructure as well as the manufacturer and the service station. By using secure
in-vehicle communication and a trusted platform model, we show how to establish
a secure end-to-end link between the manufacturer, the workshop and the vehicle.
Chapter 8
Towards the Enforcement of
Access Control Security
Requirements
8.1 Introduction
The design and enforcement of security requirements, and in particular the access
control related requirements, is central to securing automotive on-board networks
from various attacks (i.e., RPC log-off function, intercept key data, etc.), but also
a relatively very complex task. There already exist a few automotive-capable se-
curity solutions (detailed in Section 8.5.3): these solutions have traditionally been
developed using standard security solutions in mind, where the vehicle is mostly
considered as a single entity or only concerned with only the enforcement of access
control are for protecting V2X communications. However, automotive on-board ar-
chitectures do not only rely on the simple enforcement of security rules but also
involve multiple enforcement points, especially when the underlying platforms and
infrastructures are providing services themselves, like HSM, or middleware layers.
Guided by our requirements engineering approach that specifies the security relevant
automotive requirements to mitigate several attacks and vulnerabilities on these sys-
tems [80, 128, 52, 163] as well as by the specific needs and constraints, we extracted
various types of access control requirements to analyze what kind of security policy
is required as well as to decide about the appropriate enforcement points. We have
identified the following set of security requirements whose expression must notably
be enforced by the access control architecture:
• Authorization requirements (see Figure 6.4) that specify to which extent a
certain entity is allowed to access and use a specific resource under a certain
condition
• Authentication related access control requirements (see Figure 6.1) that define
what level of authentication is required for corresponding role authorizations
The above requirements have to be coordinated, which should be reflected by
a comprehensive security policy. For instance, the security policy to be applied in
a vehicle is the combination of an invariant policy for the usage control of cryp-
tographic credentials of electronic control units, and a flexible networking security
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policy. The credential usage control policy is enforced by the HSM and possibly
through the virtualization of the ECUs if applications on the same ECU have to be
segregated. In contrast, the networking security policy is enforced by all network el-
ements. Moreover, the access control architecture must also allow enforcing the rule
to limit the traffic on the buses under consideration, based on trusted authentica-
tion or other security mechanisms like traffic filtering or secure logging. To simplify
the authorization steps and to enforce these different sets of security policies in an
on-board architecture, we need a system in which access control decisions are based
on authenticated attributes of the subjects, and when the authorization authority
is decentralized, in order to attain more fine grained access rights.
Unfortunately, there is currently no automotive-capable access control architec-
ture, which not only needs to be extremely reliable and defect, but also extremely
efficient for the enforcement of these security policies. To this end, we have defined
and prototyped a security policy enforcement architecture for automotive on-board
networks where security rules are enforced and handled at different layers of the
architecture. However, the prerequisites of such an enforcement architecture are the
knowledge of the communication buses and of the available computational capabili-
ties of the on-board networks, more specifically, their ability to transmit, process, or
store complex security policies. We show how the ASN.1 [67] specification that has
been used for other purposes in the vehicle (i.e., low level drivers, RPC definition,
HSM interfaces, etc.) can be employed in order to solve this particular issue.
In this chapter, we discuss how to design security policy engines that implement
an effective enforcement in such heterogeneous automotive on-board networks. The
novelty of our approach is in its enforcement of various access control rules, by
deploying multiple policy enforcement points at the different levels of system ab-
straction. In particular, such a system must configure on one hand the mechanisms
for handling all kind of authorization requests (i.e., management of keys for com-
munication between ECUs, RPC level, and application level access control, etc.)
and, on the other hand, the filtering mechanisms are enforced at the inter-domain
gateway level in order to limit the unnecessary traffic. The configuration of security
mechanisms (cf. deployment architecture presented in Chapter 7) in automotive on-
board networks makes it necessary to define and deploy adapted security policies.
In this context, we decided on building upon the XACML access control language.
This language is suitable for the high level description of subjects, objects (or re-
sources) and permissions on these. This language provides a flexible and modular
way to define and enforce policies in distributed environments. By using XACML,
we provide a reasonable interface towards new infrastructure and application ser-
vices with W3C compliance. Although, XACML defines the policy language and a
"request–response" message format, the use of the complete XACML policy spec-
ification is neither necessary nor even desirable for an automotive environment.
Similarly, we could not afford the XML based security policy for reasons of message
size constraints as well as footprint of an additional XML parser in the on-board
system.
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We thus evaluate how policies expressed in XACML can be adapted to the auto-
motive environment efficiency requirements despite the limited computational power
of those units and network bandwidth limitations. To this end, we propose an al-
ternative interchangeable format, PDM Native Language (PNL) for XACML based
security policies that is designed and implemented for compatibility with today’s
vehicular functional and non-functional needs. We further look at the performance
analysis of our proposed PNL encoded policies with security policies specified in
the XML format. We show that PNL encoded policy is lighter and enables a much
faster parsing and configuration of security policies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.2 outlines the
security policy enforcement architecture, and in what way the security policy sup-
ports the flexible deployment and enforcement of the networking security policy.
Section 8.3 discusses how XACML is being used to define the flexible part of such a
security policy. In section 8.4, we present the security policy configuration process
in order to install and configure access control policies with in the vehicle. Section
8.5 presents and analyzes performance figures for our policy engine. Finally, the
chapter summarizes the results that we achieved regarding enforcement of access
control security requirements.
8.2 Security Policy Enforcement Architecture
We first describe the structure of Policy Decision Module (PDM) that we adopted
in chapter 7 in order to enforce various access control related security requirements.
The PDM, which can be flexibly updated, is deployed within the automotive system
at different levels of architecture layers. Considering the automotive networks and
design specifications, we propose modular access control deployment architecture. A
PDM which serves as a security policy engine is flexible deployable within the auto-
motive system environment, which means, that a PDM could be used as a centralized
module accessible from different domains and application within the automotive on-
board network, or it could be deployed based on a multi-centered approach, or the
module could be completely distributed within the system environment. There-
fore, the PDM is applicable to the different requirements and constraints given by
a specific on-board architecture and thus, can be deployed in different vehicle se-
ries over changing in-vehicular IT infrastructures. The PDM is composed of two
main components (1) Policy Decision Point (PDP), following the terminology used
in XACML, and (2) Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). As a proof of concept,
we have implemented PDM within the EMVY framework as a centralized module
accessible from different domains and application. EMVY uses distributed master-
client architecture and provide component-based templates for introducing security
relevant mechanisms for securing communication between ECUs within a vehicle.
All clients request services such as authorization request, entity authentication or
key distribution, from the master in a "thin client" fashion, i.e., the service only
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needs to be implemented on the master as shown in figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: PDM and PEP deployment
8.2.1 Policy Enforcement Points
The PEP is the point, which receives the request from the requester and forwards
it to the PDP. The PDP makes the decisions based on the policy that is a set for
accessing that resource, while the PEP enforces the access control decision. Thus,
PEPs handle access, or communication, or boot sequence validation requests for
instance and have to enforce policy-based decisions. In order to enable a maximum
level of flexibility and adaptability of the security functionality, we configure the
PEP in a multi-layer fashion as a part of many security modules or programs that
effectively enforce access rights of security-relevant resources, as shown in figure 8.1.
In particular, this multi-layer enforcement architecture enforces security policies and
rules in a distributed fashion, even though enforcement mechanisms used at each
layer are different. All this means that we need some data structure to store security
attributes computed by an enforcement point along the control flow, and that may
be used to check the satisfaction of further policy rules. In particular, such a binding
allow us to share security related information at the different architecture layers as
well as to mitigate several attacks on these layers (cf. MLAM presented in Chapter
5). For instance, deciding on access control for some RPC request requires first
allowing network traffic, at the CCM level, between the communicating parties,
then the key credential usage control policy is enforced by the PEP deployed at
the HSM in order to determine if the client allowed to communicate with other on-
board clients and which ECUs the KMM component will distribute keys to in the
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vehicle, then authorizing the communication channel using these keys, then finally
making sure that the RPC request can be performed by the entity authenticated
at the transport layer. Moreover, the filtering policies are enforced by the PEP
defined at the CCM layer. The aim of those policies is to decide whether to forward
messages or to drop them based on the authorization rules defined. Those rules
will typically define patterns that have to be matched by the transport layer for the
message to be forwarded (positive rules) or dropped (negative rules). Every CCM
will contain a list of such rules that will be screened in an orderly fashion (so as
to solve conflicts between positive and negative rules), looking for the first match.
Rules apply to the incoming interface. The case where no match applies will result in
the message being dropped, and a notification being sent to the intrusion detection
system. Rules of such policies will be based mainly on transport-layer parameters
(source and destination addresses, domain of origin or destination, etc.) but also on
application-layer information, resulting for instance not only from the observation
of a message (e.g., sending of a message from a sensor), but also on that part of its
content (depending on the processing capabilities of the gateway), e.g. contained
security features on application level.
Filtering may also be stateful, for instance relying on the past observation of
a message, and even on contextual information, i.e., information about the vehicle
and its environment that parameterize the policy but may be updated separately
(e.g., vehicle speed, nearby vehicles, attack detected on another gateway, etc.). Fil-
tering may therefore rely on plausibility checks. Contrary to filtering performed for
traffic coming from some domains (e.g., the Head Unit (HU) domain), filtering on
emergency messages should never completely prevent the transmission of potentially
e-safety related messages, and only endpoints, i.e., applications, should ultimately
decide about the validity of some information.
In addition, endpoint access control policies, enforced by PEP at the application
level (i.e., C2X App shown in figure 8.1), on the other hand determine precisely
whether an application can process certain messages based on its origin and on
the definition of the authorizations of stakeholders. These are again positive rules
expressing authorization granted to subjects. These policies are rather fine-grained.
Most of these policies are about application permissions, that is, operations that can
be performed by ECUs internally. However, some permission relate to stakeholder’s
rights, in particular with respect to the right to update firmware or parameters of
ECUs. A detail description of rule enforcement used at each layer is discussed in
Table 8.1.
8.2.2 Handling Policy Decisions
The PDP decides based on security policies whether or not access to a particular
resource is granted. The decision of the PDP is then enforced by the policy PEP
that drops a message, forwards a message or modifies a message (e.g., encrypts the
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Security Module Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
Communication Con-
trol Module– CCM
enforce the filtering policies which act as firewall. Rule enforcement will
be based mainly on transport-layer parameters but also on application-layer
information.
Entity Authentication
Module –EAM
enforce the policy based login and authentication services (e.g., password,
smartcard).
Key Management
Module –KMM
enforce the key generation and group communication security rules.
Platform Integrity
Module – PIM
rule enforcement regarding valid boot integrity measurements.
Secure Storage Module
– SSM
enforce the secure storage/access of data security rules (i.e. encrypt the stor-
age device or, can encrypt data objects individually).
Security Watchdog
Module – SWD
policy enforcement rely on a set of rules consists of a attack pattern and an
action.
Table 8.1: Software security modules and Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs).
message with the cryptographic key of the destination ECU) according to the secu-
rity policy. In our deployment architecture, a PDP usually acts autonomously in its
domain where he is assigned and makes decisions in response to every authorization
request. By default, PEP actively queries the PDP for every decision. However,
PEP could be pre-configured by the PDM (autonomous PEP). Such an autonomous
PEP would act as an ancillary PDP, mostly based on static or cached security deci-
sions, and possibly parameterized decisions depending on security information that
are available locally. For instance, during the secure bootstrapping phase, the SSM-
PEP acts as an autonomous PEP and decides based on its local policy whether the
PDP is allowed to load security policies.
8.3 Security Policy Expression
As we explained, the on-board network policy has to describe how to configure very
different security mechanisms. After exploring several alternatives including draft-
ing our own policy language, we decided on building upon the XACML [101] access
control language, obviously for expressing the access control rules of our security
policy, such as the definition of secure communication groups and related autho-
rizations at the RPC level, but as well as a more general policy language. XACML
provides a flexible and modular way to define and enforce policies, and its deci-
sion/enforcement model fits well in distributed environments, even for the on-board
embedded system of a vehicle. XACML provides an interchangeable policy format,
support for the fine-grained description of resources, can describe conditional rights,
supports policy combination and conflict resolution. Another important aspect re-
garding the choice of XACML as our policy language was its independence from a
specific implementation and the large number of tools for writing and analyzing any
policy. In the case of specific configurations, XACML is flexible enough to represent
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different security profiles. For instance, the XACML Policy element can be used
in order to encapsulate complex firewall rules comprising multiple attributes, the
source IP address/port numbers being specified in the XACML Subject element for
instance, and the destination IP address/port number being mapped to the XACML
Resource element. In a similar way, the XACML Rule element can be used to rep-
resent distinct firewall rules. However, due to the embedded nature of the on-board
system and its functional and non-functional constraints [94], [74], it is not feasi-
ble to transmit, process, or store XML-based policies in the car. For instance, for
the ubiquitous CAN bus, which is operated at around 500kbit/s and offers 8 bytes
of data payload per packet, verbose formats like XML would constitute a hardly
justifiable increase of the bus load.
To cope with the above-mentioned limitations, we defined a binary-based secu-
rity policy language that consumes less bandwidth, is fast to process, and requires
less memory (see section 8.5 for a performance analysis). We called this representa-
tion the Policy decision module Native Language (PNL). The purpose of the PNL
is not to define yet another access control policy language but rather to provide
an alternative interchangeable format for XACML policies, that can be used where
performance is an issue. We built PNL on ASN.1 standards [67]. These standards
are adopted in a wide range of application domains, as in aviation systems for traf-
fic control, mobile networks, network management, secure emails, fast web services,
etc., [67]. PNL makes use of these standards, describes a serialized representation
of XACML policies in binary format, and ensures that the XACML structure is
preserved during serialization. In order to do so, a XACML schema is mapped into
a corresponding ASN.1 definition (see listing D.1). This mapping is based on the
ITU-T X.694 standard (Mapping from XML Schemas to ASN.1 modules) [66].
1 XACML DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
2 /* XACML Policy Defintion */
3 PolicyType ::= SEQUENCE {
4 ...
5 ruleCombiningAlgId UTF8String ,
6 target Target ,
7 choice -list SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
8 ...
9 rule Rule
10 } OPTIONAL ,
11 obligations Obligations OPTIONAL
12 }
13 Policy ::= PolicyType
14 /* XACML Target Definition */
15 TargetType ::= SEQUENCE {
16 subjects Subjects OPTIONAL ,
17 resources Resources OPTIONAL ,
18 actions Actions OPTIONAL ,
19 environments Environments OPTIONAL
20 }
21 Target ::= TargetType
22 ...
23 /* XACML Rule Defintion */
24 RuleType ::= SEQUENCE {
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25 effect EffectType ,
26 ruleId UTF8String ,
27 description Description OPTIONAL ,
28 target Target OPTIONAL ,
29 condition Condition OPTIONAL
30 }
31 ...
32 Rule ::= RuleType
33 AttributeAssignmentType ::= SEQUENCE {
34 attributeId [0] UTF8String ,
35 dataType [1] UTF8String ,
36 attr [2] SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
37 }
38
39 AttributeAssignment ::= AttributeAssignmentType
40
41 ObligationType ::= SEQUENCE {
42 fulfillOn [0] EffectType ,
43 obligationId [1] UTF8String ,
44 attributeAssignment -list [2] SEQUENCE OF attributeAssignment
45 AttributeAssignment
46 }
47 ...
48 END
Listing 8.1: Excerpt of a Policy decision module Native Language (PNL) based on
ASN.1 Defintion.
We have implemented the XACML to PNL mapping engine as shown in figure 8.2.
In our architecture, this encoder resides at the OEM’s backend system. The mapping
engine is responsible for serializing security policies into the PNL format and then
transmitting it to the vehicle. During the serialization process each security policy is
verified against a XACML schema. Upon a successful validation, the security policy
is serialized into a specific ASN.1 encoding scheme. Due to constraints from other
components (e.g., low level drivers, HSM interfaces, etc.), which employ the ASN.1
DER encoding [65], the security policies are also serialized using DER encoding
rules. However, a more efficient binary encoding such as Packed Encoding Rules
(PER) can be used if needed. We anticipate that using PER encoding scheme
would further enhance performance and latency results.
8.4 Security Policy Configuration
Security policies are the basic for all authorizations within the vehicular system.
Hence, mechanisms for creating, updating, and configuring policies are very impor-
tant. We are considering security policy update protocols [59], follows the similar
steps like defined in the OTA firmware update protocol, to be used for securely
transmitting new or updated security policies in the vehicle. Whereas, from the
on-board PNL configuration perspective, our high-level goal is to auto-configure se-
curity policies and appoint access rules from the vehicle ignition stage. This implies
that security policy are deserialized during secure bootstrapping phase, while also
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recognizing an explicit configuration procedures, after secure bootstrapping phase,
in order to load new/update policies (i.e., installation of new application with its
policy set or update existing policy). Note that the new policy set or security rules,
which may have an impact on the basic safety of the vehicle, are always configured
during next vehicle start cycle. Adding/updating safety critical rules while vehicle
is running may cause safety critical problems, depending on the security policy re-
sponsible for.
Figure 8.2: XACML to PNL mapping engine
In our implementation stack, the bootstrapping protocols are defined to ensure
the secure initialization of all security modules and components ( see figure 8.1). On
a certain point of the boot strapping procedure, the boot chain send an initialization
call to the PDP(s) to load all PNL based security policies (i.e., group communication
policy) from its policy database. Note that these security policies are stored in the
Secure Storage Module (SSM), which enforces confidentiality, integrity, authenticity,
and freshness mechanisms. Thus, require proper authentication and access rights to
access these policies. Since during boot strapping process, SSM cannot ask PDP for
a decision when PDP is opens/reads from its policy database (which is also stored
via SSM), it has to make autonomous decisions. A detail description of autonomous
decisions (autonomous PEP) is discussed in section 8.2.1.
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On successful verification of access rights, the SSM allow the PDP(s) to read
policy set from its policy database. Regarding the integrity of policies, we rely on
the security solutions enforced by SSM. However for the policy validation attempt
in our prototype implementation, we enforced, that a vehicle will only be started
in case of successful configuration of all PDP/autonomous PEP(s) with respective
security policies and the vehicle will shutdown momentarily otherwise.
Figure 8.3: PDM: On-board policy deserialization and configuration
8.5 Performance Analysis
We have analyzed the performance of the PNL as well as the memory consumption
of different policies by varying the number of elements and attributes used. Perfor-
mance has a special importance with respect to the user experience in automotive
environments, where the time to load and configure security policies, and to assess
authorization request and response time is a critical issue when the driver waits
for his vehicle to start. The deserialization and configuration of authorization/se-
curity policies must be performed before receiving any request from PEP. Hence,
the configuration of these security policies is significantly contributing to the overall
responsiveness of the policy decision and enforcement at startup time.
8.5.1 Performance Analysis: Technical Approach
In order to evaluate our results against other XML based access control policies, we
are comparing our results with different XML parsers. There have been numerous
benchmark studies towards the evaluation of XML parsers [72, 19, 46, 75, 165, 132].
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These benchmarks cover several aspects of XML parsing such as performance,
schema validation, DOM manipulation, XML security, etc. We used these bench-
marks in order to select an agile XML parser implemented in the same language
as our own (C/C++), and to run a comparison with our ASN.1 encoded policies.
Several lightweight C/C++ XML libraries [72, 75, 49] have been developed for low
power devices, with fast parsing capabilities. For instance, the pugixml library en-
ables extremely fast, convenient, and memory-efficient XML document processing.
It consists of a DOM-like interface with rich traversal and modification capabilities.
However, since pugixml has a DOM parser, it cannot process XML documents that
do not fit in memory; also the parser is not a schema validating parser [72], which is
a mandatory requirement in our case, for obvious security as well as safety reasons,
such as to prevent software compromises.
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8.5.2 Experimental Setup and Results
Based on results of these benchmarks and these specific constraints, we decided to
evaluate our results with the Gnome XML toolkit (libxml) [154]. According to the
XMLBench Project [19], libxml is the fastest toolkit that has a rich enough set of
features. We have generated several XACML policies with various sizes using the
UMU XACML editor. The policy tickets are than transformed into a corresponding
PNL description, as described in section 8.3. We have set up a testing environment in
order to compare the scalability of our parser with libxml. All presented performance
results were obtained using a 64 bit Mac OS X 10.7.2 on a MacBook Pro with 8GB
of RAM and a 2.8GHz Intel Core i7 processor. All tests were run in a single user
mode without any system services running. We followed the assumptions outlined
in [19]: for instance, the time spent to initialize the toolkits is not counted in these
results, in order to compare our results with this benchmark. The measurements
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consist in several latency results which show that the parsing of a PNL encoded
policy is lighter and enables a much faster parsing and configuration of security
policies. Figure 8.4.a compares the parsing time with different policy sizes, in which
the PNL encoded policy parsing is approximately a third of the XML policy. For
2364 elements (2898 attributes) in a single XACML policy, the PNL encoded policy
amounts to 42,368 bytes and the XML encoded one to 152,817 bytes. In the eight
tests presented on Figure 8.4.b, we parsed a single XML policy (21 Elements, 22
Attributes) up to 200 times to understand the scalability. This resulted in parsing
times of 0.25 ms. In contrast, deserializing using the PNL encoded security policy
200 times takes approximately 0.015 ms. Parsing with the PNL encoding is thus
about 10 times faster that with an XML based encoding.
8.5.3 The State of the Art: Automotive Access Control Architec-
ture
There has been a quite remarkable progress in the area of access control architecture
for automotive networks [32, 16, 116], but they appear to have succeeded mostly
in terms of requirement specification or have been only concerned with security
policies for protecting V2X communications. Gerlach et al. [37] present a C2C
communication solution integrating several previous proposals [124, 123, 109] for
secure vehicular communications [16]. These proposals consider the car mostly as a
single entity, communicating with other cars using secure protocols and thus essen-
tially aim at communication specific security policies enforced at the Communication
Unit of the vehicle. Our approach in contrast treats both the expression of V2X and
intra-vehicle security policies uniformly. The EASIS project [32] defines a central
gateway, a sort of firewall, that is configured so that it denies all data traffic from
the external interfaces (e.g. C2C/C2I or Telematics) as a default. Unfortunately,
like [16] this proposal is also limited to V2X security policy enforcement and not
accompanied by any further analysis of the particular requirements/limitation of an
in-vehicle architecture with respect to security policies. Zrelli et al. [168] proposed
a security framework for the vehicular communication infrastructure implementing
access control at both the data link layer and the network layer. However, the pro-
posed solution is solely based on a central policy decision and enforcement module.
A single failure in this module may compromise the overall security of the on-board
network. Furthermore, this solution is obviously only handling V2X security policy
enforcement at the gateway level.
For in-vehicle architectures, numerous authors mention the need for on-board
access control architecture [80, 119, 9]. However, very few solutions have been
proposed. A recent security analysis [80] has shown that the risk of attacks on vehicle
on-board systems is not anymore of theoretic nature. It depicts several scenarios
where access control is either weak or simply not considered, like the firmware update
process, which may compromise the overall security of the on-board network, yet
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no security architecture is described in this work. In [9], a set of cryptographic
protocols is discussed to support vehicular use-cases. However, regarding access
control, this intra-vehicle security toolbox is also limited to the only specification
of an API, without any detail about the policy decision engine, practical matters
regarding the enforcement architecture, nor implementation perspectives.
Chutorash et al. [22] propose an approach for integrating firewalls in a vehi-
cle communication bus. Firewalls are integrated between application software and
between vehicle components. In their approach, filtering rules are applied only on
user’s request, and commands sent from the HMI, preventing unauthorized access to
vehicle components. We see that the practicality of this approach is largely limited
by the fact that: (1) rule enforcement is limited to firewall rules and more specifi-
cally only to user commands. However, in an automotive system, different entities
(i.e., security modules as discussed in chapter 7) are themselves requesters (2) rules
are statically defined and remain the same over the vehicle lifetime, and (3) the con-
straints of embedded vehicular networks regarding notably the policy transmission,
processing, or storage and the practical implementation of the proposed approach,
are again left out. The OVERSEE Project [119] aims among other objectives at in-
vehicle firewall configuration and application level access control using XML based
configuration rules. As of now, this project has just begun and no result is avail-
able, thus we cannot evaluate the practicality of this approach. However, according
to our experience, the performance of verbose formats like XML in a constrained
environment has to be closely watched.
8.6 Conclusion
We have exposed in this chapter in what respect the complexity of automotive on-
board network architectures and their evolution involve a complex expression of the
access control security requirements and their enforcement. Today’s automobiles
are a perfect example of a system whose security relies on the combination of many
different enforcement points in the automotive on-board network and even in every
electronic control unit’s communication stack. The role of access control security
requirements in this context is to link the trusted computing base and the trusted
credentials it stores with enforcement mechanisms, as well as to connect enforcement
mechanisms together. We are taking advantage of the extensibility of XACML
subjects to associate attributes, and in particular the means to perform a trusted
authentication of electronic control units: this mechanism is at the core of the
EVITA approach. The performance of the policy parsing is also very important
in a vehicle. We described how the XACML policy could be encoded in ASN.1
in order to make it fit better the resource-constrained environment of a vehicle.
The policy engine described in this chapter was finally deployed in the EVITA
project demonstrator - two cars equipped with the EVITA HSMs and software
framework - and was successfully used for network filtering, configuring secure group
communication, and RPC level access control.

Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future
Perspectives
This dissertation deals about requirements engineering driven approach to security
architecture design for distributed embedded systems. Various approaches and tech-
niques are tackled with the wish to design the secure system from the early stages
of system conceptualization.
The first part of this study introduced the notion of knowledge centric security
requirement engineering methodology. An overview of existing security require-
ment engineering approaches and methodologies is provided and their techniques
are compared to describe their strengths and weaknesses with respect to security
requirement elicitation process. As a solution to overcome the shortcomings and
limitations in the state of the art approaches to SRE, we have defined an unified
methodology based on the concepts of ontologies which offers means to combine
different capabilities of these models in a single unified security requirement engi-
neering process. Different concepts and terms identified during the analysis were
then adapted to various security ontology classes such as security requirements, se-
curity goals, security attacks, etc. In order to well integrate our approach with
standard system engineering activities, we decided to use SysML as an underlying
modeling language to model our different security requirement engineering concepts.
In this regard, we have proposed several extensions to the SysML semantic to in-
tegrate our security concepts and developed a SysMLsec profile. The objective of
this profile is to combine different modeling diagrams that help in building security
solutions. The novelty of this extension is in its integration of concepts and terms
from security ontologies in the SysML diagrams as a controlled vocabulary. Thus,
gives the security engineers the freedom to choose and reason about appropriate on-
tological concepts, provided that the SysML diagrams have the sufficient semantics
to support the detailed ontological concepts.
The second part of this thesis describes the different solutions proposed to build
the security architecture design for embedded systems. The first solution relies on
the usage of knowledge based security analysis to identify the security attacks and
vulnerabilities in the context of multilayered embedded system architecture. Fur-
thermore, the concept of knowledge oriented attack trees, parameterized by the
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ontological concepts, was brought in as the foundational graphical representation
security attacks and vulnerabilities. Which makes it possible to graphically repre-
sent various types of attack related metadata such as attack type, attack method,
adversary capabilities, etc. The second solution exposes a security requirement en-
gineering based solution for the identification, the refinement, and the traceability
of system wide security requirements that tend to overcome shortcoming in state of
the art security requirement engineering approaches. This solution introduces the
new concept of dependent requirement engineering that is used for an identification
and refinement of security requirements in relation to their source(s). Furthermore,
we also discussed the traceability property of security requirements and proposed a
very simple solution to link different models by using the reference principle.
In the third and last part of this thesis focused on the enforcement of security
requirements by developing cryptographic protocols and development of access con-
trol architecture for automotive embedded system. We proposed a firmware flashing
cryptographic protocol for securely updating firmware in the vehicle. We showed
how a root of trust in hardware could sensibly be combined with software modules.
These modules and primitives have been applied to show how firmware updates can
be done securely and over-the-air, while respecting existing standards and infras-
tructure. In contrast to existing approaches, the firmware flashing protocol describe
a complete process, which involves the service provider, the vehicle infrastructure as
well as the manufacturer and the workshop. By using secure in-vehicle communica-
tion and a trusted platform model, we showed how to establish a secure end-to-end
link between the manufacturer, the workshop and the vehicle. We finally presented
our solution to enforce access control related security requirements in the complex
automotive architecture. We proposed how to design policy engines that implement
an effective enforcement in such architectures despite the complexity of the protocol
stacks of on-board electronic control units.
We reckon that this thesis is only an extensive snapshot of our work. We plan to
continue with some of the threads of future work that we identified in the different
chapters. Specifically, an interesting issue that needs further research is embedding
the SysMLsec within a formal logic, formal methods can be further facilitate us
to formally verify security aspects defined in these models as well as to maintain
consistency as a design evolves. To do so, we need to enlarge the semantics and the
expression of the security ontologies as well as SysMLsec.
Further, we plan to evaluate the knowledge-centric security requirement engi-
neering methodology with further case studies. Most importantly, we are interested
in case studies from other application domains, and also at different stages of sys-
tems development. Based on these, we plan to iteratively refine the concepts of the
security ontologies, with the prospect of developing security architecture.
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Appendix A
Security Properties
We follow a revised definition of security properties specified in the EVITA project [129],
that is relevant for heterogeneous networks and embedded systems. The informal explana-
tions below reflect how these concepts are generally understood.
A.1 Data origin authenticity
A data origin authenticity property applies to a quantum of information and a claimed
author. The property is satisfied when the quantum of information truly originates from
the author. The property can be made more specific by providing an observation of the
quantum of information (defined, e.g., by a time and a location in the system). The author
can also be constrained by adding a time and/or a place of creation of the quantum of
information. Note that in most security oriented frameworks, data origin authenticity
implies integrity.
A.2 Integrity
An integrity property applies to a quantum of information between two observations (de-
fined, e.g., by a time and a location in the system). The property is satisfied when the
quantum of information has not been modified between the two observations. It guarantees
for instance that the content of a storage facility has not been modified between two given
read operations, or that a message sent on a communication channel has not been altered
during its journey.
A.3 Authorization
A controlled access property or requirement applies to a set of actions and/or information
and a set of authorized entities. The property is guaranteed if the specified entities are the
only entities that can perform the actions or access the information. The property can be
further detailed with time constraints on the period of authorization. Controlled access is
needed to ensure that stakeholders only have access to information and functions that they
are authorized to access as appropriate to their expected activities.
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A.4 Freshness
A freshness property applies to a quantum of information, a receiving entity, and a given
time. The property is satisfied if the quantum of information received by the entity at the
given time is not a copy of the same information received by the same or another entity in
the past. Ensuring freshness can be used to prevent replay attacks.
A.5 Non-Repudiation
A non-repudiation property or requirement applies to an action and an entity performing
the action. The non-repudiation of the action is guaranteed if it is impossible for the entity
that performed the action to claim that it did not perform it. This property can be further
detailed with a set of entities for which the action needs to be undeniable, with a time
limit, etc. There may be specific legal requirements for non-repudiation. However, non-
repudiation may also be introduced for convenience, for example, as an aid in providing
evidence or proving liability.
A.6 Privacy
A privacy property or requirement applies to an entity and a set of information. qPrivacy is
guaranteed if the relation between the entity and the set of information is confidential. This
relation can however significantly vary. For instance, one generally distinguishes different
types of privacy, typically anonymity, unlinkability, and pseudonymity.
A.6.1 Anonymity
This is the property that the relation between an entity and its identity is strictly confiden-
tial. Privacy property must be made consistent with potentially conflicting requirements
for identification, auditing, non-repudiation and jurisdictional access, which may require
users to be identified and information about their interactions to be stored.
A.6.2 Unlinkability
The unlinkability of two or more Item of Interest (abbreviated IOIs, e.g., subject, messages,
actions, . . . sent, received, or performed by the principal) from an attacker
′
s perspective
means that within the system (comprising these and possibly other items), the attacker
cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not.
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A.6.3 Pseudonymity
Pseudonymity refers to the capability of recognizing the same subject without being able
to relate him to his identity 1.
A.7 Confidentiality
A confidentiality property applies to a quantum of information and a set of authorized
entities. The property is satisfied when the authorized entities are the only ones that can
know the quantum of information. Privacy relies on confidentiality and can be considered
as a special case of confidentiality.
A.8 Availability
An availability property applies to a service or a physical device providing a service. The
property is satisfied when some service is operational. Denial of service attacks aim at
compromising the availability of their target. The property can be further detailed with
the specification of a period during which the availability is required and of a set of client
entities requesting the availability.
1A pseudonym is an identifier, that is, a name or another bit string, generated in a fully
independent manner from the subject and related attributes values, do not contain side information
on the subject they are attached to.

Appendix B
Risk Model
B.1 Introduction
The provision of security measures, like any other feature of a product or service, is in-
evitably accompanied by development and implementation costs. Consequently, protection
against every conceivable security threat would be too costly for the development of complex
systems, so resources need to be targeted on the most significant threats. The countermea-
sures that are selected for inclusion in the design must therefore be based on an objective
assessment of potential threats and their anticipated implications. Thus, in order to iden-
tify the most important security requirements that are needed to secure the system it is
necessary to assess the level of risk that may be posed by potential attacks. This provides
a convenient basis for systematically identifying and prioritizing threats that need to be
mitigated as follows:
• Where a number of possible attack objectives may achieve the attack goal, the attack
objective with the highest perceived risk level is the priority for countermeasures to
reduce the risk level for the attack objective.
• Where a number of possible attack methods may lead to the same attack objective,
the attack method with the highest perceived attack probability (i.e. lowest attack
potential) is the priority for countermeasures to reduce the risk level for the attack
objective.
• Were a number of asset attacks may lead to the same attack objective, the asset
attack with the highest perceived attack probability (i.e. lowest attack potential) is
the priority for countermeasures to reduce the risk level for the attack objective.
The results of the risk analysis is collated over all of the attack scenarios that are consid-
ered and summarized in terms of the number of instances of particular risk levels found
for each of the attacks that were envisaged against the various system assets (see Table
B.1). This therefore gives an indication of the relative importance of protecting the system
by providing countermeasures for specific assets (i.e. what to protect) against particular
types of attacks. Since all the investigated functions assume a common basic architecture,
it is likely that common patterns will arise in the attack trees. Consequently, the repeated
occurrence of particular attack patterns in attack trees is a further indicator for prioritizing
countermeasures that are likely to provide favorable cost-benefit properties. Furthermore,
the security requirements are mapped onto the functions and assets, providing a way to
evaluate the system performance (latency, throughput, and resource utilization) and al-
low the designer to further prioritize the security requirements according to system needs.
However, the expected cost of the proposed countermeasures also needs to be taken into
account in selecting specific security requirements.
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Identified Threats Risk Analysis results Security
Assets Attack Risk Level Instances Requirements
software/ AT(1−n) R(0−6) 1 - n SR(1−n)
hardware
Table B.1: Security Requirements Prioritizstion
In order to identify the most important security requirements that are needed to prevent
(or at least detect and contain) key threats, it is necessary to assess the level of risk that
may be posed by potential attacks. The risk associated with an attack is a function of
the possible severity of the attack for the stakeholders and the estimated probability of
occurrence of a successful attack of this nature. The severity of an attack is assessed using
the attack tree, by considering the potential implications of the attack objectives for the
stakeholders. The probability of a successful attack is also derived from the attack tree, by
identifying combinations of possible attacks on the system assets that could contribute to
an attack method.
Attack Potential Attack Probability
Rating Description Likelihood Ranking
0 - 9 Basic Highly Likely 5
10 - 13 Enhanced-Basic Likely 4
14 - 19 Moderate Possible 3
20 - 24 High Unlikely 2
≥ 25 Beyond-High Remote 1
Table B.2: Relating attack potential to attack probability
To determine for each path in an attack tree the attack potentials of the contributing
asset attacks are defined and classified, as shown in Table B.2. Note that once an attack
scenario has been identified and been exploited, it may be exploited repeatedly with less
effort than for the first time. Both phases, identification and exploitation, are considered
in conjunction. In this context the term attack potential is really describing the difficulty
of mounting a successful attack, while for risk analysis purposes a probability measure is
required. A high probability of successful attack is assumed to correspond to the basic
attack potential, since many possible attackers will have the necessary attack potential.
Conversely, a high attack potential suggests a lower probability of successful attacks, since
the number of attackers with the necessary attack potential is expected to be comparatively
small. Consequently, Table B.2 also proposes an associated numerical scale that reflects
the relative probability of success associated with the attack potential in a more intuitive
manner. The attack probability measure (P) is higher for easier attacks that are associated
with lower attack potentials, and lower for more difficult attacks associated with the higher
attack potentials. Where the severity vector includes a non-zero safety component, the risk
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Severity (Si) Combined attack probability (A)
A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 A=5
Si R(0-6) R(0-6) R(0-6) R(0-6) R(0-6)
Table B.3: Proposed security risk levels mapped to severity and probability
assessment may include an additional probability parameter that represents the potential
to influence the severity of the outcome. The probability and severity combinations are
mapped to a series of risk levels ranging from 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) in order to rank
relative risks (see Table B.3). The risk level (R, a vector) is determined from the severity (S)
associated with the attack objective and the combined attack probability (A) associated
with a particular attack method. This is achieved by mapping the severity and attack
probability to the risk using a risk graph approach.
In this scheme, attacks that are judged to be of high probability and high severity are
considered to represent high risks, and therefore definitely require countermeasures to miti-
gate their potential impact, while other attacks that are judged to be of low probability and
low severity are considered to be low risk, and may not require specific countermeasures.
However, more careful consideration may be required for those threats (likely to be in the
majority) that are less readily ranked in terms of relative risk, such as those judged to be
either fairly likely but not particularly severe, or relatively unlikely but fairly severe. Risk
management is an iterative process that can be performed during each major phase of the
SDLC. However, the risk management methodology is the same regardless of the SDLC
phase for which the assessment is being conducted. We may use several methodologies
and standards (i.e., ISO/IEC 13335, NIST SP-800:30, ISO/IEC ISO 31000:2009, ISO/IEC
73:2002, or ISO 14971:2000 etc.) to carry out the risk assessment. These standards pro-
vide guidance and describe the characteristics of each SDLC phase and indicate how risk
management can be performed in support of each phase.
B.1.1 Risk Analysis
Once security needs of firmware update application are defined for each security criterion,
we analyzed the risks. We first started by analyzing the attacker capabilities relevant to
each system asset (i.e., functions, processes, middleware, or hardware components, etc.)
involved in the firmware update process. Table B.4 summarizes estimates for the “attack
potential1”, together with the underlying estimates for the influencing factors, for various
attacks identified for firmware update scenario. Consequently, it also indicates an associ-
ated numerical scale that reflects the relative value and ranking/rating of attack potential
in a more intuitive manner. The estimates are based on as-is automotive on-board net-
works, prior to the introduction of security measures. The results of the risk analysis are
summarized in terms of the frequency of the risk levels found for each threat. This gives
an indication of the relative importance of protecting against specific attacks: While a low
maximum risk suggests a low priority, a high maximum risk suggests a higher priority for
protection. A lower risk that appears in many attack trees, however, might be as important
to tackle than a higher risk tears only once.
1For estimating risk in a non-ambiguous manner, an expert adversary is chosen
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Asset (at-
tack)
Elaspsed
Time
Expertise Knowledge
of System
Window
of Op-
portu-
nity
Equipment Attack Potential
Value Ranking
Communication
Unit (ex-
ploit vul-
nerability
or imple-
mentation
error)
10 6 3 4 7 33 Beyond
High
Keys
(illegal
acquisition,
modifi-
cation,
etc.)
17 6 7 10 7 35 Beyond
High
In-Car
Commu-
nication
(corrupt
or fake
messages)
10 6 3 0 4 23 High
CU (denial
of service)
4 6 3 1 4 15 Moderate
Table B.4: Evaluation of required attack potential for asset attacks identified from
attack trees
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Appendix C
SysMLsec-to-Ontology Translation
Engine
C.1 SysMLsec Knowledge Extraction
1 package sysmlsec.ontology;
2
3 import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
4 import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
5 import org.w3c.dom.Document;
6 import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;
7 import org.w3c.dom.Node;
8 import org.w3c.dom.Element;
9
10 import com.hp.hpl.jena.vocabulary.RDF.Nodes;
11
12 import antlr.debug.NewLineEvent;
13
14 import java.io.File;
15 import java.util.ArrayList;
16 import java.util.Arrays;
17 import java.util.HashMap;
18 import java.util.Iterator;
19 import java.util.Set;
20
21 public class TtoOntology {
22
23 /**
24 * for one subTab , Store all of the instances and its parameters , the
format is
25 * TabName:
26 * classA : Id : 0 kind: functional ....
27 */
28 private HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >>>
allTabsInstances = new HashMap <String , HashMap <String ,HashMap <String
,String >>>();
29
30 /**
31 * Store all of the relationships between the classes. the format is :
32 * {tabname :[classA , [classB , relationship ]]}
33 */
34 private HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String
>>>> allTabsProperty = new HashMap <String , HashMap <String ,HashMap <
String ,ArrayList <String >>>>();
35 private String filename;
36 private String labelName;
37
38 public TtoOntology(String filename ,String labelString) {
39 this.filename = filename;
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40 this.labelName = labelString;
41 }
42
43 public static void main(String [] args) {
44 TtoOntology tt = new TtoOntology("thesis -ontology.xml","SysMLsec
Requriement");
45 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >>>
allTabsInstances = tt.getInstanceHashmap ();
46 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>>>
allTabsProperty = tt.getRelationshipHashMap ();
47 Iterator <String > propertyIterator = allTabsProperty.keySet ().iterator
();
48 while (propertyIterator.hasNext ()) {
49 String tabName = propertyIterator.next();
50 System.out.println("Tab Name is " + tabName+"--------");
51 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>>
ontologyPropertyHashMap = allTabsProperty.get(tabName);
52 Iterator <String > ontologyproIterator = ontologyPropertyHashMap.
keySet ().iterator ();
53 while (ontologyproIterator.hasNext ()) {
54 String className = ontologyproIterator.next();
55 System.out.println("class "+ className + " has properties:");
56 HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >> proObj =
ontologyPropertyHashMap.get(className);
57 Iterator <String > proObjiIterator = proObj.keySet ().iterator ();
58 while(proObjiIterator.hasNext ()){
59 String propertyString = proObjiIterator.next();
60 System.out.println("----"+propertyString);
61 ArrayList <String > classesArrayList = proObj.get(propertyString);
62 for (int i = 0; i < classesArrayList.size(); i++) {
63 System.out.println("--------"+classesArrayList.get(i));
64 }
65 }
66 }
67 }
68 }
69
70 /**
71 * get the hashmap who contains all of the instances and their
properties.
72 *
73 * @return the hashmap
74 */
75 public HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >>>
getInstanceHashmap () {
76 Element modeling = readFile ();
77 NodeList subTabs = modeling.getElementsByTagName(this.labelName);
78 for (int i = 0; i < subTabs.getLength (); i++) {
79 Element subtab= (Element)subTabs.item(i);
80 initialAllInstance(subtab);
81 }
82 return this.allTabsInstances;
83 }
84
85 /**
86 * get the hashmap who contains all of the instances and their
relationships
87 *
88 * @return the relationship hashmap
89 */
90 public HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String
>>>> getRelationshipHashMap () {
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91 Element document = readFile ();
92 NodeList subTabs = document.getElementsByTagName(this.labelName);
93
94 for (int i = 0; i < subTabs.getLength (); i++) {
95 Element subtab= (Element)subTabs.item(i);
96 parseRelationShip(subtab);
97 }
98 return this.allTabsProperty;
99 }
100
101 /**
102 * read the given file and return the first Modeling element
103 *
104 * @return the first Modeling Element
105 */
106 private Element readFile () {
107 try {
108 File fXmlFile = new File(filename);
109 DocumentBuilderFactory dbFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.
newInstance ();
110 DocumentBuilder dBuilder = dbFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
111 Document doc = dBuilder.parse(fXmlFile);
112 doc.getDocumentElement ().normalize ();
113 Element firstPart = (Element) doc.getElementsByTagName("Modeling").
item (0);
114 System.out.println("first part property is "+firstPart.getAttribute(
"nameTab"));
115 return firstPart;
116 } catch (Exception e) {
117 e.printStackTrace ();
118 return null;
119 }
120 }
121 // public
122
123 /**
124 * this function read all of the relationships between the classes , and
125 * store them in the hashmap.
126 *
127 * @param doc the "Modeling Element" want to be parsed.
128 *
129 */
130 private void parseRelationShip(Element doc) {
131 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>> allRelationShipMap
= new HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>>();
132 try {
133 // all relationships are represented by the tag "connector"
134 NodeList nList = doc.getElementsByTagName("CONNECTOR");
135 for (int temp = 0; temp < nList.getLength (); temp ++) {
136
137 Node nNode = nList.item(temp);
138 if (nNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
139
140 Element eElement = (Element) nNode;
141 /*
142 * for one relationship , get the related two component name
143 */
144 String p1idString = getTagValue("id", "P1", eElement);
145 String p2idString = getTagValue("id", "P2", eElement);
146 String className1 = getTheNameById(doc , p1idString);
147 String className2 = getTheNameById(doc , p2idString);
148 className1.replaceAll(" ", "_");
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149 className2.replaceAll(" ", "_");
150 /**
151 * get the relation type , like "subclass of", "equivalent" or "
containment"
152 */
153 Element infoparamElement = (Element) eElement.
getElementsByTagName("infoparam").item (0);
154 String type = infoparamElement.getAttribute("value");
155 if (type.contains("deriveReqt")) {
156 this.addProperty(allRelationShipMap ,className1 , className2 , "
superClassOf");
157 } else if (type.contains("composition")) {
158 this.addProperty(allRelationShipMap ,className1 , className2 , "
contains");
159 } else if (type.contains("copy")) {
160 this.addProperty(allRelationShipMap ,className1 , className2 , "
equivalent");
161 }
162 }
163 }
164 } catch (Exception e) {
165 e.printStackTrace ();
166 }
167 String name = doc.getAttribute("name");
168 name = name.replaceAll(" ", "_");
169 this.allTabsProperty.put(name , allRelationShipMap);
170 }
171 private void addProperty(HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <
String >>> allRelationShipMap ,String className1 , String className2 ,
String objpro) {
172 HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >> hash1 ;
173 ArrayList <String > nameList;
174 if(allRelationShipMap.containsKey(className2)) {
175 hash1 = allRelationShipMap.get(className2);
176 nameList = hash1.get(objpro);
177 if(nameList == null) {
178 nameList = new ArrayList <String >();
179 nameList.add(className1);
180 hash1.put(objpro , nameList);
181 } else {
182 nameList.add(className1);
183 }
184 }
185 else {
186 hash1 = new HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>();
187 nameList = new ArrayList <String >();
188 nameList.add(className1);
189 hash1.put(objpro , nameList);
190 allRelationShipMap.put(className2 , hash1);
191 }
192 }
193 /**
194 * read all of the instances and their properties in the file , and store
them in the hashmap.
195 * @param doc
196 */
197 private void initialAllInstance(Element doc) {
198 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >> allInstancesHashMap = new
HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >>();
199 NodeList components = doc.getElementsByTagName("COMPONENT");
200 for (int i = 0; i < components.getLength (); i++) {
201 Element component = (Element) components.item(i);
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202 Element infoparamElement = (Element) component.getElementsByTagName(
"infoparam").item (0);
203 String name = infoparamElement.getAttribute("value");
204 name = name.replaceAll(" ", "_");
205 HashMap <String , String > parameters = new HashMap <String , String >();
206 Element extrparam = (Element) component.getElementsByTagName("
extraparam").item (0);
207 NodeList paralist = extrparam.getChildNodes ();
208 for (int j = 0; j < paralist.getLength (); j++) {
209 Node tmp = paralist.item(j);
210 if (tmp.getNodeType () == Element.ELEMENT_NODE) {
211 Element para = (Element) tmp;
212 parameters.put(para.getNodeName (), para.getAttribute("data"));
213 }
214 }
215 allInstancesHashMap.put(name , parameters);
216 }
217 String name = doc.getAttribute("name");
218 name = name.replaceAll(" ", "_");
219 this.allTabsInstances.put(name , allInstancesHashMap);
220
221 }
222
223 private String getTheNameById(Element doc , String id) {
224 NodeList components = doc.getElementsByTagName("COMPONENT");
225 for (int i = 0; i < components.getLength (); i++) {
226 Element component = (Element) components.item(i);
227 NodeList points = component.getElementsByTagName("TGConnectingPoint"
);
228 for (int j = 0; j < points.getLength (); j++) {
229 Element pointElement = (Element) points.item(j);
230 String pointID = pointElement.getAttribute("id");
231 if (pointID.equals(id)) {
232 Element infoparamElement = (Element) component.
getElementsByTagName("infoparam").item (0);
233 String name = infoparamElement.getAttribute("value");
234 return name;
235 }
236
237 }
238 }
239 return null;
240 }
241
242 private String getTagValue(String attrName , String sTag , Element
eElement) {
243 Element subNode = (Element) (eElement.getElementsByTagName(sTag).item
(0));
244
245 return subNode.getAttribute(attrName);
246 }
247 }
Listing C.1: SysMLsec Knowledge Extraction
C.2 Building OWL Ontological Instance
1 package sysmlsec.ontology;
2
3 import java.io.File;
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4 import java.util.ArrayList;
5 import java.util.Collection;
6 import java.util.HashMap;
7 import java.util.Iterator;
8
9 import org.apache.log4j.lf5.PassingLogRecordFilter;
10 import org.openjena.atlas.iterator.Iter;
11
12 import edu.stanford.smi.protege.exception.OntologyLoadException;
13 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.ProtegeOWL;
14 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.jena.JenaOWLModel;
15 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.NamespaceManager;
16 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.OWLDatatypeProperty;
17 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.OWLIndividual;
18 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.OWLMaxCardinality;
19 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.OWLModel;
20 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.OWLNamedClass;
21 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.OWLObjectProperty;
22 import edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.model.RDFIndividual;
23
24 public class Ontology {
25
26 /**
27 * store the instances and its dataproperties.
28 */
29 private HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >>>
allInstancesHashMap;
30 /**
31 * store the object properties between the instances.
32 */
33 private HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String
>>>> allRelationShipMap;
34
35 public Ontology(HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String
>>> instances ,
36 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>>>
allRelationShipMap) {
37 this.allInstancesHashMap = instances;
38 this.allRelationShipMap = allRelationShipMap;
39 }
40
41 /**
42 * generate the classes and the data type corresponding to these classes
.
43 *
44 * @param prefix
45 * the prefix of the ontology
46 * @param ontologyName
47 * ontology uri
48 * @param filename
49 * the file to store
50 */
51 public void generateOntology(String prefix , String ontologyName , String
filename) {
52 try {
53
54 // create a new ontology
55 JenaOWLModel owlModel = ProtegeOWL.createJenaOWLModel ();
56 // set the namespace
57 NamespaceManager nsmanager = owlModel.getNamespaceManager ();
58 nsmanager.setDefaultNamespace(ontologyName);
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59 owlModel.getTripleStoreModel ().getTopTripleStore ().
setOriginalXMLBase(ontologyName);
60 owlModel.getTripleStoreModel ().getTopTripleStore ().setPrefix(
ontologyName , prefix);
61 // get a subtab element
62 Iterator <String > tabNameIterator = this.allInstancesHashMap.keySet ()
.iterator ();
63 while (tabNameIterator.hasNext ()) {
64 // get the name and create a superclass
65 String tabName = tabNameIterator.next();
66 OWLNamedClass tabClass = owlModel.createOWLNamedClass(tabName);
67 // get all of the subclasses of the subtab class
68 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >> allIntances = this.
allInstancesHashMap.get(tabName);
69 Iterator <String > classnameIterator = allIntances.keySet ().iterator
();
70 while (classnameIterator.hasNext ()) {
71 String className = classnameIterator.next();
72 // create one class and add set its supperclass to the
73 // subtab
74 OWLNamedClass ontoClass = owlModel.createOWLNamedClass (className
);
75 ontoClass.removeSuperclass(owlModel.getOWLThingClass ());
76 ontoClass.addSuperclass(tabClass);
77
78 // read all of the data properties it has.
79 Iterator <String > parasIterator = allIntances.get(className).
keySet ().iterator ();
80 while (parasIterator.hasNext ()) {
81 String paraString = parasIterator.next();
82 try {
83 OWLDatatypeProperty property = owlModel.
createOWLDatatypeProperty(paraString);
84 property.setDomain(ontoClass);
85
86 property.setRange(owlModel.getXSDstring ());
87 } catch (Exception e) {
88 // if we have already created the data property , we
89 // add union domain class.
90 OWLDatatypeProperty property = owlModel.
getOWLDatatypeProperty(paraString);
91 property.addUnionDomainClass(ontoClass);
92 }
93 }
94 }
95 }
96 // set the relationship between the classes.
97 Iterator <String > tabRelations = this.allRelationShipMap.keySet ().
iterator ();
98 while (tabRelations.hasNext ()) {
99 String tabName = tabRelations.next();
100 OWLNamedClass tabClass = owlModel.getOWLNamedClass(tabName);
101 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>>
relationshiphaHashMap = this.allRelationShipMap
102 .get(tabName);
103 Iterator <String > relations = relationshiphaHashMap.keySet ().
iterator ();
104 while (relations.hasNext ()) {
105 String class1String = relations.next();
106 OWLNamedClass class1 = owlModel.getOWLNamedClass(class1String);
107 HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >> relationshipHashMap2 =
relationshiphaHashMap.get(class1String);
184 Appendix C. SysMLsec-to-Ontology Translation Engine
108 Iterator <String > relationIterator = relationshipHashMap2.keySet
().iterator ();
109 while (relationIterator.hasNext ()) {
110 String relation = relationIterator.next();
111 ArrayList <String > classes = relationshipHashMap2.get(relation)
;
112 for (int i = 0; i < classes.size(); i++) {
113 String class2String = classes.get(i);
114 OWLNamedClass class2 = owlModel.getOWLNamedClass(
class2String);
115 if (relation.equals("superClassOf")) {
116
117 class2.removeSuperclass(tabClass);
118 class2.addSuperclass(class1);
119 } else if (relation.equals("contains")) {
120
121 OWLObjectProperty containsProperty;
122 try {
123 containsProperty = owlModel.createOWLObjectProperty("
contains");
124 containsProperty.setDomain(class1);
125 containsProperty.setRange(class2);
126 } catch (Exception e) {
127 // TODO: handle exception
128 containsProperty = owlModel.getOWLObjectProperty("
contains");
129 containsProperty.addUnionDomainClass(class1);
130
131 containsProperty.addUnionRangeClass(class2);
132 }
133 } else if (relation.equals("equivalent")) {
134 class1.addEquivalentClass(class2);
135 }
136 }
137
138 }
139 }
140 }
141
142 owlModel.save(new File(filename).toURI());
143 } catch (Exception e) {
144 // TODO Auto -generated catch block
145 e.printStackTrace ();
146 }
147 }
148
149 /**
150 * generate the instances
151 *
152 * @param ontologyname
153 * @param namespaceString
154 * @param filename
155 */
156 public void generateInstance(String ontologyname , String namespaceString
, String filename) {
157 try {
158 JenaOWLModel owlModel = ProtegeOWL.createJenaOWLModelFromURI(
ontologyname);
159 owlModel.getNamespaceManager ().setDefaultNamespace(namespaceString);
160 Iterator <String > tabNameIterator = this.allInstancesHashMap.keySet ()
.iterator ();
161 while (tabNameIterator.hasNext ()) {
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162 String tabName = tabNameIterator.next();
163 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , String >> instanceHashMap = this.
allInstancesHashMap.get(tabName);
164 Iterator <String > classnameIterator = instanceHashMap.keySet ().
iterator ();
165 while (classnameIterator.hasNext ()) {
166 String className = classnameIterator.next();
167
168 OWLNamedClass ontoClass = owlModel.getOWLNamedClass(className);
169 RDFIndividual instance = ontoClass.createRDFIndividual (className
+ "Instance");
170 // instance.setPropertyValue(ageProperty , new Integer (0));
171 Iterator <String > parasIterator = instanceHashMap.get(className).
keySet ().iterator ();
172 while (parasIterator.hasNext ()) {
173 String paraString = parasIterator.next();
174 String valueString = instanceHashMap.get(className).get(
paraString);
175 OWLDatatypeProperty property = owlModel.getOWLDatatypeProperty
(paraString);
176 instance.setPropertyValue(property , valueString);
177 }
178 }
179 }
180 owlModel.save(new File(filename).toURI());
181 } catch (Exception e) {
182 // TODO Auto -generated catch block
183 e.printStackTrace ();
184 }
185 }
186
187 /**
188 * generate the properties between the instances
189 * @param ontologyname
190 * @param namespaceString
191 * @param filename
192 */
193 public void generateObjectPropertyBetweenInstance(String ontologyname ,
String namespaceString , String filename) {
194 try {
195 JenaOWLModel owlModel = ProtegeOWL.createJenaOWLModelFromURI(
ontologyname);
196 owlModel.getNamespaceManager ().setDefaultNamespace(namespaceString);
197 Iterator <String > tabRelations = this.allRelationShipMap.keySet ().
iterator ();
198 while (tabRelations.hasNext ()) {
199 String tabName = tabRelations.next();
200 HashMap <String , HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >>>
relationshiphaHashMap = this.allRelationShipMap
201 .get(tabName);
202 Iterator <String > relations = relationshiphaHashMap.keySet ().
iterator ();
203 while (relations.hasNext ()) {
204 String class1String = relations.next();
205 RDFIndividual instanceOfClass1 = owlModel.getRDFIndividual(
class1String + "Instance");
206 // System.out.print(class1String +" contains ");
207 HashMap <String , ArrayList <String >> relationshipHashMap2 =
relationshiphaHashMap.get(class1String);
208 Iterator <String > relationIterator = relationshipHashMap2.keySet
().iterator ();
209 while (relationIterator.hasNext ()) {
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210 String relation = relationIterator.next();
211 ArrayList <String > classes = relationshipHashMap2.get(relation)
;
212 for (int i = 0; i < classes.size(); i++) {
213 String class2String = classes.get(i);
214 RDFIndividual instanceOfClass2 = owlModel.getRDFIndividual(
class2String + "Instance");
215 // we just contains the "contains" property
216 if (relation.equals("contains")) {
217 OWLObjectProperty containsProperty;
218 containsProperty = owlModel.getOWLObjectProperty("contains
");
219 instanceOfClass1.addPropertyValue(containsProperty ,
instanceOfClass2);
220 }
221 }
222
223 }
224 }
225 }
226 owlModel.save(new File(filename).toURI());
227 } catch (Exception e) {
228 // TODO: handle exception
229 }
230 }
231
232 }
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Appendix D
XACML to ANS.1 Defintion
1 Access -control -xacml -2-0-policy -schema DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS
2 ::= BEGIN
3
4 VersionType ::= UTF8String
5
6 Description ::= UTF8String
7
8 XPathVersion ::= UTF8String
9
10 DefaultsType ::= CHOICE {
11 xPathVersion [0] XPathVersion
12 }
13
14 PolicySetDefaults ::= DefaultsType
15
16 AttributeValueType ::= SEQUENCE {
17 dataType [0] UTF8String ,
18 attr [1] SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
19 }
20
21 AttributeValue ::= AttributeValueType
22
23 SubjectAttributeDesignatorType ::= SEQUENCE {
24 attributeId [0] UTF8String ,
25 dataType [1] UTF8String ,
26 issuer [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
27 mustBePresent [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE ,
28 subjectCategory [4] UTF8String
29 }
30
31 SubjectAttributeDesignator ::= SubjectAttributeDesignatorType
32
33 AttributeSelectorType ::= SEQUENCE {
34 dataType [0] UTF8String ,
35 mustBePresent [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE ,
36 requestContextPath [2] UTF8String
37 }
38
39 AttributeSelector ::= AttributeSelectorType
40
41 SubjectMatchType ::= SEQUENCE {
42 matchId [0] UTF8String ,
43 attributeValue [1] AttributeValue ,
44 choice [2] CHOICE {
45 subjectAttributeDesignator [0] SubjectAttributeDesignator ,
46 attributeSelector [1] AttributeSelector
47 }
48 }
49
50 SubjectMatch ::= SubjectMatchType
51
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52 SubjectType ::= SEQUENCE {
53 subjectMatch -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF subjectMatch
SubjectMatch
54 }
55
56 Subject ::= SubjectType
57
58 SubjectsType ::= SEQUENCE {
59 subject -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF subject Subject
60 }
61
62 Subjects ::= SubjectsType
63
64 AttributeDesignatorType ::= SEQUENCE {
65 attributeId [0] UTF8String ,
66 dataType [1] UTF8String ,
67 issuer [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
68 mustBePresent [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE
69 }
70
71 AttributeDesignatorType -derivations ::= CHOICE {
72 attributeDesignatorType [0] AttributeDesignatorType ,
73 subjectAttributeDesignatorType [1] SubjectAttributeDesignatorType
74 }
75
76 ResourceAttributeDesignator ::= AttributeDesignatorType -derivations
77
78 ResourceMatchType ::= SEQUENCE {
79 matchId [0] UTF8String ,
80 attributeValue [1] AttributeValue ,
81 choice [2] CHOICE {
82 resourceAttributeDesignator [0] ResourceAttributeDesignator ,
83 attributeSelector [1] AttributeSelector
84 }
85 }
86
87 ResourceMatch ::= ResourceMatchType
88
89 ResourceType ::= SEQUENCE {
90 resourceMatch -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF resourceMatch
91 ResourceMatch
92 }
93
94 Resource ::= ResourceType
95
96 ResourcesType ::= SEQUENCE {
97 resource -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF resource Resource
98 }
99
100 Resources ::= ResourcesType
101
102 ActionAttributeDesignator ::= AttributeDesignatorType -derivations
103
104 ActionMatchType ::= SEQUENCE {
105 matchId [0] UTF8String ,
106 attributeValue [1] AttributeValue ,
107 choice [2] CHOICE {
108 actionAttributeDesignator [0] ActionAttributeDesignator ,
109 attributeSelector [1] AttributeSelector
110 }
111 }
112
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113 ActionMatch ::= ActionMatchType
114
115 ActionType ::= SEQUENCE {
116 actionMatch -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF actionMatch
ActionMatch
117 }
118
119 Action ::= ActionType
120
121 ActionsType ::= SEQUENCE {
122 action -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF action Action
123 }
124
125 Actions ::= ActionsType
126
127 EnvironmentAttributeDesignator ::= AttributeDesignatorType -derivations
128
129 EnvironmentMatchType ::= SEQUENCE {
130 matchId [0] UTF8String ,
131 attributeValue [1] AttributeValue ,
132 choice [2] CHOICE {
133 environmentAttributeDesignator [0] EnvironmentAttributeDesignator ,
134 attributeSelector [1] AttributeSelector
135 }
136 }
137
138 EnvironmentMatch ::= EnvironmentMatchType
139
140 EnvironmentType ::= SEQUENCE {
141 environmentMatch -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF environmentMatch
142 EnvironmentMatch
143 }
144
145 Environment ::= EnvironmentType
146
147 EnvironmentsType ::= SEQUENCE {
148 environment -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF environment
Environment
149 }
150
151 Environments ::= EnvironmentsType
152
153 TargetType ::= SEQUENCE {
154 subjects [0] Subjects OPTIONAL ,
155 resources [1] Resources OPTIONAL ,
156 actions [2] Actions OPTIONAL ,
157 environments [3] Environments OPTIONAL
158 }
159
160 Target ::= TargetType
161
162 PolicyDefaults ::= DefaultsType
163
164 CombinerParameterType ::= SEQUENCE {
165 parameterName [0] UTF8String ,
166 attributeValue [1] AttributeValue
167 }
168
169 CombinerParameter ::= CombinerParameterType
170
171 CombinerParametersType ::= SEQUENCE {
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172 combinerParameter -list [0] SEQUENCE OF combinerParameter
CombinerParameter
173 }
174
175 RuleCombinerParametersType ::= SEQUENCE {
176 ruleIdRef [0] UTF8String ,
177 combinerParameter -list [1] SEQUENCE OF combinerParameter
CombinerParameter
178 }
179
180 PolicyCombinerParametersType ::= SEQUENCE {
181 policyIdRef [0] UTF8String ,
182 combinerParameter -list [1] SEQUENCE OF combinerParameter
CombinerParameter
183 }
184
185 PolicySetCombinerParametersType ::= SEQUENCE {
186 policySetIdRef [0] UTF8String ,
187 combinerParameter -list [1] SEQUENCE OF combinerParameter
CombinerParameter
188 }
189
190 CombinerParametersType -derivations ::= CHOICE {
191 combinerParametersType [0] CombinerParametersType ,
192 ruleCombinerParametersType [1] RuleCombinerParametersType ,
193 policyCombinerParametersType [2] PolicyCombinerParametersType ,
194 policySetCombinerParametersType [3] PolicySetCombinerParametersType
195 }
196
197 CombinerParameters ::= CombinerParametersType -derivations
198
199 RuleCombinerParameters ::= RuleCombinerParametersType
200
201 VariableReferenceType ::= SEQUENCE {
202 variableId [0] UTF8String
203 }
204
205 VariableReference ::= VariableReferenceType
206
207 FunctionType ::= SEQUENCE {
208 functionId [0] UTF8String
209 }
210
211 Function ::= FunctionType
212
213 ApplyType ::= SEQUENCE {
214 functionId [0] UTF8String ,
215 expression -list [1] SEQUENCE OF expression Expression -group
216 }
217
218 Apply ::= ApplyType
219
220 Expression -group ::= CHOICE {
221 variableReference [0] VariableReference ,
222 attributeSelector [1] AttributeSelector ,
223 resourceAttributeDesignator [2] ResourceAttributeDesignator ,
224 actionAttributeDesignator [3] ActionAttributeDesignator ,
225 environmentAttributeDesignator [4] EnvironmentAttributeDesignator ,
226 subjectAttributeDesignator [5] SubjectAttributeDesignator ,
227 attributeValue [6] AttributeValue ,
228 function [7] Function ,
229 apply [8] Apply
191
230 }
231
232 VariableDefinitionType ::= SEQUENCE {
233 variableId [0] UTF8String ,
234 expression [1] Expression -group
235 }
236
237 VariableDefinition ::= VariableDefinitionType
238
239 EffectType ::= ENUMERATED { deny (0), permit (1) }
240 ConditionType ::= SEQUENCE {
241 expression [0] Expression -group
242 }
243
244 Condition ::= ConditionType
245
246 RuleType ::= SEQUENCE {
247 effect [0] EffectType ,
248 ruleId [1] UTF8String ,
249 description [2] Description OPTIONAL ,
250 target [3] Target OPTIONAL ,
251 condition [4] Condition OPTIONAL
252 }
253
254 Rule ::= RuleType
255
256 AttributeAssignmentType ::= SEQUENCE {
257 attributeId [0] UTF8String ,
258 dataType [1] UTF8String ,
259 attr [2] SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
260 }
261
262 AttributeAssignment ::= AttributeAssignmentType
263 ObligationType ::= SEQUENCE {
264 fulfillOn [0] EffectType ,
265 obligationId [1] UTF8String ,
266 attributeAssignment -list [2] SEQUENCE OF attributeAssignment
267 AttributeAssignment
268 }
269
270 Obligation ::= ObligationType
271 ObligationsType ::= SEQUENCE {
272 obligation -list [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1.. MAX)) OF obligation Obligation
273 }
274
275 Obligations ::= ObligationsType
276
277 PolicyType ::= SEQUENCE {
278 policyId [0] UTF8String ,
279 ruleCombiningAlgId [1] UTF8String ,
280 version [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
281 description [3] Description OPTIONAL ,
282 policyDefaults [4] PolicyDefaults OPTIONAL ,
283 combinerParameters [5] CombinerParameters OPTIONAL ,
284 target [6] Target ,
285 choice -list [7] SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
286 combinerParameters [0] CombinerParameters OPTIONAL ,
287 ruleCombinerParameters [1] RuleCombinerParameters OPTIONAL ,
288 variableDefinition [2] VariableDefinition ,
289 rule [3] Rule
290 } OPTIONAL ,
291 obligations [8] Obligations OPTIONAL
192 Appendix D. XACML to ANS.1 Defintion
292 }
293
294 Policy ::= PolicyType
295
296 VersionMatchType ::= UTF8String
297
298 IdReferenceType ::= SEQUENCE {
299 earliestVersion [0] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
300 latestVersion [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
301 version [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
302 base [3] UTF8String
303 }
304
305 PolicySetIdReference ::= IdReferenceType
306
307 PolicyIdReference ::= IdReferenceType
308
309 PolicyCombinerParameters ::= PolicyCombinerParametersType
310
311 PolicySetCombinerParameters ::= PolicySetCombinerParametersType
312
313 PolicySetType ::= SEQUENCE {
314 policyCombiningAlgId [0] UTF8String ,
315 policySetId [1] UTF8String ,
316 version [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL ,
317 description [3] Description OPTIONAL ,
318 policySetDefaults [4] PolicySetDefaults OPTIONAL ,
319 target [5] Target ,
320 choice -list [6] SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
321 policySet [0] PolicySet ,
322 policy [1] Policy ,
323 policySetIdReference [2] PolicySetIdReference ,
324 policyIdReference [3] PolicyIdReference ,
325 combinerParameters [4] CombinerParameters ,
326 policyCombinerParameters [5] PolicyCombinerParameters ,
327 policySetCombinerParameters [6] PolicySetCombinerParameters
328 },
329 obligations [7] Obligations OPTIONAL
330 }
331
332 PolicySet ::= PolicySetType
333
334 ExpressionType ::= SEQUENCE {
335
336 }
337
338 Expression ::= ExpressionType
339
340 ExpressionType -derivations ::= CHOICE {
341 attributeDesignatorType [0] AttributeDesignatorType ,
342 subjectAttributeDesignatorType [1] SubjectAttributeDesignatorType ,
343 attributeSelectorType [2] AttributeSelectorType ,
344 variableReferenceType [3] VariableReferenceType ,
345 functionType [4] FunctionType ,
346 applyType [5] ApplyType
347 }
348
349 END
Listing D.1: Policy decision module Native Language (PNL) based on ASN.1
Defintion
Appendix E
Résumé en Français
E.1 Contexte
La conception des systèmes sécurisés a été toujours une tâche complexe. En pratique, beau-
coup d’effort a été fourni par les concepteurs et les développeurs afin de définir et délivrer un
système de travail. Concernant la sécurité de ces systèmes, l’approche considérée était tou-
jours rétroactive qui s’applique qu’après la détection d’un ensemble de lacunes. Les experts
en sécurité sont donc généralement confrontés à un système existant, dont l’architecture
pourrait entraver le déploiement de mécanismes de sécurité, ce qui empêcherait l’apparition
des attaques qu’ils envisagent. Une approche qui permet d’éviter ce type de problèmes est le
développement d’une architecture de sécurité qui définie des exigences axées sur la sécurité
et qui décrit une collaboration structurée et une interdépendance entre la conception de
l’architecture et les exigences de la sécurité (SR) pour répondre aux besoins à long terme
des systèmes [138]. Le but d’une architecture de sécurité est traditionnellement de mettre
en évidence les principaux domaines de préoccupation en soulignant les critères de décision
et le contexte de sécurité pour chaque aspect du système qui peut avoir une valeur directe
ou indirecte pour un acteur. Le concept d’une architecture de sécurité englobe diverses no-
tions techniques dans lesquelles la sécurité est introduite à différents niveaux d’abstraction
et fondée sur des mécanismes différents. Thorn et al. [145] décrivent une architecture de
sécurité comme «une conception cohérente de la sécurité, qui répond aux exigences de sécu-
rité (par exemple, l’authentification, l’autorisation, etc.) et en particulier aux risques d’un
environnement ou scénario spécifique, et spécifie les contrôles de sécurité qui doivent être
appliqués et où est ce qu’ils peuvent être appliqués". À cette fin, l’un des aspects clés d’une
architecture de sécurité comme étant un outil d’une conception sécurisée c’est de fournir
un framework des exigences de sécurité (SRE: Security Requirement Engineering) à travers
lequel des exigences réalistes et concrètes peuvent être identifiées et mises en œuvre.
Du point de vue de système embarqué, cette activité, SRE, devient encore plus cri-
tique et présente des défis. Ces défis découlent de la relation étroite entre la conception
de l’architecture et de ses exigences fonctionnelles et non fonctionnelles ainsi que de leur
impact sur l’autre. Par exemple, si la conception de l’architecture du système évolue, les
exigences de sécurité devraient atteindre les nouveaux objectifs de la nouvelle conception
de l’architecture. C’est particulièrement vrai lorsque ces systèmes font partie intégrante
des systèmes critiques de sécurité tels que les systèmes automobiles [129, 9]. Ceci est lié à
Koscher et al. [80] citation, "les systèmes automobiles doivent non seulement être extrême-
ment fiable et sans défaut, mais aussi extrêmement résistant aux menaces et l’exploitation
des vulnérabilités". Plus précisément, les applications de sécurité doivent être assurés con-
tre les attaques malveillantes. Plusieurs activités de recherche ont décrit les vulnérabilités
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potentielles et contre-mesures dans les systèmes automobiles, par exemple, [51, 14], que
nous allons en faire référence dans la suite de cette thèse. À quelques exceptions près, la
plupart de ces efforts considèrent les SR d’une façon abstraite, seule l’étape d’identification
des exigences est considérée, et ne visent pas particulièrement le raffinement des exigences,
et les propriétés de traçabilité des exigences. Cependant, il y a des approches bien reconnues
comme KAOS [152] ou UMLsec [69] qui ont déjà montré des résultats intéressants dans le
domaine de SRE pour gérer les problèmes de sécurité. Pourtant, avant de considérer ces
approches, nous devons d’abord faire une distinction claire entre ce que nous entendons
par système embarqué et quelles sont leurs fonctions, ainsi que les problèmes de sécurité
non-fonctionnels.
En général, les systèmes embarqués sont définis comme une combinaison de matériel
et de logiciels qui forment une partie d’un système plus vaste et sont généralement conçus
pour accomplir une tâche spécifique. Plus précisément, ce qui rend les systèmes embarqués
distribués différent des systèmes à usage général sont des caractéristiques spécifiques : ces
systèmes ont des ressources limitées concernant leurs capacités (et par conséquent dans leurs
défenses). Ils ont des problèmes de fiabilité et de performance, ainsi que les contraintes de
calcul en temps réel. Ces systèmes sont souvent portables ou mobiles, et ils sont facilement
accessibles aux adversaires au niveau de la couche physique. Cette accessibilité a donné lieu
à plusieurs nouvelles attaques de sécurité au cours de ces dernières années [80, 163, 164].
Par exemple, Koscher et al. [80] démontrent la capacité de contrôler un large nombres de
fonctions automobiles tout en ignorant les données du conducteur. Ces attaques ont été
faites par le simple accès aux diagnostics internes sur portuaires (OBD- II) et l’incorporation
d’un code malveillant dans l’unité télématique d’une voiture. Cela permet à un adversaire
de contrôler pratiquement différentes fonctionnalités de bord - y compris la désactivation
des freins, un freinage sélectif des roues individuelles sur demande, l’arrêt du moteur, et
ainsi de suite. En outre, l’aspect le plus important du système embarqué tel que c’est défini
par Noergaard [100]:
". . . aucun des éléments à l’intérieur d’un système embarqué fonctionne en vase clos.
Chaque élément au sein d’un dispositif interagit avec un autre élément d’une certaine façon.
En outre, plusieurs caractéristiques qui sont visibles de l’extérieur des éléments peuvent
changer étant donné un ensemble d’autres éléments qui sont censés fonctionner avec. Sans
comprendre les «pourquoi» fournies derrière la fonctionnalité d’un élément, sa performance,
etc, il serait difficile de déterminer comment le système se comporte dans une variété de
circonstances dans le monde réel".
Du point de vue sécurité, cette définition implique que, pour un système intégré, pour
être sécurisé, chaque élément ainsi que ses relations avec les autres éléments à différents
niveaux d’abstraction (par exemple , application, au niveau du protocole, au niveau du
middleware, le niveau infrastructure, niveau de stockage, et ainsi de suite) doivent être
sécurisés . Par exemple, l’unité de contrôle électrique (ECU), peut compter sur un module
de sécurité matériel pour le traitement des opérations cryptographiques, mais si les couches
supérieures (par exemple, la couche de middleware) gèrent ces attributs d’authentification
différemment et permettent à l’adversaire de fausser ces attributs (c’est à dire , les tickets
d’authentification) , la sécurité globale est violée. En particulier, nous pouvons identifier
les failles de sécurité et les problèmes en examinant les interactions et les collaborations
entre les couches subtiles. De même, plusieurs approches [79, 55, 164, 161] ont montré que
nous ne pouvons pas résoudre le problème de sécurité d’un système intégré à un seul niveau
d’abstraction. Par conséquent, il est naturel de développer une spécification des exigences
de sécurité en mettant l’accent sur les caractéristiques distinctes des systèmes embarqués
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et en particulier en tenant compte d’une structuration en couches pour la représentation
d’une architecture de système embarqué, qui peut nous aider à développer une architecture
de sécurité modulaire. Dans ce contexte, l’état actuel des approches de SRE, comme KAOS
et UMLsec, sont loin de Capturer le fonctionnement de base des architectures de systèmes
embarqués. Par exemple, le cadre KAOS se concentre principalement sur la satisfaction
des objectifs et sur la synthèse de modèles de comportement [151] et ne considère pas
l’architecture système du système. Par exemple, il est difficile de capturer et de modéliser
dans KAOS une architecture et encore moins plusieurs couches architecturales. En revanche,
UMLsec, qui est une approche d’ingénierie dirigée par les modèles, considère à la fois les
aspects structurels et comportementaux de SR. Cette approche considère que les exigences
bien formées ont déjà été obtenues et raffinées jusqu’au niveau de la conception à travers la
définition des comportements normaux des composants du système. UMLsec se concentre
plus particulièrement sur l’amélioration de ces conditions de sécurité dans les mécanismes
de sécurité.
E.2 Contributions de la thèse
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une approche pour la gestion des exigences de sécurité
(SRE) qui permet la conception d’une architecture de sécurité pour les systèmes embarqués.
Nous mettons l’accent sur l’acquisition de connaissances liées à la sécurité et à la gestion
à travers la définition d’un processus de SRE qui permet de concevoir un système qui est
intrinsèquement sécurisé dès sa conception. Notre approche se compose de trois parties
successive:
1. Approche basée sur les connaissances pour l’ingénierie des exigences de
la sécurité: Dans la première phase de cette thèse, nous présentons les principaux
éléments constitutifs de notre méthodologie SRE proposée et nous discutons de son
intégration avec un système d’ingénierie à travers un langage de modélisation.
• Nous avons analysé systématiquement diverses sources telles que les normes
de sécurité, un ensemble de méthodologies représentant l’état actuel des ap-
proches existantes, afin de construire une méthodologie unifiée de SRE. La
méthodologie proposée montre comment les capacités des modèles et des ap-
proches des différents SRE peuvent être intégrés à un processus de SRE axé sur
la connaissance. En outre, nous considérons les concepts clés définis dans ces
approches et nous construisons des ontologies de sécurité pour chaque concept
afin de guider notre processus de SRE avec une base de connaissances. Ainsi,
il sera possible d’analyser différents concepts de sécurité et de permettre une
structuration particulière, une réutilisation et une base de connaissances sur
les concepts de sécurité qui peut être partagée dans le processus de SRE. Bien
que notre méthodologie proposée soit dédiée aux systèmes embarqués, il est en-
core assez souple pour l’adapter à tout type d’architecture de système d’usage
général comme dans le cadre des architectures orientées services (SOA) [115],
et aussi capables de produire des exigences de sécurité précises. Les résultats
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sont présentés dans [60].
• Nous avons d’abord exploré les capacités de SysML, le système Modeling Lan-
guage [107] pour supporter notre méthodologie de SRE basée sur la connais-
sance. SysML est un standard OMG [106]pour le système de modélisation des
applications d’ingénierie et a une expressivité suffisante pour décrire une concep-
tion détaillée du système. Cependant, une faiblesse majeure pour l’utilisation
de SysML est le manque des aspects orientés sécurité. Pour tirer profit des
capacités de SysML, nous avons proposé plusieurs extensions à la sémantique
SysML pour pouvoir intégrer nos concepts de sécurité. En particulier, nous
avons intégré l’exigence de sécurité et les schémas d’attaque de sécurité. De
plus, nous avons enrichi ces diagrammes avec nos concepts ontologiques pro-
posés, comme un vocabulaire contrôlé. L’utilisation des ontologies dans les lan-
gages de modélisation offre une occasion concrète de raisonner sur l’exactitude
de ces modèles. En outre, nous avons implémenté ces fonctionnalités dans le
moteur TTool [82] qui supporte également notre modèle SysML étendu pour
définir les exigences de sécurité et de la modélisation de l’arbre d’attaque . Cet
outil prend en charge facilement la méthodologie itérative que nous préconisons.
2. Conception des exigences de sécurité: Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse,
nous présentons chaque activité du processus des exigences de sécurité (SREP) en
détails et nous expliquons comment une base de connaissances liées à la sécurité est
générée et partagée entre toutes les activités.
• Afin d’illustrer les différentes parties de cette thèse, nous introduisons un exem-
ple pratique - sur la mise à jour de fireware - utilisé tout au long de la thèse pour
expliquer nos propositions. L’exemple est originaire de la conception sécurisée
d’un système embarqué de véhicule développé dans le projet européen EVITA
[117]. L’étude de cas a été développée pour illustrer le processus de mise à jour
du firmware sécurisé.
• Nous abordons le problème de l’identification des attaques de sécurité et les
vulnérabilités dans le cadre d’une architecture de système multicouche, où
l’information liée à la sécurité est générée, traitée et stockée à différents niveaux.
L’idée est d’extraire les connaissances sur les différentes activités du système et
qui correspondent à diverses activités de développement du système, et d’utiliser
ces connaissances à des fins d’analyse de la sécurité. En particulier, nous util-
isons les bases de connaissances en s’appuyant sur différentes ontologies tels
que l’ontologie de l’architecture du système, l’ontologie des objectifs, etc pour
analyser la sécurité du système et pour spécifier comment un adversaire peut
attaquer le système. En outre, le concept d’un arbre d’attaque basée sur la
connaissance est introduit dans la représentation graphique fondamentale pour
la modélisation d’attaque.
• Nous avons illustré l’approche dans le cadre de l’identification et de raffine-
ment des exigences de sécurité, et nous avons présenté un moyen de retracer
les exigences de sécurité. Nous décrivons d’abord le processus d’identification
des exigences de sécurité qui utilise les différentes bases de connaissances pro-
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duites durant les différentes phases de la SREP. Il nous permet de découvrir les
exigences de sécurité du stade de développement du système tout au début et
par rapport aux différentes bases de connaissances disponibles. Ensuite, nous
proposons le concept de modèle de raffinement pour remédier à certaines insuff-
isances et limites des approches existantes pour le raffinement des SR. Enfin,
nous proposons une approche pour tracer les exigences afin de déterminer leurs
sources et les raisons pour leurs existences. Nous utilisons en particulier nos
diagrammes d’exigences de sécurité SysML étendu pour modéliser et partager
des connaissances connexes sur les SR.
3. Mise en oeuvre des exigences de sécurité: Dans la troisième et dernière partie
de cette thèse, nous traitons la mise en œuvre des SR et nous proposons des solutions
pour la conception et le déploiement de protocoles cryptographiques et pour la mise
en œuvre des exigences de sécurité liées au contrôle d’accès.
• Nous avons proposé une approche basée sur l’utilisation des clés cryptographiques
protégés avec du matériel peu coûteux pour construire le firmware montrant
la spécification du protocole cryptographique. Nous montrons comment une
racine de confiance dans le matériel peut être raisonnablement combinée avec
des modules logiciels. Ces modules et primitives ont été appliquées pour mon-
trer comment les mises à jour du firmware peut être faite en toute sécurité, tout
en respectant les normes et les infrastructures existantes. Malgré le fait que le
modèle de plateforme de confiance implique certaines contraintes, telles que
l’obligation d’intégrer des clés cryptographiques à une configuration de démar-
rage donnée, nous montrons comment les protocoles que nous avons présenté
gèrent la mise à jour des registres de référence de la plateforme pendant la phase
de démarrage d’une unité de contrôle électronique - ECU.
• La dernière contribution de cette thèse est consacrée à la mise en oeuvre des
exigences de sécurité concernant le contrôle d’accès. Nous avons proposé et
développé un module de décision de la politique qui est utilisé pour appliquer les
différentes règles de contrôle d’accès en déployant plusieurs points d’application
pour les différents niveaux d’abstraction du système. Nous discutons la façon de
mettre en œuvre les politiques qui implémentent une application effective dans
de telles architectures, malgré la complexité des piles de protocoles au bord des
unités de contrôle électronique. On évalue également comment les politiques
exprimées dans XACML peuvent être adaptées aux exigences d’efficacité dans
des environnements automobiles malgré la puissance de calcul limitée de leurs
unités et leurs limites de bande passante au niveau réseau.
